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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the early hours of 1 January 1863, USS Westfield grounded hard in the sand 
off the northeast side of Pelican Spit in Galveston Bay, Texas. The gunboat was building 
up steam to cut off two Confederate cottonclads before they reached the other Union 
ships in the bay. Hours later, an explosion ripped through the hull, sinking the vessel in 
the shallow water. Scuttled by the captain, William B. Renshaw, Westfield lay in the 
sands of Galveston Bay until the remains were excavated in 2009 and 2010 by PBS&J, 
now Atkins Global, under the supervision of the Texas Historical Commission and the 
U.S. Navy. The artifacts were brought to the Conservation Research Laboratory on 
Texas A&M University’s Riverside Campus where they were sorted, documented, and 
conserved.  
 This thesis begins with a detailed account of Westfield’s history, starting with the 
vessel’s use as a New York ferryboat, the conversion to a gunboat and commission in 
the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, and, finally, the explosion and sinking during the 
Second Battle of Galveston and subsequent Confederate salvage attempts. Following this 
is a summary of the conservation methods used for Westfield artifacts, including an 
experiment on the treatment of waterlogged cast iron from the ship. A catalog of the 
artifacts, providing research on the various types of materials in the collection and a 
short summary of the artifact types, is also presented.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: DOCUMENTATION AND PRIORITIZATION OF THE 
USS WESTFIELD ARTIFACT ASSEMBLAGE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
William Watson (1892:171), in his memoir The Civil War Adventures of a 
Blockade Runner, described the wreckage of the Civil War Union gunboat USS 
Westfield: “[The wreck site was] a formidable looking pile of iron boilers and machinery 
sticking out of the water which marked the spot where the ill-fated vessel came to her 
tragical end with some of her officers and crew a short time previously.” The quiet night 
in 1865 when Watson sailed past the wreckage of Westfield and into safe harbor in 
Galveston Bay, reflected little of the noise and chaos that surrounded Westfield when the 
gunboat sank two years previously, in the Second Battle of Galveston on New Year’s 
Day, 1863. Westfield ran aground off Pelican Island in the early morning at the start of 
the battle, when the crew was attempting to defend the Union-held Galveston Bay from 
an attack by two Confederate ‘cottonclads’ (Hayes 1974:555-559). For the rest of the 
battle, the crew aboard Westfield was unable to extricate the ship from the sand (Cotham 
1998:125-126). The captain, William Bainbridge Renshaw, made the decision to scuttle 
Westfield by detonating the magazine to keep the gunboat from falling into Confederate 
hands. An accident caused the ship to explode prematurely, resulting in the death of 
Captain Renshaw, five of the officers, and members of the crew (Burt 1863:455-457). 
Commodore David G. Farragut, commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron 
(WGBS) which Westfield was a part, later blamed the embarrassing defeat at the Battle 
of Galveston on Captain Renshaw’s decision to scuttle Westfield (Farragut 1863c:446-
447).  
The sinking of USS Westfield at the Second Battle of Galveston effectively 
ended the Union’s efforts to dominate Texas’ coastal waters until the end of the war. The 
broken remnants of Westfield left in the sediment of Galveston Bay were subject to 
Confederate salvage, dredging efforts at the turn of the 19th century, and almost 150 
years of erosion, until the remains of the ship were recovered by the U.S. Army Corps of 
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Engineers and PBS&J Corporation (now Atkins Global) in 2009. Following initial 
cataloging, more than 8,000 artifacts were brought to the Conservation Research 
Laboratory (CRL) at Texas A&M University’s Riverside Campus in Bryan, Texas. The 
collection has been extensively documented and prioritized, and is currently undergoing 
conservation through January 2015. 
1.2 Excavation 
The remains of the former flagship of the WGBS stretched across a debris field 
164 ft. (50 m) in length and 82 ft. (25 m) in breadth just northeast of Pelican Island 
(Figure 1.1). As a part of the Texas City Channel Improvement Project, the area was 
identified as a target in 2005, when the wreck was identified and mapped, and diagnostic 
artifacts were recorded in 2006 by archaeologists from PBS&J. All but a few fragments 
of the wooden hull had completely disintegrated, and a thick, 1 ft. (0.3 m), layer of 
sediment covered most of the remaining artifacts. In 2006, the largest objects were 
identified and recorded; these include the bearing block, firebox and boiler flues from 
the vessel’s steam engine, and a Dahlgren cannon overlooked by Confederate salvers. 
These artifacts will be discussed further in a thesis by Andrew Thomson and dissertation 
by Justin Parkoff.  
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Figure 1.1. Location of the Westfield site 41GV151. After McComb (1986:9).  
 
 
The site was excavated in November and December of 2009. Traditional 
underwater excavation methods, using divers recording provenience from a grid system, 
were initially attempted on the Westfield project; however due to the heavy currents, 
poor visibility for divers, and ship traffic, other methods were employed. A large 
diameter electromagnet, which could pick up iron artifacts, and an environmental 
clamshell dredge, brought up the majority of remains. In addition to the participation of 
PBS&J, the excavation was a cooperative effort of commercial divers, archaeologists, 
commercial dredge operators, and U.S. Armed Services explosive experts under the 
guidance of then-Texas State Marine Archaeologist Steve Hoyt, and the Underwater 
Archeology Branch of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC). 
The recovery of the artifacts was coordinated by the Navy Supervisor of Salvage 
(SUPSALV) and their contractor, DonJon Marine Co., Inc. Following excavation, 
PBS&J archaeologists managed the collection through the process of screening, 
recording, and cataloging. Three barges were stationed near the site. The first, 120 ft. x 
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40 ft. (36.58 x 12.19 m), housed a 138-ton crane, a sorting area, and positioning and 
navigation equipment. The second, 100 ft. (30.48 m) in length, held the 16-ton crane and 
diving and communications equipment. The last, also 100 ft. (30.48 m) long, contained 
filter screens for sorting and storage equipment. After the large artifacts and potentially 
explosive material were excavated, the clamshell dredge removed sediment and artifacts 
from 15 x 15 ft. (4.57 x 4.57 m) squares, distributed on a virtual grid established over the 
wreck site using navigation software. Given the time and environmental constraints for 
the excavation, this recording method gave the most accurate provenience for the 
artifacts. Each load of the clamshell was placed in a watertight roll-off box, a large metal 
container containing a series of screens that would allow the artifacts to be sifted and 
sorted by size. Once sorted, the objects were sent to Freeport, Texas, where 25 
archaeologists cataloged, recorded, and photographed every item recovered. This work 
continued from January into March of 2010 (Borgens and Gearhart 2010:4-5). An 
excavation report, Investigation and Recovery of USS Westfield (Site 41GV151) 
Galveston Bay, was prepared by Amy Borgens, Bob Gearhart, Sara Laurence, and 
Douglas Jones in 2010. 
1.3 Collection Management 
The USS Westfield artifact collection arrived at Texas A&M University’s 
Conservation Research Laboratory (CRL) in the spring of 2010.  Prior to conservation, 
the artifacts were stored outdoors in large round bins, five-gallon buckets, or large metal 
storage containers. The buckets contained the small iron artifacts, in addition to 
cupreous, lead, and organic objects. These were stored in tap water or deionized water to 
begin the process of desalinization, discussed in Section 3. Tap water filled the large 
bins which held the larger iron artifacts. A sequestering agent of 2-5% sodium hydroxide 
was added to the highest priority artifacts before and after the outer corrosion layers of 
concretion were removed. The largest artifacts, including the boiler flues and firebox, 
were stored in freight shipping containers filled with tap water.  
Due to the state of preservation, the large number of artifacts, and the limited 
budget, not every artifact recovered from the USS Westfield site could be conserved. A 
 5 
 
prioritization system was developed to determine which artifacts should be kept for 
conservation or teaching, which would go into permanent wet storage, and which 
artifacts that would be deaccessioned and reburied. Artifacts were prioritized using a 
rating system, numbered one through five. Priority 1 artifacts were those that were 
diagnostic, a well-preserved representative example of important categories of artifacts 
such as metal fasteners or firebox grates, or unique artifacts. These also included all 
cupreous artifacts, and the majority of organics, ceramics, and glass. Artifacts were 
labeled Priority 2 if they were diagnostic but either less well-preserved or more 
numerous on the site. In addition, some were saved for teaching purposes and 
conservation training.  Priority 3 artifacts included those that were partially preserved 
common artifacts that still retained some diagnostic features. Fragments of non-
diagnostic artifacts were categorized as Priority 4. Priority 5 artifacts included 
concretion bleeds, or concretions of iron corrosion products that did not contain either 
artifacts or molds of the original iron that had corroded away. This category also 
included modern, or post-Civil War era, intrusive artifacts. Priority 1 artifacts were 
conserved, while Priority 2 and 3 were put into permanent wet storage or reburied in 
sealed plastic containers. Priority 4 and 5 artifacts had their identifying tags removed and 
were deaccessioned. 
The priority distribution is listed below in Table 1.1. The artifact count shows 
how many individual artifacts are in each priority, while the lot number count shows 
how many artifact numbers are in each. Individual lot numbers may contain more than 
one artifact.  
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Table 1.1. Artifact Totals by Priority.  
  Artifact Count Lot numbers 
Priority 1 artifacts  1,472 903 
Priority 2 artifacts  1,139 858 
Priority 3 artifacts  1,586 812 
Priority 4 artifacts  949 620 
Priority 5 artifacts   1328 580 
Priority CRL (training)  1676 188 
 Total 8133 3922 
 
 
Prioritization of the iron artifacts required conservators with extensive 
knowledge of the collection and of artifacts from underwater sites in general. Most of the 
small ferrous objects were prioritized from the x-ray alone, a process which required 
long hours of examination under the x-ray viewer. Categorizing larger artifacts was 
simpler; Priority 1 status was given to highly diagnostic or unique artifacts, well-
preserved examples of a particular type of object, or objects which have been selected 
for planned museum displays. The rest of the large artifacts were labeled Priority 2 or 3. 
In the winter of 2011-2012, the final prioritization decisions were made, and buckets 
containing the artifacts were sorted by priority. Each of the over 200 buckets were re-
opened, and the artifacts were checked against the database and photographs, before 
being sorted into a new bucket containing other artifacts of the same priority. At the 
same time, these buckets were condensed and filled to the brim, saving storage space at 
CRL and reducing the cost of permanent wet storage, or reburial. The number of buckets 
was reduced from 200 to fewer than 85.   
To determine an artifact’s priority, each artifact in the Westfield collection 
required documentation in the form of an artifact catalog and photograph. The catalog 
form recorded the basic measurements, a sketch, and a short description of each artifact. 
Initial photographs were extremely useful as a quick guide for identifying artifacts that 
were mislabeled or lost their identification tags. Most of the initial cataloging and 
photography took place directly after the excavation; however, prior to conservation, 
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reburial, or de-accessioning, the conservators at CRL confirmed that diagnostic 
information on each artifact was recorded.  
 In addition to the catalog and photographs, x-radiographs were taken of the small 
iron artifacts to aid in the process of identification and prioritization. The majority of the 
collection consists of iron concretions, or iron artifacts covered in disfiguring corrosion 
products, discussed further in section 3.2. In order to prioritize these objects, an x-ray 
was taken to identify the iron artifact underneath the corrosion. Every concretion small 
enough to fit on the x-ray film, and not identifiable based on appearance, was x-rayed for 
identification. This was not necessary for the larger or non-ferrous artifacts, due to the 
lack of thick corrosion products obscuring the artifact underneath. Organized by date 
taken, the x-ray numbers were listed in the database for easy access.  X-rays for Priority 
1 artifacts were digitally photographed and available on a computer for quick reference.  
Artifact cards detailed each artifact’s conservation and included a short 
description and measurements, treatment plan, and associations with other artifacts. 
During conservation, in-progress photos were taken to record the conservation process 
and to identify artifacts after the concretion was removed. Following conservation, every 
artifact was photographed with a scale and lot number. All data and photographs are 
stored on CRL computers and copied on backup external hard drives. 
With a collection of over 8,000 artifacts, organization was a high priority. 
Artifacts were cataloged in a Microsoft Excel database organized by lot number. The 
database included information on the location or status, count, and material of each 
artifact, as well as a short description, important notes, and priority category. The 
database proved a useful tool as the artifacts could easily be sorted by each of these 
categories. The location or status category aided in locating a specific artifact, directing 
the conservator to a specific location in the laboratory or showing that the conservation 
was either in progress or completed. The challenge of keeping the database updated 
required cooperation from all of the labs conservators and constant maintenance, 
especially when the artifacts were re-sorted by priority. However, this saved 
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considerable time when calculations became necessary to determine how many artifacts 
were still awaiting conservation or reburial. 
 Developing consistent descriptions of the artifact categories was necessary in 
order to group similar types of artifacts; however, this was a gradual process and 
occasionally became a source of confusion. Within Priority 1 artifacts, many were 
unique and represented their own category. These were difficult, if not impossible, to 
group together. In addition, within each type, the artifacts were in varying states of 
preservation. However, the description categories became especially important when 
determining if a representative sample or percentage of a specific artifact had been 
designated Priority 1, while the rest were placed into Priority 2 for reburial or 
conservation training.  
1.4 Conclusion  
Due to the size of the Westfield collection, the site formation processes and 
excavation, and the subsequent lack of provenience for the artifacts, documentation of 
the artifacts is critical for the interpretation of the wreck site. Documentation in the form 
of photographs, measurements, catalogs, x-radiographs, and a database enabled the 
conservators to prioritize the collection and determine which artifacts have enough 
informational and educational value to warrant complete conservation. The prioritization 
method was necessary in order to provide the maximum information for the lowest cost.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to present the conservation, documentation, 
and analysis of the highest priority small artifacts. Section 2 includes the history of 
Westfield, the Battle of Galveston, and the ship’s sinking. The third section details the 
general conservation procedures for Westfield artifacts and an experiment conducted to 
develop alternative methods for conserving cast iron. The artifact catalog, Section 4, 
includes detailed descriptions, measurements, type, and material of the artifacts.  
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
“Like the bee, which is held aerodynamically incapable of flight yet flies anyhow, the 
ferryboats did not understand that they could not go into the open ocean, and steamed 
obliviously forth.”  
A.A. Hoehling (1989:28)
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The twisted, jagged pile of metal excavated from the murky waters of Galveston 
Bay was once a highly efficient and useful gunboat, essential to the Union Navy for 
navigation along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Westfield played a number of roles in 
her short life; first as a ferryboat in New York, next as a gunboat in David Porter’s 
Mortar Flotilla, and finally as Captain William Renshaw’s flagship in the West Gulf 
Blockading Squadron’s (WGBS) expedition to the Texas coast. The importance of the 
historical events that surrounded Westfield is often overlooked in history books. The 
Union dominated the Gulf of Mexico for much of the Civil War, but suffered a major 
setback when Galveston and Westfield were lost.  
Much of Westfield’s story is found in archival records and other contemporary 
documentary sources. These historical records provide details of the events and people 
involved that the archaeological data cannot. The main source for information on the 
history of Westfield comes from letters of the WGBS in The Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Volumes 18 and 19. 
Newspaper articles from the New York Times and the Houston Telegraph provide 
contemporary accounts of the important events of Westfield’s career as both a ferryboat 
and navy ship. Personal accounts include Henry O. Gusley’s journal published as The 
Southern Journey of a Civil War Marine, and William Watson’s The Civil War 
Adventures of a Blockade Runner. Secondary sources such as Edward T. Cotham’s 
Battle on the Bay, Spencer C. Tucker’s Blue and Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat, 
Jack D. Coombe’s Gunfire Around the Gulf: The Last Major Naval Campaigns of the 
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Civil War, and A.T. Mahan’s Navy in the Civil War, Vol. 16: The Gulf and Inland 
Waters fill in the gaps and provide a retrospective analysis. 
2.2 Industrialization: Shipbuilding and the U.S. Navy 
The process of industrialization in the 19th century transformed urban 
shipbuilding industry in two respects. Shipbuilding became more standardized and 
specialized. This resulted in greater labor division, with less training for apprentices, 
who were taught only one specific part of the shipbuilding process rather than many 
different skills.  Other skills were learned on the apprentice’s own time, based on 
personal ambition. Industrialization also produced a revolution in the technology of 
shipbuilding. New developments in dry docks and marine railways made ship repairs, 
the most profitable function of the ship yard, easier and faster (Thiesen 2006:65,69).   
Experimentation in shipbuilding prior to the American Civil War led to 
numerous technological innovations. Developments in Britain and France included 
steam and screw propulsion, iron hulled vessels, and innovations in weaponry, such as 
the armored batteries and an increased use of rifled artillery and barrels and explosive 
shells. The United States started experimenting with iron hulled ships as early as the 
1840s and 1850s in order to remain competitive (Hackemer 2001:67-68). The Civil War 
and the advent of steam-powered warships also brought significant changes in naval 
logistics. Steamships required vast amounts of coal and elaborate facilities for repairs 
compared to wooden vessels.  
By 1860, the United States Navy was suffering from neglect by politicians and 
the American people, who were focused on the presidential election and the possibility 
of war.  The newly elected Abraham Lincoln wanted to maintain the Union while 
attempting to avoid the outbreak of war (Roberts 2002:9,11).  However, events leading 
to the Battle of Fort Sumter in April of 1861 changed his strategy.  On 19 and 27 of 
April, Lincoln issued proclamations calling for a blockade of the Southern states’ coasts, 
harbors, and inlets, counting on the lack of a developed transportation system in the 
South.  Known as the “Anaconda plan”, the Northern strategy involved a blockade of 
Southern ports, constricting trade on the Mississippi River, followed by an advance upon 
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the river. Many shallow draft steam vessels were needed to execute the blockade along 
the 180 navigable harbors and inlets and the 3,549 mi. (5,712 km) of coastline around 
the Southern states (Hackemer 2001:68-69; Roberts 2002:9-11).   
The U.S. Navy had 42 commissioned vessels in 1861, stationed between New 
York and Japan. There were another 29 decommissioned vessels in navy yards. Of the 
42, only 30 were steam warships, some with only one gun. On the eve of war, naval 
officials lacked experience in wartime management and were distracted by disloyalty 
within the officer corps. Established during peacetime, the official process for acquiring 
ships for the Navy was slow (Roberts 2002:9-10). The New York Times quoted an article 
from the London Times published on 24 January 1862: 
 
As the emergency was pressing, the Federal government at once resolved on 
purchasing a whole fleet of vessels from the mercantile marine. They spent on 
this service about a million and a half in money, and bought up apparently every 
floating thing at hand that would carry a gun or two. They did not even confine 
themselves to steamers, but snapped up old sailing brigs, barks, and schooners, 
ferry-boats, and so “reconstructed” their navy. That navy, therefore, which six 
months ago consisted of half a dozen serviceable frigates and twice as many 
serviceable sloops, now comprises, in addition, 35 steamers, 43 screw steamers, 
13 ships, 18 boats and 43 schooners all picked up in the various Federal ports 
since July last (New York Times 1862a).  
 
The Navy began building their resources by purchasing any vessel available that was 
capable of supporting weaponry. The blockade had to be initiated immediately, without 
time wasted on building ships. Because several months were needed to build new 
warships, a system of increased oversight and strict contract requirements was initiated. 
The Navy relied on private contractors for purpose-built warships and armored vessels, 
realizing early the government lacked the necessary resources (Hackemer 
2001:66,83,97).  Officials quickly gained the authority and funds to start construction. 
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Six months after Fort Sumter, a sense of urgency had fallen upon the U.S. Navy (Roberts 
2002:10).  
The lack of ships, however, was not a result of deficiencies in the naval 
shipyards. On the contrary, with private contractors and financial support from the 
federal government, U.S. Navy yards moved to the forefront of shipbuilding technology. 
The facilities contained large, well-ventilated buildings with mold lofts, specialized 
shops, and new iron timber sheds for drying. Naval yards used railway networks to move 
supplies, a technology that private companies could not afford. Starting in the early 19th 
century, the navy was the first to make use of ship houses, which allowed for year round 
construction. In 1851, a land based dry dock was completed in the New York City Navy 
Yard which cost two million dollars and took 10 years to complete. The naval yards did 
not lack manpower, as political appointments supplied so many men that the navy was 
slow in replacing them with the new, more efficient steam-powered machinery (Thiesen 
2006:73-74).  
2.3 USS Westfield 
Westfield was built by Jeremiah Simonson of Brooklyn, New York in the spring 
and summer of 1861. At 891 tons, the vessel was 214 ft. (65.2 m) in length, 34 ft. (10.4 
m) in breadth, and 12 ft. 11 in. (3.9 m) in depth. The vertical walking beam engine and 
the machinery were built by Morgan Iron Works of New York. The piston cylinder had a 
10 ft. (3 m) stroke and was 50 in. (1.3 m) in diameter.1 Westfield was originally 
commissioned by Cornelius Vanderbilt for the Staten Island and New York Ferry 
Company.  Starting on 10 July 1861, Westfield joined Southfield and ran the Staten 
Island route, between Whitehall Street, New York and Staten Island, including 
Tompkinsville, Stapleton, and Vanderbilt’s Landing, today known as Clifton, Staten 
Island (Figure 2.1).  Five months later, the U.S. Navy purchased the ferryboat for 
$90,000 (Heyl 1965:335). The vessel was heavily armed and clad in iron along the 
bulwarks for its conversion to a gunboat. The iron plates were thin compared to other 
Civil War ironclads, measuring 0.31 inches (0.79 cm) and only capable of stopping 
small shot (Justin Parkoff 2012, pers. comm.). Her main deck was fitted with 
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compartments, a galley, and water closets, along with accommodations for the officers 
and crew, and her upper deck was removed entirely (Copeland 1861a, 1861b).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Westfield’s route during service as a Staten Island ferryboat. After Hilton 
(1964). 
 
 
USS Westfield was commissioned in the U.S. Navy on 13 February 1862. 
Lieutenant Commander William B. Renshaw served as captain and would remain in that 
position until Westfield’s sinking, despite a failed attempt in July of 1862 to place Acting 
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Lieutenant Townsend as captain while Renshaw took command of USS Miami (New 
York Times 1862d; Renshaw 1862c:99). C.W. Zimmerman became the Acting Master 
and Executive Officer and other Acting Masters included Gustav Vassalo, F.L. Miller, 
and Leonard D. Smalley. The officers of Westfield are listed below in Table 2.1 (New 
York Times 1862d).  
 
 
Table 2.1. Officers of USS Westfield (New York Times 1862d). 
 
Position Officer 
Captain William Bainbridge Renshaw 
Acting Master and Executive Officer C.W. Zimmerman 
Acting Master Gustav Vassalo 
 F.L. Miller 
 Leonard D. Smalley 
Acting Assistant Surgeon E.H. Allis 
Acting Assistant Paymaster Charles C. Walker 
Second Assistant Engineer William K. Green 
Third Assistants Charles W. Smith 
 John Van Hogan 
 George S. Baker 
Master’s Mates John P. Arnett 
 William L. Babcock 
 David Harvey 
 
 
2.4 Union Strategy in the Gulf of Mexico 
At the start of the American Civil War, the Union’s strategy in the Gulf of 
Mexico was to blockade Southern ports, most importantly at Apalachicola and 
Tallahassee, Florida, Galveston, Texas, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama. 
Realizing the necessity of the Mississippi to the Confederacy, the Union sought to divide 
and conquer by working their way up from the gulf and down from the river’s upper 
waters (Mahan 1885:2-4,8). Control of the Mississippi River meant control over 
communication, transportation, and resources for the Confederacy. At the base of the 
3,710 mi. (5,971 km) long river was New Orleans, the first target of the Union’s new 
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strategy (Coombe 1999:6).  Credit for the logistics behind the attack on New Orleans 
was attributed to the Navy Department, according to Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the 
Navy during the Civil War. However, both David D. Porter, Commander of the WGBS’s 
Mortar Flotilla, and Gustavus V. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, claimed the 
idea, with the former much more outspoken in his claims. Regardless, in late 1861, 
Welles, Fox, Porter, and Abraham Lincoln convened at the house of General George G. 
McClellan to discuss plans for the attack on New Orleans. David Porter was placed in 
charge of the mortar flotilla, of which Westfield was a part (Dufour 1960:135-
136,138,149). Fox and Porter selected David G. Farragut, Porter’s half brother, to take 
command of the expedition and the WGBS. Porter claimed Farragut had, “undoubted 
courage and energy” (Stiles 1995:79). 
The WGBS was given jurisdiction over the waters of the Gulf of Mexico from 
Pensacola, Florida to the Rio Grande. David G. Farragut took command of the WGBS 
on 21 February 1862 and led the expedition to New Orleans (Soley 1883:123).  Under 
Farragut’s command, Porter commanded the mortar flotilla, which included the steamers 
listed below in Table 2.2.  
 
 
Table 2.2. Mortar steamers in David D. Porter’s mortar flotilla (Welles 1862:25 and 
Dufour 1960:155). 
 
Westfield Commander W.B. Renshaw Converted Staten Island ferryboat 
Clifton Acting Lieutenant C.H. Baldwin 
Converted Staten Island 
ferryboat 
John P. 
Jackson 
Acting Lieutenant S.E. 
Woodworth 
Converted Staten Island 
ferryboat 
Owasco Lieutenant John Guest New gunboat, 507 tons 
Miami Lieutenant A.D. Harrel New side-wheel steamer 
Harriet Lane Lieutenant J.M. Wainwright Porter’s flagship, 600 tons 
R.B. Forbes Acting Volunteer Lieutenant William Flye 
Wrecked during storm on 25 
February 1862 
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2.5 Westfield in the Mississippi 
2.5.1 Preparations for New Orleans 
As Captain David Farragut assumed command of the WGBS, on 22 February 
1862, USS Westfield left Staten Island in fair weather and headed southward (Cotham 
2006:43).  Westfield, John P. Jackson, Clifton, and Forbes sailed for rendezvous with 
Captain David D. Porter’s Mortar Flotilla and Farragut’s WGBS. The ships arrived at 
Port Royal, South Carolina three days later (shown in Figure 2.2; New York Times 
1862e, 1862f). Off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, the ships encountered strong gale 
winds which caused damage to Westfield; some planks from her bow were torn off. In a 
New York Times article reporting the event, naval officers stated that New York ferry 
boats, “are not the nest of sea boats”, blaming inadequate construction for Westfield’s 
lack of seaworthiness and subsequent damage from the storms (New York Times 1862g, 
1862h; Borgens et al. 2010:27).  
After repairs at Port Royal, on 8 March USS Westfield headed to Fort Taylor in 
Key West, Florida. Fort Taylor was the largest fort belonging to the Union in the 
Southern states, mounting over 200 guns. Henry Gusley described the enjoyable 
Southern weather as he and the rest of the crew waited for the arrival of Westfield’s 
sister ship, USS Clifton, which was separated during the storm. After Clifton rejoined 
Westfield, both vessels traveled to Apalachicola, Florida and remained there until leaving 
for Pass á l’Outre at the mouth of the Mississippi River on 17 March.   
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Figure 2.2. Map of the places visited by USS Westfield. After Symonds (2009:39). 
 
 
Immediately upon Westfield’s arrival, the sailors aboard were employed in 
assisting the larger ships of the WGBS over the sand bar, a shallow build-up of sediment 
which blocks the entrance into the Mississippi River, a common characteristic of Gulf 
Coast rivers (New York Times 1862i; Cotham 2006:43,45). The Mississippi Delta has 
four main entrances; Northeast Pass, South Pass, Southwest Pass, and Pass á l’Outre 
(Figure 2.3). On 18 March, 20 mortar schooners, and 6 gunboats began to enter the 
easternmost branch, Pass á l’Outre (Mahan 1885:53; Coombe 1999:46).  The mortar 
schooners are listed below in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. West Gulf Blockading Squadron’s mortar schooners and their tonnage 
(Dufour 1960:152). 
 
Name Tonnage Name Tonnage 
Norfolk Packet 349 Sarah Bruen 233 
Horace Beals 296 Sophronia 217 
T.A. Ward 284 Matthew Vassar 216 
Sea Foam 264 C.P. Williams 210 
Henry Janes 260 Arletta 200 
Racer 252 Para 200 
Sidney C. Jones 245 Oliver H. Lee 199 
John Griffeth 240 William Bacon 183 
Maria J. Carlton 178 Adolph Hugel 275 
Orvetta 171 George Mangham 275 
Dan Smith 150 Total 21 vessels 
 
 
 The crew of Westfield and the other mortar steamers spent two weeks towing the 
rest of the sailing ships over the sand bar and through the passes, shown below in Table 
2.4  (Cotham 2006:43,45). In addition to those listed, three deeper draft vessels were 
sent to the Mississippi, and only two, Pensacola and Mississippi, were able to cross the 
bar at Southwest pass with the aid of Westfield and the other gunboats. The two vessels 
scraped over the bar with difficulty, delaying the entire Union fleet for 12 days (Stiles 
1995:80).  During this period, David Porter offered great praise for Captain Renshaw 
and Westfield, citing Westfield and Clifton as most effective vessels (Porter 1862a:72).  
 
 
Table 2.4. The sailing ships of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron (Stiles 1995:80). 
 
Sailing Vessels Armament Commander 
Hartford 25 guns Commander Richard Wainwright 
Brooklyn 24 guns Captain T.T. Craven 
Richmond 26 guns Commander James Alden 
Mississippi 9 guns Commander Melancton Smith 
Pensacola 24 guns Captain H.W. Merrit 
Cayuga 6 guns Lt.-commanding N.B. Harrison 
 
 19 
 
Table 2.4 Continued.  
Oneida 9 guns Commander S.P. Lee 
Varuna 10 guns Commander Charles S. Boggs 
Katahden 4 guns Lt.-commanding George N. Ransom 
Wissahickon 4 guns Lt.-commanding A.N. Smith 
Winona 4 guns Lt.-commanding F.T. Nichols 
Itasca 4 guns Lt.-commanding Pierce Crosby  
Kennebec 4 guns Lt.-commanding John H. Russell 
Iroquois 9 guns Commander John De Camp 
Sciota 4 guns Lt.-commanding Edward Donaldson 
Total 177 guns  
 15 ships  
 
 
 
The vessels of the WGBS rendezvoused at Pilot Town, Louisiana (Figure 2.3) 
once all managed to make their way into the Mississippi River. Henry Gusley, a marine 
aboard Westfield, wrote that there were a total of 47 ships, with 440 guns of large caliber 
in the fleet. At Pilot Town, the ships prepared for battle. The topmasts of the sailing 
vessels were removed and branches were attached to disguise them as masts in the trees. 
Bows were cleared for guns and all unnecessary equipment, down to the chronometers, 
was removed and stored at Pilot Town. Chain cables from sheet anchors, secured along 
the sides of the ships, acted as armor for the engines. Mississippi mud, painted along the 
outer hull, disguised the hulls and blended in with the water (Mahan 1885:57,71; 
Cotham 2006:47). Decks and gun carriages were whitewashed so they stood out and 
were more visible to the crew at night (Coombe 1999:81).  The ships were trimmed to 
the head, moving the ballast forward so the bows sat lower in the water, so that any 
grounding would occur forward on the ship. If a ship grounded aft, the vessel might 
swing around in the river and capsize. Ships were to always try to keep their bows 
upstream (Mahan 1885:56-57).  
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Figure 2.3. Mississippi River Delta region. After Symonds (2009:60). 
 
 
Confederate defenses at New Orleans were concentrated at Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip. The forts were located 90 mi. (145 km) south of New Orleans and 20 mi. (32 km) 
north of the passes at Plaquemine Bend, with Fort Jackson on the southwest side and 
Fort St. Philip on the northeast. The area was cleared of trees, so that Union ships could 
not hide from the forts and the forts’ guns would have a clear field of fire. Named for 
General Andrew Jackson, Fort Jackson was built between 1823 and 1832 for a cost of 
$554,000. The brick fort was built in the shape of a pentagon with 20 ft. (6.1 m) thick 
walls rising 25 ft. (7.6 m) high on a foundation of cypress logs. Fort St. Philip was built 
in 1769 by the Spanish governor Baron de Carondelet. Built of brick and earth, Fort St. 
Philip was in the shape of a five pointed star. The walls were 17 ft. (5.2 m) high and 20 
ft. thick (6.1 m). Fort St. Philip also had two water batteries, adjacent to the main 
structure. Seized by the Confederacy on 8 January 1861, the forts had 109 guns 
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combined, 56 of which were heavy 24 pounders (Mahan 1885:58-59; Coombe 1999:84-
85). 
Additionally, the Confederates had 12 ships with 39 guns under the command of 
John K. Mitchell (Stiles 1995:81). CSS Louisiana, an armored vessel with 16 guns, had 
not yet been finished and was secured to the river bank during the battle. Other notable 
vessels include McRae, with seven guns, Jackson, with two, Manassas, with one 32-
pounder carronade, and two sea going steamers, Governor Moore and General Quitman, 
each with two guns (Mahan 1885:61-62). 
During preparations, reconnaissance missions were sent to observe Confederate 
forces. Commander Farragut sent USS Kennebec and USS Wissahickon to discover what 
obstacles had been placed in the river by the Confederates. Heavy chains had been 
stretched between both forts and secured with cypress logs. Ship hulks, eight in all, were 
moored in line across the river; their rigging dismantled and left floating in the water to 
entangle passing ships (Mahan 1885:65-65; Stiles 1995:80). Westfield was sent along 
with Harriet Lane, Clifton, and Owasco to observe the forts. The Union ships exchanged 
fire with two rebel steamers which were chased back up the river (Cotham 2006:47).  A 
shot from Westfield’s rifled gun ripped through the shaft of one of the rebel gunboats, 
CSS Defiance, and she was sunk (Renshaw 1862a:389).     
2.5.2 The Battle of New Orleans 
Capturing New Orleans was vital for Union control over the lower Mississippi 
River. The Union’s strategy began with a naval attack of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, 
shown in Figure 2.4, from the south, using mortar schooners. Mortar schooners, or 
“chowder pots”, were unable to move on their own, requiring fast moving, shallow 
steamers, such as Westfield, to tow them into position. Mortar schooners averaged a 200 
ton displacement and were reinforced with heavy keels to support their guns. The Union 
would use their ammunition advantage in a low position close to the shore, below the 
range of Confederate guns high in the forts (Stiles 1995:79; Coombe 1999:75-76). 
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Figure 2.4. Map depicting the location of Forts Jackson and St. Philip relative to the 
Union vessels during the Battle of New Orleans (Official Records of the Navies of the 
War of the Rebellion 1905a:277). Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Making of 
America Digital Collection. 
 
 
On 18 April, the mortar schooners were moved into position while the men 
aboard the gunboats exchanged fire with riflemen in the trees and guns from the forts. 
Bombardment of the forts began at 10 A.M. and continued until 6 P.M., with mortars 
firing one shot every 10 minutes, or 168 shells every 4 hours. As darkness fell, flames 
were spotted over Fort Jackson, whose citadel and outbuildings were on fire. Although 
exhausted, the crews of the mortar schooners redoubled their efforts when they realized 
that every shot reached the inside of the forts. As night progressed, the men were 
allowed to rest, and the guns were only fired once every half hour (Mahan 1885:62-63; 
Dufour 1960:231; Stiles 1995:82-83). 
At night, the Confederates sent fire rafts down the river to throw the Union ships 
into confusion and distract them from the bombardment of the forts. Fire rafts, referred 
to by the Union as “weak inventions of the enemy”, were flatboats filled with pine knots 
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and other flammable material (Mahan 1885:65; Stiles 1995:81). Commander Farragut 
instructed the ships to keep the rafts in the center of the river channel and use their guns 
to punch holes in the rear of the rafts in order to flood the incendiary materials (Coombe 
1999:81). Captain Renshaw reported the use of Westfield’s force pumps to throw water 
onto the flames of the rafts (Renshaw 1862a:389). A description in the New York Times 
depicted the scene vividly: 
 
The men had an opportunity to test in a practical manner their means for 
destroying fire rafts, and they proved to be an admirable success. A turgid 
column of black smoke, arising from resinous wood, was seen approaching us 
from the vicinity of the forts. Signal lights were made, the varied colors of which 
produced a beautiful effect upon the foliage of the river bank, and rendering the 
darkness [more intense] by contrast when they disappeared; instantly a hundred 
boats shot out toward the raft, which now was blazing fiercely and casting a wide 
zone of light upon the water. Two or three of the gunboats then got under way 
and steamed boldly toward the unknown thing of terror. One of them, the 
Westfield, Capt. Renshaw, gallantly opens her steam valves, and dashes furiously 
upon it, making the sparks fly and timbers crash with the force of her blow. Then 
a stream of water from her hose plays upon the blazing mass (New York Times 
1862j).  
 
However, fighting fire rafts was not always a gallant task. One night during the 
battle, Westfield accidently ran into USS Iroquois. Ten of Iroquois’ crew jumped 
overboard but were quickly picked up (Palmer 1862:800). 
 On 20 April, USS Pinola and USS Itasca dismantled the massive chain and line 
of schooner hulks that blocked the Union ships from traveling above the forts and 
gaining the advantage. Mortar schooners helped to defend the two ships, which were 
under fire from the forts. Three days after the successful removal of the barrier, at 2 
A.M. on 24 April, the noise of clicking capstans and chain cables grating against their 
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hawse holes alerted the Confederates that the Union fleet was again on the move. 
Commander Farragut sent the heavy vessels, Hartford, Brooklyn, Richmond, Pensacola, 
and Mississippi, to defend the rest of the fleet from any incoming Confederate vessels 
from the north. Porter and his mortar schooners followed, distracting the forts by firing 
upon the water batteries, while shells from the forts could only pass overhead. In the 
final attack, the Union ships passed under the forts and up river to meet the Confederate 
vessels (Porter 1862b:367; Mahan 1885:64,66-77; Stiles 1995:79). 
 The battle lasted nearly an hour. Westfield concentrated fire on Fort Jackson at a 
distance of 600 yd. (549 m) away, conserving ammunition as much as possible. While 
the Union had more supplies than the Confederacy, the fleet was far from a friendly port 
and still lacked the ammunition, fuel, and medical supplies than was needed. After six 
days of bombardment, the Confederate batteries on either side of the river were quickly 
silenced during a final attack (Renshaw 1862a:389-390; Mahan 1885:57,85-86). In the 
ensuing battle, nine Confederate ships were destroyed, including CSS Manassas and the 
unfinished CSS Louisiana and CSS Mississippi. The ram Manassas was run ashore and 
set on fire. Riddled with shot from USS Mississippi, Manassas dislodged from the shore 
and exploded near the forts. The only Union ship to be nearly lost, USS Varuna, ended 
up in the middle of the Confederate ships. She went unnoticed until she fired upon the 
surrounding rebel ships. Varuna was run aground on the bank of the river to avoid 
sinking, and the captain and crew were rescued by Oneida. The battle was practically 
won once the larger Union ships defeated the Confederate ships and passed above the 
forts (Mahan 1885:85-86; Dufour 1960:335-338; Stiles 1999:86,88-89). 
 Westfield continued firing on Fort Jackson until 27 April. General Benjamin 
Butler landed a large force behind Fort St. Philip and effectively cut off the Confederate 
forces on three sides. The forts officially surrendered on 28 April 1862 to Commodore 
Porter. The marines on Westfield were ordered to land and take possession of Fort 
Jackson (Cotham 2006:51-52). Commodore Farragut went to take command of New 
Orleans where the citizens were busy setting the city’s coal, cotton, steamboats, and 
ships on fire (Mahan 1885:86). The forts were New Orleans’ primary defense, as the 
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town was surrounded by marshes and the Mississippi. When the forts fell, New Orleans 
fell also. In nine days, the Union captured the lower Mississippi. On 29 April, Westfield 
headed for New Orleans and remained there until 1 May when the crew sailed down to 
Pilot Town at the mouth of the river to prepare for the attack on Mobile (Cotham 
2006:51-52). 
 The fall of New Orleans was a major victory for the Union. Control over the 
lower Mississippi River meant cutting Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana off from 
the other Southern states, which included the loss of Texas beef and salt from Louisiana. 
The Confederacy also lost the machine shops of New Orleans and a port of entry for 
supplies from Europe. The Confederate Navy lost two great warships, Louisiana and 
Mississippi, either of which could have destroyed the wooden ships of the Union 
blockade. In addition, Fort Jackson sustained heavy damage. The fall of New Orleans 
also convinced the French emperor, Napoleon III, to forego recognizing the Confederacy 
as a nation. The victory weakened confidence in the Confederacy’s leadership, was a 
boost to Union morale, and weakened the power of those who desired peace. In addition, 
the lower Mississippi provided a naval base for conducting war on the rest of the 
southern ports. From that position, the Union navy could flank any Confederate force in 
the west (Mahan 1885:86,89; Dufour 1960:335-338). 
2.5.3 Mobile, Alabama 
 Westfield was again employed in dragging mortar schooners out of the mud and 
fighting off mosquitoes in the Mississippi River at the beginning of May 1862, returning 
to Ship Island, Mississippi for coal. By 7 May, Westfield was anchored near Fort Gaines 
and Fort Morgan at Mobile, Alabama with Harriet Lane, Clifton, Jackson, and Miami. 
On the ships’ approach to Mobile, three Confederate gunboats were spotted outside the 
forts, and the Union ships gave chase. The rebel gunboats ran behind the forts to safety. 
Henry Gusley felt that they were on the eve of another battle and imminent victory like 
New Orleans. After two days of blockading Mobile, a reconnaissance mission was 
conducted with Clifton, which became stuck in the mud within range of the forts and 
was fired upon. On 9 May, a blockade runner passed through the blockade during the 
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night. The following day, Westfield, Clifton, and Jackson were ordered back to Ship 
Island, and in a friendly race, Westfield proved the fastest of the three (Cotham 2006:37-
38,52,55-56). 
2.5.4 Lake Ponchartrain, Pearl River, and the Rigolettes 
 By 14 May 1862, Westfield was anchored off the mouth of Pearl River, which 
empties into the Rigolettes at the outlet of Lake Ponchartrain (see Figure 2.3 above). 
Pearl River has three outlets; the deepest has very little current and creates part of the 
border between Louisiana and Mississippi. Here, Captain Renshaw desired to rid the 
area of Confederate steamships and rebels who ambushed ships from the shore. Pearl 
River is full of extreme bends and curves. Westfield could not continue up the river after 
about 70 mi. (113 km) and sent the much smaller Sachem on further, accompanied by 
Westfield’s boat. Sachem ran aground in a bend with a “tremendous crash” and was 
extricated from the trees using a hawser tied to a tree on the opposite bank. A rebel 
ambush fired upon Sachem and Westfield’s boat from the bank of the river. The vessels 
soon returned to where Westfield was anchored in Lake Borne, at the outlet of the 
Rigolettes. During the night, Westfield ran aground, and, without cause, the ship’s 
armorer, Jacob Snukel, apparently threw himself overboard and drowned. Westfield 
returned to Ship Island, where Henry Gusley and the other marines aboard hoped to be 
home by July (New York Times 1862l; Cotham 2006:58-62). 
2.5.5 Vicksburg, Mississippi 
 The following month, between the end of May and mid-June 1862, was 
uneventful as Westfield traveled between Pensacola, Florida, New Orleans, and Rodney, 
Mississippi before traveling to Vicksburg, Mississippi (Cotham 2006:63-74). Vicksburg 
sits 400 mi. (644 km) above New Orleans and was the Union’s next step in the efforts to 
control the Mississippi. The bluffs around Vicksburg rose high enough for Confederate 
batteries to be out of range of shipboard guns (Mahan 1885:93-94). In the days before 
the attack commenced, Westfield was once again positioning mortar schooners in the 
Mississippi River as she was fired upon by Confederate shore batteries (Craven 
1862:762). Figure 2.5 shows the positions of the Union and Confederate Navy boats.  
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The attack on Vicksburg began at 3 A.M. on 28 June 1862. The Union steamers, 
including Westfield and Clifton, assaulted the town and batteries for two hours at a range 
of 1,200 yd. (1,097 m) (Baldwin 1862:643). The New York Times said that, “the air was 
literally filled with projectiles” during the attack. The siege of Vicksburg was slower and 
less effective than at New Orleans, due to the natural strength of the Confederate 
positions, and the Union fleet sustained more damage in the process. Jackson became 
disabled, and Clifton attempted to come to her rescue. Clifton received a shot through 
her boiler, killing 7 men, while 20 jumped overboard. Westfield came to the aid of both 
ships, and in doing so, received a shot through her wheel house, cutting the arm of the 
wheel, close to the steam chest. The shot rolled across the deck and was picked up and 
saved as a trophy (New York Times 1862m; Cotham 2006:79,82).  
On 7 July, two Confederate regiments were spotted attempting to leave the town. 
The Union raked the woods with shot and picked up three rebel prisoners. Three days 
later, marines from the Union steamships landed at Vicksburg, but victory still eluded 
them. On 15 July, the rebel ram Arkansas made her way through the upper Union fleet 
and anchored off Vicksburg (Cotham 2006:81-83). Down the river at the lower 
Confederate batteries, Westfield, the Union steamers, and mortar schooners were 
engaged with the battery and preparing for the possibility of an attack by Arkansas. 
Captain Renshaw heard firing from Farragut and Davis’ fleets a few miles above 
Vicksburg as Arkansas attempted to make her way down the river. The mortar schooners 
were moved into position, all except one. Sidney C. Jones had grounded on the river 
bank. Renshaw instructed her captain to be prepared to blow her up if he spotted 
Arkansas. Some miscommunication occurred, and Jones was fired prematurely, before 
the Confederate ram was seen. The source of the miscommunication was never found. 
The final battle at Vicksburg lasted two hours until the Confederate batteries were 
silenced, the town was fired, and the fleet returned to New Orleans. The health of the 
fleet’s crew had much deteriorated during the siege, with 20 cases of fever and more 
than 20 cases of scurvy aboard Westfield (Renshaw 1862b:29-31, 1862c:98-99; Cotham 
2006:83-84).  
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2.5.6 Baton Rouge, Plaquemine, Donaldsonville, and Pensacola 
 Between the siege at Vicksburg and the Battle of Baton Rouge, Westfield was 
again pulling mortar schooners across Pass á l’Outre at the mouth of the Mississippi 
River. In New Orleans on 7 August, Captain Renshaw received news that rebels had 
attacked Union troops at Baton Rouge, and Farragut again engaged Arkansas. Westfield 
did not play a large role in the battle, but she was present with Commander Farragut’s 
fleet, lying 30 mi. (48.2 km) below Baton Rouge. The marines aboard Westfield later 
heard that 6,000 rebels under General Mansfield Lovell had attacked the Union forces of 
2,500. The Union lost 250 men and the Confederates 800. The Union forces remained in 
control of the city. Arkansas was blown up by the Confederates to avoid capture, and 
General Lovell’s legs were shot off and he died after he was captured. 
 On 8 August, Westfield left Baton Rouge on the way to Pensacola, Florida. On 
their way out of the Mississippi, Captain Renshaw was ordered to inform the citizens of 
Plaquemine and Donaldsonville to evacuate, as Commander Farragut intended to burn 
both cities. Plaquemine was eventually spared; however Donaldsonville was “razed to 
the ground”. Westfield arrived in Pensacola on 12 August, where she remained through 
September (Cotham 2006:82-98). 
2.6 Gone to Texas 
2.6.1 Galveston 
The Texas coast was a weakness in the Union’s blockade in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The many bays and inlets along the coast provided hiding holes for blockade runners and 
Confederate ships. After the failed attempt to capture Vicksburg, Commander David 
Farragut desired to close those holes. He sent a portion of his fleet, consisting of David 
Porter’s mortar flotilla gunboats Harriet Lane, Owasco, Clifton, and Westfield, to the 
Texas coastal waters, in order to secure bases in the major harbors at Galveston, Corpus 
Christi, Sabine Pass, and Port Lavaca (Cotham 1998:57-59; Tucker 2006:323). 
Throughout the 19th century, Galveston was considered the most important of 
those Texas towns (shown in Figure 2.6). Located 50 mi. (80.5 km) south of present-day 
Houston, the barrier island of Galveston stretches approximately 30 mi. (48 km) long 
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and averages around 3 mi. (4.8 km) wide. Galveston Bay (shown in the map below in 
Figure 2.6) is about 35 mi. (56 km) long and ranges between 12 and 18 mi. (19 and 29 
km) wide and was considered the best harbor in Texas (New York Herald 1863). A 
natural current in the bay created the harbor that formed behind the sand barrier, a 
horseshoe shaped outer bar that stretches four miles (6.4 km) between Galveston Island 
and Bolivar Peninsula to the east. The bay varies in depth, averaging approximately 
seven to eight feet (2.1-2.4 m). Named after Count Bernardo de Gálvez who 
commissioned a chart of the Texas coast in 1785, the city of Galveston was established 
by the Galveston City Company and Michael B. Menard, the city’s founder, in 1838 
(McComb 1986:5-6,8,43). 
In 1860, the town’s population of over 7,000 lived in a city which contained a 
market hall, a town hall, eight churches, and several hotels. Control over the harbor and 
town meant control over Texas’ second largest city, largest seaport, and almost all 
exported sugar and Texas cotton, approximately 200,000 bales in 1860. Cotton was 
shipped to Galveston and Sabine Pass from locations across the Confederacy to be sent 
to ports in the Caribbean, including Cuba, Mexico, and to Europe. Imports focused 
around arms and ammunition, which were lacking in the agricultural-based Southern 
economy (New York Herald 1863; McComb 1986:6; Tucker 2006:323). Galveston 
created a base from which the Union could secure the border with Mexico and 
discourage commerce between Texas and Mexico. The Union could also monitor cotton 
exports and access the interior of Texas for military invasion.  
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Figure 2.6. Map of Galveston Bay, Texas. After McComb (1986:9). 
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While the blockade of Galveston began in July of 1861, Union forces did not 
attempt to capture the city until 4 October 1862. The primary reason for this was the lack 
of resources in the area and what appeared to be a “formidable battery” located on 
Pelican Island, just north of the town. However, in October of 1862, the gunboats of 
Porter’s mortar flotilla finally provided the resources Farragut needed to take control 
Galveston (Tucker 2006:323-324). On 2 October, the steamers Westfield, the flagship 
under Captain Renshaw, Harriet Lane, under Commander Jonathan M. Wainwright, 
Owasco, captained by Commander John Guest, Clifton, under Lieutenant-Commander 
Richard L. Law, and, the schooner Henry Janes, under Acting Master L.W. Pennington, 
anchored just outside the sandbar at the mouth of Galveston Bay (Renshaw 1862d:254; 
Cotham 2006:104). In the early morning two days later, Harriet Lane entered Galveston 
Harbor under a flag of truce with the intention of demanding the surrender of the city. 
After receiving a shot across her bow, Harriet Lane anchored and waited for a 
Confederate boat to approach. When one did not appear, Captain Wainwright sent out a 
boat with the executive officer. The officer sent the request for the Confederate’s 
surrender to Colonel Joseph Cook, who immediately set off for the city of Galveston to 
dispatch a boat with a response. The small sailboat, whether unintentionally or on 
purpose, required more time than expected by Captain Wainwright on the journey back 
to Harriet Lane. Captain Renshaw reported strong winds in the harbor, which could have 
delayed the small boat; however, Captain Wainwright took great offense to the boat’s 
leisurely progress. Wainwright and Harriet Lane steamed out of the harbor to reconvene 
with the other Union ships before the small sailboat’s mission was completed (Cook 
1862:262; Renshaw 1862e:255). 
Not wanting to delay the imminent capture of Galveston any further, Renshaw 
ordered the entire force over the bar and into the harbor (Renshaw 1862e:256). Westfield 
led the force into the harbor, with Clifton towing No. 19 mortar schooner on her right, 
Harriet Lane on Westfield’s left, and Owasco at the center, behind. A shot by a 
Confederate 10-inch Columbiad was fired on the vessels from Fort Point, at the most 
northeastern part of Galveston Island near the entrance of the harbor (Figure 2.7). The 
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Union’s rapid reply caused the rebel forces at Fort Point, and the slowly approaching 
sailboat, to retreat quickly. Henry Gusley states that the crew aboard Westfield, “turned 
[their] long [Parrott] rifle on the retreating rebels, considerably accelerating their before 
remarkable speed.” The apparently formidable Confederate battery at Galveston was 
now discovered to contain mostly guns of the ‘Quaker’ variety, those made of logs 
painted to look like cannon (Renshaw 1862d:255; Cotham 2006:104). As the Union 
force weighed anchor in front of the city, Westfield was fired upon by two 24-pounders 
set up in the east side of Galveston city. Renshaw reported to Farragut, that although the 
shot fell short, he was reluctant to take out the battery with Westfield’s guns because he 
wanted to avoid firing into the populated city, under the nose of the foreign consuls. 
Although warranted, this fear of offending foreign consuls and humanitarians was to 
shape Renshaw’s future decisions regarding Galveston. 
Firing ceased as the small, yet determined, sailboat once again turned back to 
complete the mission of relaying the Confederate response to Renshaw. Renshaw had 
requested the immediate surrender of Galveston, lest the city should be burned to the 
ground. Colonel Joseph Cook and other rebel officers had been sent on the Confederate 
sailboat to inform Captain Renshaw that the Confederates would not surrender, due to 
the numbers of women, children, and foreign consul still living in the city. Cook stated 
that Renshaw would indeed be blamed for the destruction of the city and the lives lost. 
While still determined to capture Galveston, Renshaw changed his mind when Cook and 
the rebel officers reported, whether truthfully or not, the existence of yellow fever 
amongst the city’s residents. Cook requested four days to remove the women and 
children before the Union took control, and Renshaw reluctantly agreed so long as the 
Confederates did not change their defenses on the island. With this requirement, 
Renshaw intended that the Confederates were not to increase or decrease their defenses, 
while Colonel Cook understood the agreement to concern only the increase. The 
agreement was sealed with a handshake (Cook 1862:262-263; Renshaw 1862e:256-257). 
Coinciding with the meeting aboard Westfield, marines were sent off to spike the 
battery at Fort Point and inspect the rebel barracks on Pelican Spit, across the entrance to 
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the bay from Fort Point. Here, the marines discovered the Quaker guns and were so 
impressed by the ruse of the Confederates, that one was mounted on the hurricane deck 
of Westfield. The gun can be seen in the Memphis drawing (Appendix Figure A-1). Two 
days after the arrival of the Union fleet, marines accompanied by Captain Wainwright of 
Harriet Lane, landed at the city and were warmly welcomed to the mayor’s office to 
formally receive the key to the city (Cotham 2006:106). 
The Confederates realized Galveston could not be defended as they gazed at the 
Union ships a mile off the wharf, counting approximately 40 guns aboard them. They 
had a large battery of 12 to 20 guns at Virginia Point, on the mainland across a railroad 
bridge, five miles (8 km) northwest of the city (Figure 2.7 below). Here, the rebel army 
of 3,000 to 5,000 sat waiting, believing that the Union was planning to send a large force 
to invade Texas. But the Union forces, with the light mortar schooners and the shallow 
draft of Westfield, would not have a problem accessing Virginia Point on their own. 
Galveston lacked fresh water and was in constant need of supplies. The Confederate 
commanders decided to evacuate to Virginia Point in the hopes of preventing a landing 
by the Union, protecting the railroad, and saving the city. All supplies, machinery, and 
county records were removed to Virginia Point. Those people who chose to stay would 
no longer receive protection or supplies from the Confederates. A small force was left on 
the Galveston side of the railroad bridge, to evacuate once the Union took control (Cook 
1862:262-263; Debray 1862a:261, 1862b:261; Renshaw 1862e:259).  
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Figure 2.7. Galveston, showing locations of forts and railroads. After Cotham 
(1998:19). 
 
 
The Confederates also took the liberty of removing four guns from their defenses 
at Galveston during the night (Cook 1862:263). The guns were two old-fashioned 24-
pounders, one 80-pound rifle, and another unknown gun. When informed, Renshaw 
aimed to ignore the Confederate breach on their agreement. He wanted to avoid what he 
called a “long consular controversy” and exposure to yellow fever. Captains Law and 
Wainwright thought differently. They confronted the Confederate officers in Galveston, 
demanding the guns be returned under the threat of hostilities. Offended, the rebel 
officers disputed the claim that the agreement prevented the removal of the guns, and 
answered that if Renshaw were to attack Galveston during the four day truce, he would 
be in breach of the agreement. Not wanting to be accused of violating the agreement, 
Renshaw backed down. 
Captain Renshaw had other concerns to attend to. A visit from an English consul 
living in Galveston informed him that the rebels would sooner destroy the town than 
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surrender to the Union, tipping Renshaw off that hostilities in the area were far from 
over. In addition, Captain Renshaw was concerned over the number of deserters looking 
for protection and supplies from the Union forces. While the wealthy and influential 
citizens had evacuated the town for mainland Texas, the middle and lower classes 
remained, with Union sympathies and a lack of provisions. Captain Renshaw also did 
not have the men to occupy the town for a substantial amount of time. Despite what the 
Confederates believed, a large Union force was not on its way to hold the town and 
attack Texas. As a result, Renshaw could only land a small party, raise a flag above the 
customs house for a half hour or so, and retreat back to the ships in the harbor. In a 
report to Commander David Farragut, he requested provisions and 200 to 300 men with 
six pieces of artillery in order to defend Fort Point or Pelican Island (Renshaw 
1862e:258-260). The latter request was refused. Farragut had neither the troops nor the 
guns to send to Renshaw. He instructed Renshaw to leave Galveston in the hands of a 
single gunboat and to head south toward the next major city on the Texas coast (Farragut 
1862b:260). 
 During this time, Henry Gusley and the other marines were stationed at the 
abandoned Confederate barracks on Pelican Island. The month of October was spent in 
picket duty, digging earthworks to defend Pelican Island, and dispersing rebel cavalry on 
the bridge at Virginia Point with Westfield’s 100-pounder rifle gun. Other days were 
spent in rowing matches and oyster bakes (Cotham 2006:107-109). During one rather 
extensive oyster bake, Captain Renshaw called the marines back on board Westfield, and 
the Union steamships quickly set sail for Matagorda Bay. 
2.6.2 Matagorda Bay 
 Westfield and Clifton arrived in Matagorda Bay on 23 October 1863 (shown in 
Figure 2.8 below). The bay had been blockaded by Union ships since the previous 
winter, and the inhabitants of Indianola and Lavaca had long been expecting to see 
Union ships in the bay. Crossing the channel at Pass Cavallo, Westfield and Clifton both 
ran aground on the sand bar, extricating each other in turn. Meanwhile, Confederates at 
Fort Esperanza, on the western end of Matagorda Island near the pass, did their best to 
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ward off the Union ships using the guns from the fort. They were no match for the Union 
guns, which pummeled the fort until the Confederate soldiers “concluded that discretion 
was the better part of valor and retreated to Indianola before they could be cut off” 
(Malsch 1988:162,167; Cotham 2006:110-111).   
  
 
 
Figure 2.8. Matagorda Bay. After Cotham (2006:112). 
 
 
The two Union ships, along with Lecompte, a captured blockade runner, 
anchored off Indianola on 26 October. Westfield was tied to the wharf and Renshaw sent 
a flag of truce to the town, demanding a representative to discuss the fate of Indianola. 
H.B. Cleveland, T.D. Woodward, and Captain Henry Sheppard met with Captains 
Renshaw and Law aboard Westfield. Renshaw stated that he had three rifled guns and six 
nine-inch guns with which he could command the entire bay, but he offered to provide 
freedom to bring small boats with supplies and people in and out of the town in 
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exchange for the opportunity to land a few men to buy supplies. His offer was refused by 
the stout Confederates, who opted to have their town burned rather than help the enemy. 
Captain Renshaw ordered the women and children to evacuate before bombardment 
began. The town was demolished, and although only one Union and two Confederates 
were killed, many were wounded (Malsch 1988:137-138). The crew aboard Westfield 
obtained their supplies, hunting geese, duck, and capturing cattle at Indianola (Cotham 
2006:114). 
 Westfield and Clifton traveled further up the bay to Port Lavaca, and, in the same 
pattern as at Indianola, Renshaw sent a flag of truce on shore requesting a meeting. 
Major Daniel D. Shea and four citizens of the town met with Renshaw and refused his 
demand for surrender. Captain Renshaw provided an hour and a half to evacuate the 
women, children, and sick, due to the epidemic of yellow fever in the town (Malsch 
1988:168). As the Union ships fired at Port Lavaca, the town fired back with four 
batteries, totaling eight to ten guns. There were no lives lost in the shelling; however, 
considerable damage was done to the town, after the Union ships had fired 252 shot and 
shells. Both Westfield and Clifton received damage, and the 100-pounder Parrott rifle 
aboard Westfield burst, wounding three men. On the evening of 31 October, the Union 
ships anchored out of range of Lavaca’s batteries. Bombardment continued the next 
morning for two and a half hours, until the Union ships ran low on ammunition and 
returned to the channel at the mouth of Matagorda Bay (Cotham 2006:115).  
 The Union ships left Matagorda Bay after capturing and looting Indianola and 
bombarding Lavaca. USS Kittatinny and her captain C.W. Lawson were left to defend 
the Union holdings. However, she was unable to cross the bar at Pass Cavallo, drawing 
one too many feet (0.3 m) to cross. Her inability to enter the bay allowed the 
Confederates to reoccupy Fort Esperanza after Westfield and Clifton returned to 
Galveston (Malsch 1988:169-170). 
2.6.3 Back at Galveston 
 Westfield and the Union ships left Matagorda Bay and arrived back at Galveston 
early on the 5 November 1862. On their arrival, the Union ships found a rather dismal 
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scene. Owasco, left to defend the Union hold on the bay, was aground on the sand bar 
(Cotham 2006:116).  Galveston’s population was cut in half, and with only ten percent 
of businesses left open, and the remaining population still subsisted on Union rations 
(McComb 1986:72-75). In addition, there were rumors of a rebel ram discovered at the 
head of Galveston Bay. This rumor seemed to have been proven true, and after almost a 
week in Galveston, the crews aboard the steamers were told to be on the alert. Henry 
Gusley recalled the foreshadowing speech Captain Renshaw made on the occasion: 
 
My lads, I have called you together to tell you that there is a rumor afloat that an 
attempt will be made some of these nights to drive us from the harbor, by some 
rebel steamers, and I have reason to believe there is some truth in the rumor. 
Now what I want to impress on you is that you must keep your eyes wide open, 
to prevent a surprise; be ready at your guns at the first alarm. I know I have a 
good crew- I couldn’t wish a better set of men; but here in an enemy’s country I 
can’t impress it upon your minds too strongly to be vigilant. If we are attacked at 
all it will be by boats drawing very little water, and they may come upon us 
without coming through the channel; and their object will be to board us. So you 
must keep your eyes all around you; for if they get alongside before we are ready 
to receive them, or before our anchor is up, they may stand a pretty good job of 
succeeding; but if we are under weigh, I know- with the good stout engine of the 
Westfield and her gallant crew- we can sink and destroy a good half-dozen of 
them (Cotham 2006:116-119). 
 
 Few events transpired in November of 1862 for Westfield. A small crew from 
Owasco landed to obtain supplies and was fired upon in an ambush. Almost all of the 
men were wounded, and only two escaped, while the rest were taken prisoner by the 
Confederates. HBM Greyhound, a British war steamer, arrived during a particularly 
rough storm, and after a visit from her captain Sir Henry D. Hickley, the Yankee sailors 
on the captured blockade-runner Lecompte struggled to return him to his vessel. Henry 
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Gusley was never informed of the purpose of the British ship’s visit; only that she was 
bound for Mexico. In preparation for a possible Confederate attack, Gusley and the crew 
of Westfield practiced drills to see how fast the men could beat to quarters. All could be 
ready for battle in three and a half minutes. On 20 November, a blockade running sloop 
with over 60 bales of cotton attempted to escape the harbor in between the Union ships. 
She was set aflame by her captain when capture seemed imminent but was saved before 
too much damage was done. The sloop was sent to New Orleans to be sold. 
 At the end of November and through December of 1862, there were increasing 
signs of a Confederate presence in the area. On 29 November, a rebel ram was spotted 
coming down the bay and heading towards Westfield, anchored alone in Bolivar 
Channel. The crew moved quickly to clear the decks, weigh anchor, and move into 
position. As Westfield headed toward the ram, the vessel turned and steamed back up 
into Galveston Bay. Westfield could not follow due to the shallowness of the water. On 1 
December, the Union-supporting inhabitants living on the lower wharves at Galveston 
were attacked by the Confederates. The Union ships were able to defend the inhabitants 
and disperse the rebels. Two days later, another foraging party from Westfield landed at 
Bolivar Point. Fearing a similar fate as what awaited the crew of Owasco in the 
preceding month, an eight-inch shell was fired into the bushes before the crew landed, 
and the trip was successful in procuring a small portion of beef. 
 Into December, the marines aboard Westfield heard more rumors of impending 
rebel attacks. Captain Renshaw received a report concerning an imminent attack on 
Sabine Pass from several rebel steamers and a ram. Clifton was sent to aid the Union 
ships there. Nothing amounted of the rumor. Upon Clifton’s return, a nine-inch Dahlgren 
was transferred from her deck to that of Westfield. The 100-pounder which exploded in 
Matagorda Bay was stowed below decks until the gun was removed from the ship on 21 
December.  Harriet Lane and Owasco moved closer to the city for a better view and to 
prevent the rebels from approaching the city. The Union residents of Galveston were 
informed that communication across the railroad bridge between Virginia Point and 
Galveston was going to be cut off, and the residents needed to move or be left 
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disconnected from supplies and protection. Renshaw most likely aimed at destroying the 
railroad bridge and offered the Union sympathizers free passage to New Orleans aboard 
Island City, a coal bark. On 13 December, gunners aboard Westfield were sent to Fort 
Point to disable the Confederate gun abandoned there and burn the magazine. Soon 
thereafter, 24 and 25 December saw the arrival of 400 soldiers of the 42nd Massachusetts 
regiment aboard USS Saxon. The additional soldiers were needed to hold the city, but no 
plans for an attack had been made by Captain Renshaw and the Union ships. The 
Confederates were already making plans to retake the city. As the players took the stage 
for the Battle of Galveston, Westfield took on board the last of her new guns, a long 32-
pounder rifle. The last to arrive were Sachem from Corpus Christi, Lecompte from 
Matagorda, and a man-of-war schooner from further along the coast of Texas. At the end 
of December, rain and a cold “norther”, a fierce wind from the north, swept over the 
island. On the night of 30 December, the rebels burned the lighthouse in preparation for 
their attack the following night. Henry Gusley cursed the Texas guerillas for destroying 
not only the useful structure but government property (Cotham 2006:120-127).  
 Gusley’s account of Captain Renshaw’s speech, quoted above, ended with a 
foreshadowing statement: 
 
I am fully determined not to be driven from here, and I know you will stand by 
me to the last to prevent such a thing. I have not the least doubt of your bravery; I 
have had sufficient proofs of that, but what I want to impress upon you is to be, if 
possible, more vigilant. As I said before, if they catch us napping they may 
succeed, but if we are wide awake when they come, I’ll be damned if they will” 
(Cotham 2006:118-119). 
 
Within two months of this speech, Captain William Renshaw kept his promise. His death 
prevented him from being driven out of the bay; however, his fleet was to retreat without 
him. The Confederates had caught them napping, and succeeded in recapturing 
Galveston. 
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2.6.4 The Battle of Galveston 
At the end of December 1862, Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, Owasco, and 
Corypheus, were stationed in Galveston Bay. Troops on shore consisted of 260 men 
commanded by Colonel I.S. Burrell of the 42nd Massachusetts Volunteers (Palmer et al. 
1863:447). The Confederate ships, under the command of Major Leon Smith, were 
hidden in the northern portion of the bay, near Buffalo Bayou. CSS Bayou City, a packet 
ship under Captain Henry Lubbock, had been seized by the state, converted to a gunboat, 
and armored with a 12-pounder rifled gun on her bow deck. The bulwarks were built up 
with cotton bales and the ship could hold 100 men. Another packet, Neptune, was fitted 
as a gunboat on 26 December and also guarded with cotton bales. She was armed with 
two howitzer guns and captained by W.H. Sangster. Two tenders accompanied the ships; 
CSS Lucy Gwinn, under Major Andrew McKee, and CSS John F. Carr, under Captain 
John Y. Lawless. As the Confederate boats lay waiting for orders, the men watched the 
Union ships in the bay (Doran 1862:2; Houston Telegraph 1863a:2). 
 The Confederates got their chance in the very early morning on New Year’s Day 
1863. All four ships, lined up two by two, were spotted by Clifton and Westfield in the 
bright moonlight at 1:30 A.M. coming down from Buffalo Bayou (The Daily Delta 
1863:1; Palmer et al. 1863:447-448). Major Leon Smith, searching on land for a signal 
from the land forces that the battle was underway, found no such sign. He ordered his 
ships back up the bay, to avoid damage from the Federal ships.  At 3 A.M., the 
Confederate forces on land were seen and heard firing on the Union soldiers. Major 
Smith, aboard Bayou City, abruptly turned around and headed back down the bay, 
feeding the boiler fires with resin to create enough speed to compensate for the time 
already lost (Houston Telegraph 1863a:2; Jones 1961:322). Major William L. Burt, Aid-
de-Camp to Brigadier-General Charles S. Hamilton was on board the transport ship, 
USS Mary A. Boardman, which was lying at anchor near Westfield. He reported spotting 
the four rebel gunboats coming down the bay at 3 A.M. Soon after this, the moon set, 
and the sky became hazy and dark (Burt 1863:455). Signal rockets warned the other 
Union ships and the troops on shore of the oncoming Confederate attack (Tucker 
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2006:325). By daybreak, the Confederate ships were within a mile (1.6 km) of Harriet 
Lane (Houston Telegraph 1863a:2).  
 The naval attack began with an attempt by Bayou City to ram the Lane, 
succeeded only in knocking off part of the Lane’s wheelhouse. A second attempt 
resulted in a large hole in Harriet Lane’s side. The Lane responded by ramming her bow 
into Bayou City and giving her an ineffective broadside. A bystander on land called out 
to Captain Wier on Bayou City, encouraging him to give the Yankees another New 
Year’s present. As Wier shouted, “Well here goes your New Year’s present!”, the 
Confederate 32-pounder rifled gun he was directing exploded, killing Captain Weir and 
wounding several of the crew. Neptune also headed straight for Harriet Lane, ramming 
her bow into the Union ship’s side, aiming for the wheel house but missing by 
approximately 10 ft. (3 m). Neptune was badly damaged in the collision, and Captain 
Sangster was forced to run her into the sand, where she sank in eight feet (2.4 m) of 
water. The Confederate sharpshooters on board were still above the waterline, however, 
and continued firing at the Union ships. Bayou City rammed into Lane’s side a second 
time, locking the two ships together. Soldiers began to board Harriet Lane as she 
careened over. She could no longer move as Bayou City was stuck under her port wheel, 
and her anchor was accidentally deployed after her cathead was knocked away (Jones 
1961:322; Cotham 1998:125-126).  
 Harriet Lane did not stand much of a chance. The report by Jas. S. Palmer, 
Melancton Smith, and L.A. Kimberly (1863:448) stated that Bayou City had 200 
Confederate troops, cotton bales stretching 20 ft. (6 m) above the waterline, and the 68-
pounder rifled gun, that exploded during the attack. Neptune was quoted to have 160 
men and was also fortified with cotton bales. As the Confederate crew from Bayou City 
boarded Harriet Lane, the Union crew attempted to repel them. In the process, both 
commanders of Harriet Lane, Captain Wainwright and Commander Edward Lea were 
killed (Palmer et al. 1863:448). The Farmer’s Cabinet (1863:1) in Amherst, New 
Hampshire reported that a “pistol ball passed in one of [Captain Wainwright’s] eyes and 
out at the back of his head. He was wearing his spectacles at the time and the officer who 
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was paroled took them to Commodore Renshaw. One of the glasses was shot out, while 
the other was covered with blood and flesh.”  In total, 5 Union men were killed, 5 
wounded, and 110 taken prisoner on Harriet Lane. 
 Owasco was below Galveston coaling when the Confederate ships attacked. She 
quickly moved to aid the troops on shore against the rebel artillery. Harriet Lane was 
soon observed under attack, and Owasco attempted to come to her aid. She grounded 
several times, only sporadically firing at the rebel ships with her nine-inch gun. As 
Harriet Lane’s guns turned on her fellow Union ship, Owasco realized Lane was lost 
and quickly retreated to join Corypheus and Sachem near the wharf (Palmer et al. 
1863:448).  
 As Owasco rounded Fort Point, at the entrance to the channel between Pelican 
Island and Galveston (shown in Figure 2.9 below), she received fire from three 
Confederate guns at the fort. Owasco headed for Kuhn’s Wharf, just east of Fort Point 
and directly in front of the main market place in Galveston, The Strand. The infantry of 
the 42nd Massachusetts regiment was stationed here, attempting to keep the Confederate 
forces at bay (Cotham 1998:115-116). 
 In the early morning of 1 January 1863, the Confederate land forces of 3,000 
troops of 4 to 5 regiments and 20 pieces of artillery snuck across the 2 mi. (3.2 km) 
bridge crossing from Virginia Point to Galveston (Davis 1863:458; Houston Telegraph 
1863a:2). The bridge had not been destroyed by either side, and rebel control of the 
bridge was later blamed for the Union defeat at Galveston (Burt 1863:457). The troops 
had to pull the guns over themselves, as the mules refused to cross the bridge. After 
crossing, the Confederates still had to make their way into Galveston. As the moon still 
shone brightly, their route diverged from a straight path into town, delaying them 
further. Edward T. Cotham (1998:113-114) supposed that the early arrival of the 
Confederate ‘cottonclads’ in the bay actually distracted the Union ships from the 
approach of the troops. Under the direction of General J. Bankhead Magruder, three 30-
pounder rifled Parrott guns were moved to Fort Point, a 32-pounder was placed at a 
cotton press, just opposite of Harriet Lane, and the rest were placed at the warehouse 
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near Kuhn’s Wharf and the Strand, approximately a quarter mile (0.4 km) from the 
Union troops (Davis 1863:458; Houston Telegraph 1863a:2; Palmer et al. 1863:448). 
 The Battle of Galveston officially began at 3:00 A.M. on 1 January, as General 
Magruder fired the first shot from inside the city, directly in front of the wharf. 
Magruder’s plan of attack at Kuhn’s Wharf was two-fold. Two guns were placed in the 
second story of the warehouse, and aimed directly at the wharf (Jones 1961:321). 
Confederate sharpshooters were placed in the buildings and on roofs around the wharf. 
Magruder also knew that they would never take the wharf from a position directly in 
front of it. He ordered 500 troops to wade in the water and approach the wharf from 
underneath and to the sides. Equipped with ladders and protected by Confederate 
artillery on the parallel wharves on either side of the Union troops, the soldiers 
approached Kuhn’s Wharf, only to discover that their ladders were too short. Union fire 
rained down upon the retreating soldiers as they waded back to land. A diagram of 
Galveston during the battle is shown below in Figure 2.9. 
As the sun rose over the island, the Union vessels Corypheus, Owasco, and 
Sachem, already bombarding the city and causing a significant amount of damage, 
stepped up their efforts. Damage from one of Owasco’s shells can still be seen on the 
Hendley Building, located along the seafront on The Strand (Figure 2.10). The show of 
force from the Union ships caused the Confederate troops to retreat to the safety of the 
surrounding buildings. Magruder felt defeated, but his attitude soon changed when he 
was informed of the capture of Harriet Lane (Cotham 1998:116-122). 
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Figure 2.9. Map of Galveston during the Battle of Galveston (Official Records of the 
Navies of the War of the Rebellion 1905c:450). Courtesy of Cornell University Library, 
Making of America Digital Collection. 
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Figure 2.10. Hendley Building, showing damage caused by a shell from USS Owasco. 
Photograph by Jessica R. Stika. 
 
 
 Three Union units, companies D, G, and I, of the 42nd Massachusetts arrived on 
Christmas Eve and landed at Kuhn’s Wharf Christmas Day, 1863. Colonel Burrell was 
assured by Captain Renshaw that the wharf was perfectly safe and in easy reach of the 
Union ships (Burt 1863:455; Davis 1863:457). The troops were entirely dependent on 
the ships for defense or an escape route (Farmer’s Cabinet 1863:1). As the Confederates 
advanced at 3:00 A.M., the troops signaled to the gunboats for help. Firing from both 
sides lasted until a flag of truce was spotted on the Union vessels. Colonel Burrell sent 
Lieutenant Charles Davis to Owasco to inquire about the flag of truce and have the 
gunboats remove the men from shore. The Confederates simply outnumbered the Union 
troops and were too strong for the defense of Kuhn’s Wharf to continue. Aboard Owasco 
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during the truce, Davis watched the troops marched off as prisoners. Commander Law 
informed Davis that the gunboats would proceed immediately to the wharf, so Davis 
remained on Owasco. He was the only man of the 42nd Massachusetts not taken prisoner 
(Davis 1863:458). 
 Law agreed to a three hour truce that dictated neither side would move any 
vessels. However, this truce did not extend to the forces on shore, nor were they 
informed of the truce. Colonel Burrell agreed to a truce lasting 30 minutes, just enough 
time to communicate with the navy ships. Clifton did not move to the shore to evacuate 
the troops following the truce, and Colonel Burrell was forced to surrender his entire 
command to the Confederates (Tucker 2006:355).  
When the Confederate ships emerged from the northern part of the bay at 
approximately 4:00 A.M., Captain Renshaw ordered his crew to weigh anchor and cut 
off the Confederate ships before they reached the troops on shore. In his haste, Westfield 
grounded hard in the sand to the northeast side of Pelican Spit. Renshaw signaled to 
Clifton for assistance. Despite great efforts from the sailors aboard both ships, Westfield 
remained stuck (Burt 1863:455; Jones 1961:323; Tucker 2006:325,354). As the moon 
set, flashes of light shone from the town as Magruder and his soldiers fired upon the 42nd 
Massachusetts located on Kuhn’s Wharf. Clifton sailed immediately to their aid, leaving 
the crew of the stuck Westfield to fend for themselves (Palmer et al. 1863:448).  
With the capture of Harriet Lane, Major Leon Smith hoisted a flag of truce and 
sent a boat to Clifton demanding the surrender of the Union ships. He required all crew 
to be transferred to one ship which was to leave the harbor. Otherwise, Smith would 
attack the gunboats one by one. Lieutenant Commander Law aboard Clifton brought the 
proposal to Westfield for deliberation. At this time, Renshaw watched as the troops on 
shore were marched away as prisoners, Harriet Lane was towed up to the wharf, and the 
rebels moved more artillery into position (Jones 1961:323; Palmer et al. 1863:448).  
Captain Renshaw knew that the current situation in Galveston would be a great 
embarrassment to him and the navy. He had demonstrated his concern for the navy’s 
reputation in his letter to Command David Farragut where he explained his reasoning 
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behind what Farragut believed to be generous allowances made to the Confederates and 
the citizens of Galveston, in October of 1862 (Renshaw 1862e:258). Renshaw was aware 
of Farragut’s disapproval, and the loss of Renshaw’s flagship would solidify Farragut’s 
opinion. Later, Farragut would write in a letter to Captain James Alden, “Why he 
destroyed his vessel no one can tell.” However, Renshaw decided to scuttle the ship 
rather than face the Confederates and the larger, better armed Harriet Lane. Farragut 
later stated in his letter, “If the Lane gets out [of Galveston Bay], she will be as bad as 
the [CSS] Alabama” (Farragut 1863b:490). 
USS Mary E. Boardman was signaled to remove the crew and supplies from 
Westfield (New York Times 1863a). Boats from Westfield, two cutters and a gig, 
transferred 130 men and their supplies in 15-20 minutes. Supplies thrown into the boats 
included hammocks, officers’ trunks and seamen’s chests, cutlasses, swords, rifles, 
fowling pieces, blankets, clothing, looking glasses, and important papers, including the 
pay roll and papers from the safe. The ship had been recently supplied with provisions 
and clothing from USS Tennessee (Houston Telegraph 1863b:1; Allis 1863:441). Major 
William L. Burt (1863:456) of Mary Boardman later reported attempting to dissuade 
Renshaw from abandoning his ship, claiming that Westfield was too valuable with her 
shallow draft and heavy guns. 
At 10:00 A.M., Captain Renshaw and his officers returned to Westfield and made 
preparations to fire the ship. The safety valves on the boiler were chained down and the 
magazines were opened. Turpentine was splashed over the deck and forward magazine, 
and Renshaw lit the match (Burt 1863:456; New York Times 1863a; Tucker 2006:326). 
Sometime between Renshaw’s movement from the deck of Westfield to his foot stepping 
into the awaiting gig lying adjacent to the gunboat, Westfield exploded with a terrible 
force. Primary sources, including special correspondents from the New York Times 
(1863a) and letters in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the 
War of the Rebellion (Burt 1863:456; Palmer et al. 1863:449), agree that Westfield 
exploded prematurely. Other accounts hold to a delayed explosion, stating Renshaw and 
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the officers returned to Westfield to confirm the match had lit, and the ship exploded 
while their boat was near (Cotham 1998:129). 
The forward magazine exploded with such force that the bow was torn to pieces, 
which shot into the air in a cloud of black smoke. The Captain’s gig lay floating empty. 
In their preparation to engage the Confederate ships, the guns had been loaded and they 
began to discharge in every direction. Quartermaster Charles Burrell aboard USS Saxon 
observed Renshaw, “rapidly ascending, and then coming down in small pieces” (New 
York Times 1863a; Cotham 1998:129). Those officers killed in the explosion are listed 
below in Table 2.5.  
 
 
Table 2.5. Officers and crew who died in the explosion of Westfield on 1 January 1863 
(Cotham 2006:130). 
 
 Seamen 
Officers Henry Bothke 
Commodore William Bainbridge Renshaw Rodolphus C. Hibbard 
Lieutenant Charles W. Zimmerman Peter Johnson 
Engineer W.R. Green Mathew McDonald 
Gunner’s Mate John Callahan Firemen 
Quartergunner Sam P. King George E. Cox 
Coxswain W. Easer Esser William Reeves 
 High McCabe 
 
 
As the smoke cleared around the exploded Westfield, the situation looked bleak 
for the Union forces. The 42nd Massachusetts had surrendered. Further attempts to 
communicate with the forces on land, if considered, were not conducted (Burt 
1863:457). Harriet Lane was damaged and under Confederate control. The only 
remaining ships fit for battle was Clifton and Owasco. The rebels were observed 
installing more guns upon Fort Point. Before the explosion, Renshaw ordered the 
remaining Union ships out of the harbor. Without another option, Commander Law 
immediately moved to retreat out into the Gulf of Mexico (New York Times 1863a; 
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Palmer et al.1863:449-450; Tucker 2006:326). L.D. Smalley took charge of Mary 
Boardman as pilot, and the ships moved towards the bar. All the flags of truce had been 
removed from the ships, and the Confederates fired on the vessels as they left. With the 
extra weight of the crew and supplies from Westfield, the Boardman could not pass over 
the bar, and all of the supplies were tossed overboard, excluding the personal 
possessions of the crew. The ship eventually crossed the bar, hitting the sand heavily as 
she went. At 1:00 P.M., all of the Union vessels had followed and were stationed outside 
the bay. The coal barks Cavallo and Elias Pike were left for the Confederates (Burt 
1863:456-457; New York Times 1863a). At 8:00 P.M., the Union ships left Galveston for 
New Orleans, where they arrived three days later (Palmer et al. 1863:449-450; Cotham 
2006:130). Galveston was left completely unprotected, and any Union claim on the 
island or bay was lost (Burt 1863:457). 
2.6.5 After the Battle 
 Twenty-four hours after the fall of Galveston, General Magruder reported the 
capture of Harriet Lane, one heavy rifled gun, and 350 prisoners. He also promised the 
salvaging of guns from the sunken Westfield (Magruder 1863:465). Confederate 
salvagers quickly recovered the upper works, steam stack, and two guns. The 
paddlewheel shafts were raised and bored out for guns. Five months later in May of 
1863, four men were employed in diving and recovering any items of value. The forward 
decks were found to be burned off, the stern about 180 feet (54.9 m) from the main 
section of the wreck. Six guns were salvaged, two with carriages still attached (Borgens 
et al. 2010:44). These were found, well preserved, 30 ft. (9.1m) from the wreck. The 
Houston Telegraph (1863c:1) praised the divers, citing the great “rapidity of the current” 
and the “difficulty in keeping the stall in proper position”. A summary of the items 
recovered are listed below in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6. Items salvaged from the wreck of USS Westfield by Confederates. From the 
Confederate Prize Commission Records (Borgens et al. 2010:44,46). 
 
Ammunition Rigging and ship supplies Raw material 
1- 9-inch Dahlgren 1 brass wheel >1,400 lbs (635 kg) of brass 
1- Dahlgren carriage and 
portion of chassis 
6 coils of sisal rope (540 ft 
( 245 m) each) 
>10,000 lbs (4,356 kg) of 
iron 
1- 6-inch rifled gun 2 lifting rods  
90 shells for rifled gun 2- 8-inch gun carriages (damaged)  
4- 8-inch shell guns 3,300 lbs (1,497 kg) of boiler plate Items for crew 
>120- 8-inch shells 4 in. (10.16 cm) diameter hawser 36 pairs of handcuffs 
Complete tackle for 6 
guns 
1 coppered rudder and 2 
pintels 5 barrels of meat 
6 gun tackle for ship 
carriages 
2 wheel shafts (10,000 lbs 
(4,356 kg) each) 1 barrel of beans 
Conical shot 4 launches  
21- 13-inch shells   
1 fighting bolt (attaches 
barrel of portable 
howitzers to the carriage) 
  
 
 
 
 The Battle of Galveston was considered one of the greatest defeats of the Union 
Navy during the Civil War. Commander Farragut believed there was no justification for 
Westfield’s destruction or the abandonment of Harriet Lane. Farragut provided little 
respect or words of praise following the death of William B. Renshaw (Farragut 
1863c:447). With Renshaw no longer alive to take the full blame for the disaster, 
Commander Law became the scapegoat. He was court-martialed and removed from his 
position for three years (Cotham 1998:133). 
 The wreck of Westfield continued to rot away in the years after Battle of 
Galveston. William Watson, owner of the blockade runner Rob Roy, called the wreck, “a 
formidable looking pile of iron boilers and machinery sticking out of the water” (Watson 
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1892:171). By 1906, Westfield’s formidable pile of boilers and machinery had become a 
nuisance to local fishing boats. The engine shaft was still upright and 4 ft. (1.2 m) from 
the surface of the water. A snag boat was used to remove the majority of the wreck 
(McComb 1986:78-79,82-83). Most of the hull had rotted away, and a majority of the 
wreckage was broken up through dynamiting (Borgens et al. 2010:48).  
2.7 Conclusion 
 Westfield was a part of a small class of Union gunboats converted from New 
York ferryboats at a time when the U.S. Navy was desperate for shallow craft that could 
easily navigate the rivers and bays of the Southern states. Because of this feature, the 
gunboat was useful during many naval engagements in the Civil War, including the 
Battle of New Orleans, the attack on Matagorda Bay, and the capture of Galveston. On 1 
January 1863, Westfield ran aground in her attempt to destroy two Confederate 
‘cottonclads’ advancing on the Union ships in Galveston Bay. Unable to shift the vessel 
off the sand, Westfield’s captain, William B. Renshaw, scuttled the gunboat. The 
premature explosion killed Renshaw and all of Westfield’s officers, after which, the 
remaining Union ships retreated from the bay. After extensive salvaging by the 
Confederates, the wreckage of Westfield lay in the mud for almost 150 years until her 
excavation.
                                                
1 The diameter of the cylinder was confirmed by the author to be the outer diameter of the cylinder. After 
the concretion was removed from a known piece of the cylinder, the inside depth and width measurements 
were taken, and an inner diameter of 48.6 in. (123 cm) was calculated. Adding the wall thickness of 0.75 
in. (2 cm), the diameter of 50 in. (127 cm) was confirmed. After verifying the historical account, diameters 
of other artifacts could be measured to prove they were once part of the cylinder. In the case of the hot 
well pump, 132-017, the diameter was too small, at approximately 40 in. (102 cm), and the discovery was 
made by Justin Parkoff that the pump was not part of the cylinder but originally attached to the hot well.  
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3. CONSERVATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Conservation treatments of artifacts from marine sites, while time-consuming, 
are necessary for the post-excavation study and the curation and display of the artifacts 
in a museum. The removal of disfiguring concretions and biological growth, only 
completed during the conservation phase, can reveal important details that may 
compensate for the lack of exact provenience, as is the case for most of the artifacts from 
USS Westfield. With a collection as large as that of Westfield, artifacts are also available 
for conservation experiments and student training. Conservation of the Westfield artifacts 
at Texas A&M University’s Conservation Research Laboratory is predicted to continue 
until January of 2015. This section is intended as a discussion of the various methods 
applied to Westfield artifacts and not as a step-by-step guide for conservation.  
3.2 Iron  
Iron comprises the majority of artifacts preserved in the collection of USS 
Westfield. The iron machinery, including the boiler and firebox, and the plates that lined 
the outer hull, comprise a significant portion the finds in terms of weight and size.  
3.2.1 Iron Corrosion 
Only two primary types of iron existed before 1900, cast or wrought iron 
(Pearson 1987:212). Wrought iron is essentially pure iron, containing less that 0.2% 
carbon by weight, in the form of slag inclusions. The slag is beaten out of the iron as 
much as possible while the metal is worked in the forging process. The slag corrodes 
along the contact surface with the iron, causing longitudinal striations which have the 
appearance of wood grain. The corrosion occurs from the surface down to the center, 
parallel to the original surface. The iron ions are then deposited as iron oxides or 
carbonates, and the metal dissolves into the water. The original surface is generally not 
preserved as metal but may still exist in the corrosion products as a mold of the original 
artifact (Pearson 1987:77; Cronyn 2001:182-183). Wrought iron also has a tendency to 
corrode differentially in localized areas, or spots, resulting in a scattered, friable surface 
(MacLeod 2002:710). 
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Alloys added to iron can produce different properties, resulting in significant 
differences in corrosion. Cast iron contains a small percentage of carbon, approximately 
2-6% by weight, added through carburization, a process that is both time consuming and 
expensive. The higher carbon content in cast iron will have more anodic voltages and a 
less negative electropotential than wrought iron. As cast iron corrodes in sea water, the 
outer surfaces undergo graphitization. The carbon, in the form of graphite, acts as the 
noble or cathodic part of a galvanic corrosion cell. Pearlite in the iron acts as the anode 
and corrodes, which causes the artifact to lose density and mechanical strength. Flakes of 
graphite survive in a three-dimensional matrix that contain iron oxides and iron 
carbonates, causing the corroded surface to become soft. This graphitized zone creates 
an outer shell, covering the corrosion that travels to the center of the artifact. Closer to 
the iron core, cementite needles appear in the graphite, followed by a layer of pearlite 
underneath. Layers of ferrite form below the pearlite and nearer to the surface of the 
intact metal. Until the graphite matrix overtakes the entire cast iron artifact and breaks 
down, cast iron will remain in a solid form at the core, even if the iron is totally corroded 
and covered in corrosion products. The graphitized zone has a very light weight and is 
very unstable, which can cause this outer zone to rapidly break down after excavation. 
Because cast iron’s complex nature, it is much more difficult to conserve, being more 
sensitive and time-consuming than wrought iron (Pearson 1987:77,79; Hamilton 
1996:46; Cronyn 2001:176,185; Selwyn et al. 2001:110; MacLeod 2002:706).  
The majority of cast iron artifacts excavated from Westfield are preserved in a 
transition phase. The graphitized zone is still intact but fragile. The smallest artifacts cast 
iron artifacts have completely corroded, leaving a mold of the original artifact which can 
be cast. The difficulty arises in the artifacts that still contain the original iron core, yet 
the surrounding original surface has completely converted into corrosion products. For 
these cases, the cavities are filled with epoxy resin gradually as they are cleaned. Once 
the concretion is removed, the half-epoxy, half-iron artifact is molded and then cast to 
create an entirely epoxy cast. This complete epoxy cast is necessary because the iron will 
continue to corrode and separate from the epoxy sections.  
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The basic electrochemical reaction that iron undergoes as corrosion occurs is the 
same for wrought and cast iron. During the corrosion process, electrons are released 
from the iron atom as the metal breaks down, and the atom forms a ferrous ion, or a 
positively charged cation. This process requires oxygen, hence the name oxidation. The 
production of iron ions occurs at anodic areas. 
 
Fe→ Fe2+ + 2e-   
      
Reduction occurs at the cathode and involves the consumption of the loose electrons. 
The rate of this consumption controls the rate of corrosion at the anode, as both reactions 
must occur at the same rate to maintain neutrality in the charges. The surrounding 
environment provides the oxygen and water molecules that can act as the cathode to 
form a hydroxyl ion. If no oxygen is present, the hydrogen accepts the electrons to form 
stable hydrogen molecules. 
 
O2 + 2H2O + 4e- → 4OH-     
    
These reactions form a current called the corrosion cell and is summarized below: 
 
4Fe + 2H2O + 3O2 → 4FeO(OH)  
    
In addition, any remaining iron ions react with ions in the seawater to make corrosion 
products such as carbonates, oxides, hydroxides, and sulfates which are deposited on the 
surface of the iron. These form a hard concretion and block the seawater from contact 
with the original surface, stifling further corrosion in a process called passivation 
(Pearson 1987:68-69; Cronyn 2001:166-168).  
The types of corrosion products present in the concretion greatly depend on the 
environment and the type of iron. For marine artifacts, the majority of the concretion is 
calcium carbonate, generally located on the outer layers of the concretion (Selwyn et al. 
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2001:110). The outer layers also contain high proportions of magnesium carbonate, 
hydroxides, siderite, and iron (III) sulfate, which create a concrete-like substance around 
the artifacts. The inner layers of the iron concretion consist of iron oxides and hydrated 
oxides. Both concretion layer types can sometimes cover an entire deposit or can trap 
non-ferrous metals or organic material (Cronyn 2001:171-172,179,181).  
 Corrosion can continue underneath the corrosion products. The electrons 
produced during the oxidation reaction flow from the anodic to cathodic areas through 
the metal. Any resistance in the iron will slow this movement. Electrons build up at the 
anode, causing the electro-potential (Ecorr) of the anode to become more negative while 
the cathode becomes more positive. Cations are created at the anodes during the release 
of the electrons and anions are generated at the cathodes. The diffusion of cations to the 
cathodic areas and anions to the anodic areas happens easily in seawater that has high 
ionic conductivity and a supply of dissolved oxygen (Pearson 1987:68,69,74). 
However, chlorides in the seawater are more aggressive and can pass through the 
concretion and continue to attack the metal. This reaction does the greatest damage to 
archaeological iron (Hamilton 1996:44).  
 
Fe2+ + 2Cl- → FeCl2 
         
Chloride ions may account for up to 13% weight of iron and cause iron ions to 
precipitate out as iron oxides and iron oxyhydroxides in the concretion, as opposed to on 
the surface of the iron. For cast iron, chloride ions are dispersed in the graphitized areas, 
while for wrought iron, the ions congregate around exposed areas on the metal surface 
and the slag. Once the concretion is removed, chloride ions will migrate and diffuse off 
the original surface (Selwyn et al. 2001:110).  
3.2.2 Corrosion Rates 
 Each iron object is subjected to varying conditions which result in varying 
amounts of corrosion. Factors that influence the corrosion of iron include the 
composition, temperature, and pH of the water, the composition and depth of burial in 
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the seabed, marine growth, water movement, and proximity to other objects. For 
example, the cathodic reaction is controlled by oxygen reduction, and the availability of 
oxygen will vary depending on temperature. Estuarine environments, like Galveston 
Bay, or polluted waters will have lower levels of dissolved oxygen due to increased 
biological activity (Pearson 1987:68,69,74). Wooden objects have an adverse affect on 
iron and were commonly found near or concreted to iron artifacts found on Westfield. 
Wood takes up the dissolved oxygen and creates an anaerobic environment around the 
iron. As a result, sulfate-reducing bacteria grow using the wood as nourishment and 
create hydrogen sulfite as a by-product, which reacts with the iron and increases the 
corrosion rate (Hamilton 1998). Other metal artifacts can influence corrosion rates 
through galvanic coupling. The metal with the lower, or more negative Ecorr, or 
electropotential, will have an increased rate of galvanic corrosion while the higher or 
less negative Ecorr will experience galvanic protection (Pearson 1987:72). For example, 
the electroplated silver condiment cap (109-010.1) was concreted to a large iron bolt 
which likely experienced galvanic corrosion in favor of the silver, a nobler element with 
a higher Ecorr.   
 Corrosion rates can aid in the understanding of corrosion mechanisms and the 
deterioration of iron, as well as provide a general sense for the thickness of concretion 
on the artifacts. Despite the differences between wrought and cast iron, both corrode at 
the same rate. Corrosion rates have an average minimum of 0.004 in/yr (0.1 mm/yr). 
However, they are greatly dependent on the electropotential (Ecorr) and the pH of the 
surrounding seawater and iron (Pearson 1987:77; MacLeod 2002:698-699).  Ian 
MacLeod found that in southern Australian waters, the corrosion rates of shipwrecks 
depended on the depth of the wreck because dissolved oxygen concentrations increased 
as the temperature and salinity decreased at lower depths. MacLeod’s equation to 
calculate corrosion rates for open ocean wrecks applies specifically to southern 
Australian latitudes: 
 
Icorr = 0.2438 – 0.0107 m + 0.000 m2   
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In this quadratic equation, Icorr is the corrosion rate and m represents the depth of the 
shipwreck in meters. Westfield sank in the warm waters of Galveston Bay, far from 
southern Australia. However, with a lack of environmental data or comparative wrecks, 
this equation is a best attempt at estimating a corrosion rate more fitting than an average 
minimum. Although the gunboat ran aground and sank at a much shallower depth of 
approximately 7-8 ft. (2.13-2.43 m), Westfield was discovered at a depth of 47 ft. (14.3 
m), believed to be her depth for the majority of the time between sinking and excavation. 
Using MacLeod’s equation, the corrosion rate for Westfield can be estimated at 0.005 
in/yr (0.13 mm). However, the thick layer of concretion can decrease corrosion rate by 
blocking access to dissolved oxygen and creating a microenvironment on the surface of 
the metal, with an increased chloride concentration and a more acidic pH. In addition, in 
the swift currents of Galveston Bay, concretion could be accidentally removed, allowing 
the chlorides and lower pH of the microenvironment to accelerate corrosion. Therefore, 
any estimation of corrosion rates must be considered in the general sense, while artifacts 
must be considered individually (MacLeod 2002:698-703).  
3.2.3 Treatment 
Conservation treatments of cast and wrought iron have two goals; to lower the 
concentration of chloride ions and reduce the iron ions to magnetite in order to preserve 
the greatest amount of iron, and more importantly, to preserve the original surface in the 
corrosion layers. Two primary treatments applied to marine iron artifacts, alkaline 
sodium sulfite and electrolysis, can effectively accomplish those goals. However, 
problems are encountered with the treatment of cast iron versus that of wrought iron. 
3.2.3.1 Chloride Diffusion 
 Chlorides present in iron are primarily FeOCl and FeCl3. These molecules must 
first dissolve to produce free Cl- ions which move from the iron and corrosion to the 
wash solution. This diffusion is described using Fick’s Second Law of Diffusion: 
 !"!" = 𝐷  𝛻  𝐶  
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D is the diffusion constant, 𝛻 is Laplace’s operator, and C is the concentration of 
chlorides at a specific time and place. The equation shows that the release of chlorides 
from the iron is controlled through the diffusion rate or coefficient, which depends on 
the artifacts’ volume, properties, porosity, and initial chloride distribution. This rate can 
only be determined for artifact samples that are constant in composition and structure. 
Therefore exact solutions to this equation cannot be found for marine artifacts of varying 
sizes and shapes. To account for this, the diffusion coefficient can be determined from a 
graph of the total chloride ions released from an artifact in grams, labeled Q by N.A. 
North and C. Pearson, against the square root of time, or t. If all other variables remain 
constant during the extraction of chloride ions, the graph will produce a linear equation, 
resulting in a diffusion coefficient that will remain constant over time.   
 This concept has many applications concerning the treatment of iron. Primarily, 
diffusion coefficients aid in the evaluation of treatments, particularly electrolysis. A 
constant diffusion coefficient from gradually increasing chloride content, measured 
using the mercuric nitrate test, shows that there is no advantage to replacing wash 
solutions until the chlorides in the solution and the artifacts reach equilibrium. Once this 
equilibrium is reached, the chloride content measurements will stabilize, and the 
diffusion of chloride from the artifacts will dramatically slow down. This allows the 
conservator to more efficiently treat iron artifacts, and treatment times can be determined 
more methodically.  
If the diffusion rate is known to be constant, manipulation of treatment 
conditions can be applied experimentally to increase or decrease this rate. The chloride 
extraction rate has been proven to increase with an increase in temperature, dependent 
on time. If this temperature is raised to 80ºC (176ºF), the increased diffusion rate was 
found to be permanent. Changes in pH have been found not to have a great effect, but 
the addition of sodium hydroxide, with the higher mobility of hydroxide ions, can 
penetrate the corrosion more quickly and aid in the release of chlorides. Electrolysis and 
sodium sulfite treatments can both increase the rate of diffusion, but this rate varies 
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between artifacts, especially by volume, but also dependent on porosity, initial chloride 
content, and properties of the metal (North and Pearson 1978a:26,28,30; North and 
Pearson 1978b:174-185). 
 More recently, amendments to this theory have been proposed by Selwyn et al. 
(2001:113,117).  The constant or uniform diffusion rate through time indicates that the 
chloride ions are evenly dispersed throughout the iron artifact. However, if the chloride 
ions were concentrated at the surface of the iron, then a more abrupt model is more 
descriptive, where the graph of the diffusion rate remains lower for an initial amount of 
time, then increases steadily before creating a plateau at the top of the graph. This graph 
explains that the artifact must first be passivated, or the corrosion stopped, before 
chloride ions can diffuse out. In addition, the uniform diffusion rate does not apply to 
artifacts that change shape during the treatment, i.e. concretion layers falling off. 
However, the uniform rate is more applicable to treatments that involve the removal of 
the corrosion products beforehand, as generally practiced with marine artifacts. 
3.2.3.2 Alkaline Sodium Sulfite Treatment 
 The alkaline sodium sulfite treatment is primarily used for cast iron but is applied 
to wrought iron as well. The purpose of this method is to increase the porosity of the iron 
in order to increase the rate of chloride release and harden the graphitized zone of cast 
iron. At a high pH in the presence of sodium hydroxide, ferric chloride (FeCl3) 
precipitates to form ferric oxyhydroxide through the polymerization of iron hydroxide. 
The ferric oxyhydroxide undergoes reduction by the sodium sulfite to magnetite. 
However, the sodium sulfite treatment is most effective as the reducing agent that 
prevents corrosion and allows chloride ions to diffuse from the metal (Gilberg and 
Seeley 1982:180; Pearson 1987:222-223; Cronyn 2001:199). As a result, the focus of 
this treatment is the diffusion of chlorides to stabilize the artifacts when they appear too 
weak to undergo electrolysis. The treatment is most applicable to small, cast iron 
artifacts that still contain an iron core, which would otherwise disintegrate during 
treatment (Hamilton 1996:79-80). In addition, this method is more effective directly 
following excavation and when concretion layers are not allowed to dry out (Gilberg and 
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Seeley 1982:183). Following conservation with sodium sulfite, the residual treatment 
products after conservation do not increase the corrosion of the artifact unless the 
relative humidity rises above 75% (Rimmer and Watkinson 2010:16-22).  
 The small, cast iron artifacts in the Westfield collection were treated using 
sodium sulfite. First, concretion was cleaned mechanically from the artifacts’ surfaces. 
They were placed in an airtight container with 0.5 M sodium hydroxide and 0.5 M 
sodium sulfite, with deionized water. Three consecutive treatments six weeks in length 
were used to effectively remove the chlorides. The baths are mixed quickly and sealed to 
avoid oxidation, then heated continuously at 60ºC (140ºF). Due to alkaline sodium 
sulfites interference with the mercuric nitrate tests, preventing the test from reaching an 
end point, the chloride levels were measured from the rinse solutions following 
treatment to confirm the salts had reached a safe or minimal level. Following the 
treatment, the artifacts were rinsed in baths of deionized water, coated in tannic acid, and 
sealed in a layer of microcrystalline wax (Hamilton 1996:77-88; Donny Hamilton 2013, 
pers. comm.).  
3.2.3.3 Electrolysis 
 Following arrival at the Conservation Research Laboratory, the iron artifacts of 
Westfield were stored in tap water with a low concentration of sodium hydroxide, about 
2-5%, which passivates the iron at a high pH from 10-12 and allows the chlorides to 
begin to diffuse out. Treatment began with mechanical cleaning and the removal of the 
corrosion products using pneumatic air scribes and dental picks.  
 The less fragile iron objects were treated in baths of 2% sodium hydroxide, in 
either mild steel or heavy plastic vats to undergo electrolytic reduction. Electrolysis 
effectively increases the diffusion of chlorides and causes the reduction of iron corrosion 
to magnetite. An electrolytic cell is created, using a power source to supply the electric 
current, with the artifact acting as the negatively charged cathode to which positively 
charged iron ions travel and a mild steel mesh positively-charged anode to which 
electrons travel. Reduction takes place at the cathode and oxidation at the anode. The 
conservator adjusts the applied electromagnetic field which controls current density 
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(Hamilton 1996:56-60). Lower currents prevent corrosion, called cathodic desalting. 
When the current density is increased, the reduction of iron oxyhydroxides and iron 
oxychloride to magnetite occurs and releases chlorides. The magnetite is less dense and 
more porous, allowing for the diffusion coefficient to increase which decreases the 
amount of treatment time (North and Pearson 1978a:30-31; Cronyn 2001:199). The 
diffusion of chlorides is measured using the mercuric nitrate test described by Hamilton 
(1996:60-62). The chlorides, measured in parts per million, are recorded weekly until 
they are at a minimal level, commonly below 50 parts per million. 
 For more efficient treatments, multiple artifacts are placed in the same bath and 
are treated until the chlorides of the solution are minimal. Following electrolysis, the 
artifacts are washed in three consecutive baths of boiling deionized water. After the final 
bath and while still hot, the artifacts are painted with tannic acid and allowed to cool. 
Tannic acid is applied again in two coats before the artifacts were coated in 
microcrystalline wax to seal the iron from the surrounding environment. Hamilton 
(1996, 1998) and Cronyn (2001) are recommended for a more detailed explanation of 
electrolysis methods.  
3.2.4 Cast Iron: Problems and Solutions 
 After treatment began on the initial cast iron artifacts to be conserved, cracking 
and spalling was observed on the outer edges of the iron. This occurred consistently, 
affected neither by size, shape, treatment, or location. Cracking also occasionally 
occurred after the corrosion products were removed and before treatment began.  
 Because this was not observed with the wrought iron, the assumption is made 
that the cracking occurred in the graphitized zone of the cast iron. N.A. North in Pearson 
(1987:212-213) observed that if cast iron is allowed to dry out in air, iron chloride with 
decompose to form Fe2O3, FeCl3, HCl, and FeO(OH) which creates ideal conditions for 
increased corrosion. In addition, exposure to the environment will weaken the bond 
between the graphitized zone and the metallic core, ultimately resulting in the breaking 
off of the graphite during treatment. Pearson (1987:109-110) concurred, including that 
graphite is very unstable and rapid corrosion can force the surface layers off. In addition, 
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the evolution of hydrogen gas during electrolytic reduction can also cause this 
graphitized layer to break off. N.A. North recommended storing artifacts in a solution of 
sodium hydroxide and keeping the artifact wet, a practiced treatment at CRL. However, 
he also recommended treating cast iron artifacts individually to avoid a concentration of 
current on any one particular artifact, a method that is not always feasible economically 
when treating a collection as large as Westfield’s (Pearson 1987:227). 
 Keeping the artifact wet continuously can also become a problem in practice. The 
artifact may become partially exposed if not monitored carefully or partially dry out 
during mechanical cleaning. However, North does not speculate on the amount of time 
an artifact is left in a dry environment before an increase in corrosion and damage to the 
graphitized zone occurs.  
 To confirm North’s theory, an experiment was conducted to discover if the trend 
of spalling and cracking is related to time spent in a dry environment, and if so, what is 
the length of time spent in a dry environment until the effects are observed. Knowing 
that the artifacts were quickly stored in water after excavation, brought to CRL still in 
water, and stored wet until treatment, the assumption was made that the cast iron 
artifacts could have only been dry for short periods of time before treatment. For this 
test, a Priority 1 artifact consisting of 24 cast iron coupons cut from a piece of diamond 
pattern floor plating was treated using alkaline sodium sulfite and electrolytic reduction. 
The coupons measured 3 in. by 3 in. (7.62 cm x 7.62 cm) and were similar in chloride 
content, state of preservation, and composition. Two coupons were used for each test 
and were divided into different treatments, shown in the table below (Table 3.1). The 
control treatment was a bath of 2% NaOH in deionized water. The alkaline sulfite and 
electrolytic reduction treatments were consistent with the methods described above. 
Each test group in electrolytic reduction shared a vat, two coupons per vat, due to supply 
and space constraints.  
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Table 3.1. Treatment test groups. 
 Minimal time 1 hour 6 hours 24 hours 
Control 2 coupons 2 coupons 2 coupons 2 coupons 
Alkaline sulfite 2 coupons 2 coupons 2 coupons 2 coupons 
ER 1 coupon 1 coupon 1 coupon 1 coupon 
ER (drilled) 1 coupon 1 coupon 1 coupon 1 coupon 
 
 
 A large piece of cast iron diamond-pattern plate was chosen for this experiment 
because it could be evenly cut into small 3 in. (7.62 cm) coupons using a tile saw. Once 
these samples were cut, they were weighed and measured, recording the length, width, 
and thickness.  The samples were left to dry as shown in Table 3.1, after which, each 
sample was photographed on all six sides (shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2). The control 
samples were placed into individual sealed containers in a solution of 2% sodium 
hydroxide.  One sample from each test group treated with electrolytic reduction was 
drilled, as recommended by Dr. Donny Hamilton, so that a screw could be inserted and 
attached to the inner iron core (Donny Hamilton 2012, pers. comm.). This allowed for 
the electrical current to be conducted directly to the iron core, bypassing the resistant 
outer layer of graphite. The other samples treated with electrolytic reduction were 
attached to the current in the typical manner, which a clip on the surface of the artifact. 
The chlorides were monitored weekly through the treatment and the sodium hydroxide 
electrolyte was replaced subjectively, based on the individual chloride readings on each 
bath, measured with the mercuric nitrate test. The samples treated with alkaline sodium 
sulfite were placed in separate airtight containers containing 20 g of sodium hydroxide 
and 126 g of sodium sulfite per 1 L of water. The containers were placed in an oven 
heated to 60°C (140° F). Following treatment, the samples were again measured, 
weighed, and photographed. They were boiled to remove the sodium hydroxide and 
sodium sulfite, and the salts were measured from the boiled water.  
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Figure 3.1. Experiment observations. Monitoring chlorides (left) and images of each 
face after drying (right). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Cast iron coupons left to dry after 30 minutes. 
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 The chloride readings were converted from parts per million (ppm) to mg/L then 
multiplied by the volume of each container to give the amount of chlorides in milligrams 
diffused from the artifacts each week. This was graphed against the square root of time 
in days, according to North and Pearson (1978a:26,28,30; 1978b:174-185), mentioned 
above in Section 3.2.3.1. These graphs are shown in the Appendix (Tables A-3-A-6). 
The results did not show the strict linear diffusion of salts, nor the abrupt model outlined 
by Selwyn et al. (2001:113,117).  In the first case, the variable nature of the laboratory 
conditions and the slight differences in each artifact did not produce a straight line. In 
the latter case, the concretion was removed from the artifacts before they were placed in 
electrolysis and the extremely porous nature of the graphite would have allowed the salts 
to migrate through the entire graphite layer. Despite this, a general upward trend was 
observed when studying the graphs and best fit lines were drawn to connect as many 
points between vat changes as possible. The points on either end of these best fit lines 
were connected by a straight line and the slope was calculated. These slopes were 
averaged to provide a diffusion coefficient for each vat. The diffusion coefficients for 
the control, 60 minutes, 6 hour, and 24 hour vats were 150 mg/sq. rt. of t, 197 mg/sq. rt. 
of t, 221 mg/sq. rt. of t, and 204.5 mg/sq. rt. of t, respectively. The importance of these 
numbers is not in their accuracy, they would change had different points been selected 
for the averages, but in their relationship to each other. The diffusion coefficient for the 
control was much lower than the coefficient for the artifacts left out for any length of 
time. In addition, no trend was observed in the diffusion coefficient for the air dried 
artifacts. Instead, the coefficient consistently hovers around 200 mg/sq. rt. of t. This 
higher diffusion coefficient is caused small fractures in the graphite from exposure to air 
which results in a faster rate for the diffusion of chlorides. This higher diffusion 
coefficient was seen for all three drying periods, indicating that even a small amount of 
time, for the first test one hour, can cause this damage. 
 This result would also seem to indicate that once done, the damage to the 
graphite layer does not worsen when air dried for a longer period of time, even up to 24 
hours. However, upon visual inspections of the samples left to dry for 24 hours, physical 
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damage to the graphite layer indicated otherwise. The graphite layer for these samples 
was easily damaged upon handling, a corner breaking off when the sample was removed 
from the vat, and the surface was visibly softer than the other samples. In addition, both 
of the 24 hour samples treated in ER had small blisters on the smooth surface of the 
diamond-pattern face, caused by the diffusion of hydrogen from the core and a much 
weaker graphite layer.  
 After treatment, the samples placed into both sodium sulfite and electrolysis were 
boiled and rinsed in deionized water. This provided the first opportunity to measure the 
chlorides for the artifacts treated in sulfite. The chloride readings for the sodium sulfite 
artifacts, the samples treated with electrolysis but not drilled to directly connect the iron 
core to the current, and the samples which were treated with electrolysis and drilled were 
121 ppm, 43 ppm, and 14 ppm, respectively. After a few days of rinses in boiling 
deionized water, the chloride measurements for all three sample types were minimal, at 
or below 10 ppm, showing that each treatment was successful at reducing the chlorides 
in the artifacts. 
 These results provide recommended treatments for the remaining cast iron 
artifacts from Westfield. First, the conservator should be mindful of how long the 
artifacts are left in open air during concretion removal and treatment set up, as short as 
an hour of drying time damages the graphite. Constant and vigilant rinsing with water 
will alleviate this problem. This is already conducted at the Conservation Research 
Laboratory and this experiment serves as a reminder of how important that is. Second, 
drilling the cast iron artifacts to provide a direct current to the iron core is recommended 
for artifacts sturdy and large enough to be drilled. This treatment is currently being 
conducted on several large pieces of the cylinder and the results are promising. The 
concretion layers are cleaving off easily during mechanical cleaning and no spalling has 
been observed. After treatment, the perforation caused from drilling will be filled and 
sealed with wax, obscuring the mark.  
 This experiment was conducted to solve a problem observed on Westfield cast 
iron, using the treatments and monitoring methods available to conservators at CRL. For 
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conservators facing similar dilemmas on contemporary sites, this treatment is also 
recommended. While this method may seem unorthodox, or even destructive to the 
artifacts, the benefits of lower levels of salts and a stronger iron core outweighs the 
negative aspects. However, this treatment should only be used on artifacts with an iron 
core, where there is very little surface detail that could be damaged, and most 
importantly, on artifacts that are sturdy enough to be propped up under a drill press and 
bear the strength of the drill. Leaving the concretion on the underside of the surface 
being drilled will prevent the drill from breaking off the graphite on that side. In 
addition, a low current density during the initial phase of electrolysis is highly 
recommended to prevent damage to the surface.  
3.3 Copper 
Second only to iron, cupreous artifacts are the most common metal found on 
19th- century shipwrecks, used primarily as sheathing to protect the wooden hull from 
teredo worm damage. Like lead, copper is toxic to marine organisms, which impedes 
their growth on the artifacts. At seawater temperatures, copper ions oxidize to cuprous 
(I) and cupric (II). The ions combine with the chlorine and oxygen in the surrounding 
environment to form primarily copper oxides, cuprous chloride, and copper (II) chloride. 
Others include cuprous carbonate, azurite, and malachite. Like iron, the copper atoms 
corrode by losing an electron and bonding with another anion in the surrounding 
environment. 
 
Cu – e- → Cu+ 
 
Cu+ + Cl- → CuCl 
 
Copper corrodes at a rate of 0.008 in./yr (0.2 mm/yr) at seawater temperatures, 
about 15°C (59°F), and this rate increases by a factor of 2 for every 10°C (50ºF) rise in 
temperature. However, the corrosion rate decreases when the copper undergoes galvanic 
coupling with iron, and many copper artifacts from Westfield were found encased in iron 
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concretion. As a result, only a small amount of copper corrosion products were found on 
the cupreous objects. Additionally, a layer of calcium carbonate precipitated from the 
seawater can be deposited on the copper, and marine organisms can attach themselves on 
the layer. This latter phenomenon was not generally observed on Westfield copper 
artifacts. In addition, although to a lesser extent than lead, grit and sand in the seawater 
can erode and damage copper artifacts (Pearson 1987:81-81,83-84; Hamilton 1996:90-
92). 
 Storage in a neutral or alkaline solution passivates the copper artifacts after 
excavation due to a thin oxide layer that is formed on the surface. Deionized water or 
sodium carbonate, at a 5% solution in deionized water, will suffice for this purpose. For 
the Westfield artifacts, treatment began with the removal of corrosion products 
mechanically, with tooth brushes and pneumatic chisels for larger deposits. The copper 
artifacts were treated with electrolytic reduction in a solution of 2% sodium hydroxide, 
with mild steel mesh as the anode. The artifacts were then placed in three baths of 
boiling deionized water and polished with sodium bicarbonate to remove any residual 
corrosion products (Hamilton 1996:92). Following polishing, the artifacts were 
immersed in a 2% solution of benzotriazole (BTA), which inhibits corrosion by forming 
a stable polymeric coating that seals the copper from the atmosphere, effectively 
stopping any cathodic or anodic reactions from occurring. A coat of microcrystalline 
wax or Krylon spray is added as an additional sealant to ensure the artifact is completely 
sealed from the surrounding environment (Pearson 1987:237). 
3.4 Lead 
Lead artifacts found at the site of Westfield include lead belt buckles, a small, 
square lead sheet, and amorphous, non-diagnostic lead pieces. The explosion and 
subsequent erosion by sand and sea water left many of these pieces unrecognizable. 
Lead was commonly used on ships as sheeting, stripping, weights, copper sheathing 
repair, or shot (Pearson 1987:89,243). 
 In seawater, lead is less susceptible to corrosion than iron or copper. Lead 
corrosion products consist of lead (II) sulfate (PbSO4) and lead chloride (Pb(OH)Cl). 
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Lead sulfate creates a coating that passivates the metal and impedes further corrosion. 
When exposed to seawater, a thin, white layer may form, composed of cerussite, or lead 
carbonate, and hydrocerussite, or basic lead carbonate, which crystallizes and protects 
the lead. This layer was occasionally observed on artifacts excavated at the Westfield 
site.  
 While the corrosion products on the Westfield lead were stable, the lead was 
cleaned mechanically using tooth brushes and dental picks, careful to avoid scratching 
the soft surfaces of lead artifacts. Hydrochloric acid (1 M HCl) was also used to clean 
the lead chemically, removing any carbonates or organic debris on the surface (Pearson 
1987:243-244; Hamilton 1996:104; Cronyn 2001:202,204). Lead can be dissolved in 
‘soft’, or deionized, water, so the HCl was mixed in tap water and the lead rinsed in tap 
water following treatment (Pearson 1987:244; Hamilton 1996:104). After rinsing, the 
lead was left to air dry and coated in microcrystalline wax to protect the artifacts from 
the surrounding environment and to make them safe to handle for analysis (Hamilton 
1996:106). 
3.5 Ceramics and Glass 
3.5.1 Ceramics 
 The ceramics from the site of Westfield consist of fragments of whiteware, 
ironstone, stoneware, and porcelain. Calcium deposits and iron corrosion covered the 
surfaces, occasionally surrounding the fragment completely. In addition, surface damage 
included abrasion from the environment and flaking due to salt crystallization (Pearson 
1987:99-101). Prior to conservation, the ceramics were stored in deionized water to 
remove any salts. Most fragments had corrosion products or marine life that was cleaned 
mechanically using a toothbrush and dental tools. If staining was present, the ceramics 
were placed in a solution of 10% hydrochloric acid in tap water in conjunction with 
mechanical cleaning. If the hydrochloric acid failed to remove the stain, a solution of 
10% oxalic acid in deionized water was used to remove the remaining stains.  
Following concretion and stain removal, consolidation is the typical conservation 
method used to conserve ceramics. For consolidation, a 5-20% solution of Paraloid B-72 
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or polyvinyl acetate (PVA) in acetone is either applied to the surface or is used as a bath 
to consolidate the body of the ceramic (Hamilton 1996:21).  The consolidant should not 
alter the appearance of the ceramic, so attention must be paid to the concentration of the 
resin and the solvent’s evaporation rate based on the conservator’s experience (Pearson 
1987:257).    
However, silicone oil was used to treat the ceramics from Westfield because 
silicone oil bonds with the surface of the ceramic, creating thin layers of protection. 
Silicone atoms form chains by bonding with oxygen atoms through polymerization. A 
catalyst cross-links the bonds to form chains that lock into place around the artifact. The 
silicone oil is made of various molecular weights that produce different results. Different 
combinations of silicone oils and cross-linker percentages are used on a variety of 
materials to produce different results, depending on aesthetic considerations (Helen 
Dewolf 2011, pers. comm.). In many instances, this treatment is seldom required by 
ceramics as it is more expensive and labor intensive than consolidation and not generally 
reversible. 
 After the ceramics were rinsed in tap water and deionized water to remove the 
acids, they were placed in dehydration baths outlined below in Table 3.2. The fragments 
were placed in each bath for a period of two weeks. Dehydration is necessary to remove 
all traces of water before being placed in silicone oils. When mixed with water, silicone 
oil forms silicone rubber which is very difficult to remove from the surface of the 
artifact. Once dehydrated, the fragments were placed into a solution of 85% silicone 
polymer, made up of 66% SFD-1 and 34% SFD-5, and 15% methtrimethoxysilane 
(MTMS) cross-linker. This was placed under a vacuum to facilitate the replacement of 
acetone with the silicone oil. The vacuum was increased then decreased slowly at regular 
intervals to ensure all the acetone was removed and the ceramic fragments were not 
damaged. Following removal from the vacuum, the ceramic fragments were allowed to 
drain before exposure to dibutyltin-diacetate (DBTDA) vapors. The DBTDA vapors act 
as a catalyst, which links the silicone polymer chains and creates the silicone oil layer 
around the artifact.  
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Table 3.2. Standard Conservation Research Laboratory dehydration sequence.  
Bath  Bath  
1 75% DI water/25% ethanol 6 75% ethanol, 25% acetone 
2 50% DI water/50% ethanol 7 50% ethanol/50% acetone 
3 25% DI water/75% ethanol 8 25% ethanol/75% acetone 
4 100% ethanol 9 100% acetone 
5 100% ethanol 10 100% acetone 
  
 
3.5.2 Glass 
 Glass from Westfield was fragmentary and often non-diagnostic. Most glass 
recovered from the site was deposited long after Westfield sank, and the modern 
intrusive glass was not treated. Due to the initial explosion, subsequent erosion, and 
salvage techniques, the site was not expected to yield complete glass artifacts.  
Glass consists of silica, alkali or soda ash and potash, and flux or lime, used as a 
stabilizer. By the 19th century, glass formulas became more stable than in previous 
centuries. Impervious to salts, 19th-century glass generally only suffers from 
devitrification when found in salt water environments (Hamilton 1996:22). As the glass 
is exposed to salt water, sodium and potassium hydroxides enter the silica structure of 
the glass and produce hydrated glass. This forms thin layers of glass which are easily 
spalled or eroded and provide access for the hydroxides to the body of the glass. 
Gradually, the glass becomes opaque and breaks down (Pearson 1987:101-102). 
Therefore, the conservation of glass requires consolidation similar to ceramic artifacts. 
While Westfield glass did not exhibit delamination, as generally only seen on 17th-18th 
century glass, to protect the fragments from further damage, the glass underwent 
passivation polymerization and catalyzation. The silicone polymer coats the glass to 
consolidate and bond with the surface, creating a layer that stops devitrification (Smith 
2003:96,98). The glass was treated in the same way and at the same time as the ceramics 
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described above. However, this treatment is only recommended for unique or fragile 
artifacts. 
3.6 Organics 
Well-preserved organics are typically unique to underwater archaeological sites. 
The term organics envelops many types of materials, and the properties of each type 
need to be considered before conservation begins. For organic artifacts, a successful 
conservation method will depend how close the final results resemble the original 
appearance (Pearson 1987:122). Conservation methods for organic artifacts from the site 
of Westfield are unique because of the large amount of iron present on the site which 
caused many of the organic artifacts to exhibit iron corrosion. The conservation methods 
discussed focus on treatment using silicone polymers, while individual cleaning methods 
vary. While silicone oil has proven to be successful for the treatment of many organic 
materials, the expense associated with the treatment may not be feasible for very large 
artifacts or collections.  
3.6.1 Wood  
Very little wood was found at the site of Westfield relative to the amount of wood 
that was used during the ship’s construction. Most fragments are small and impregnated 
with corrosion products. A number of wood fragments exhibited evidence of fasteners, 
primarily bolts. The proximity of the wood to corroding iron preserved the fragments but 
also made their conservation more difficult. 
While there are many methods for conserving waterlogged wood, none fulfill 
every requirement of the conservator. Many methods claim to be reversible; however, 
difficulties arise with the removal of bulking agents, and freeze drying can turn the wood 
a dull gray color, although this method is very useful for larger pieces. Due to the small 
size of the Westfield wood fragments, a silicone polymer treatment was used. 
Upon arrival at the Conservation Research Laboratory, the waterlogged wood, 
along with other organics, was stored in covered containers, the covers preventing 
biological growth before treatment. Conservation began with mechanical cleaning with 
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pneumatic chisels and tooth brushes. Pneumatic chisels were used frequently due to the 
large amount of concretion present on most of the wood artifacts.  
Iron corrosion imbedded in the wood was removed using baths of dibasic 
ammonium citrate, a chelating or sequestering agent.  Other options for removing the 
iron include citric acid, oxalic acid, formic acid, acetic acid, and disodium-
ethylenediaminotetraacetic acid (EDTA). However, none of these acids can remove iron 
sulfides and may have some adverse effects. Except EDTA, the compounds have a pH 
less than five, which has been observed to cause damage to organic artifacts (Pearson 
1987:126-127,195). Unlike acids, which use their hydrogen ion to extract hydroxyl ions 
from the ferric hydroxide in the wood, leaving the iron in a freed ferrous form, chelating 
agents are electron donors. They bond with a metal ion to form ring structures, thereby 
extracting only the iron from the wood. Because of this, chelating agents can remove all 
iron ions, including iron sulfides (Pearson 1987:126-127,195; Rodgers 2004:152).  
While a 2% ammonium citrate treatment was chosen to treat the iron 
impregnated wood, EDTA is the most commonly used chelating agent in conservation 
and was a viable option.  Both compounds have a pH at approximately five and are less 
of a risk to organic artifacts than other acids. However, an EDTA solution can cause the 
wood to soften after prolonged exposure greater than 24-36 hours.  In contrast to fast 
treatments in strong solutions, repeated, lengthy baths in weaker solutions, such as 2% 
ammonium citrate, are more effective and more easily monitored (Pearson 
1987:127,195,244; Stambolov 1968:45). In addition, the use of EDTA as a chelating 
agent generates two reactions, a Lewis-Brönsted equilibrium and a Lewis acid/base 
equilibrium. These compete and slow down the efficiency of EDTA. Therefore, EDTA 
requires deprotonization before the solution is used and the addition of a metal ion buffer 
to increase the selectivity of the solution. The higher selectivity of ammonium citrate is 
more efficient due to the reduced destructive secondary reactions and effects (Chartier 
1991:73-75).  
 Once the iron corrosion products are removed, the wood fragments are placed in 
dehydration baths, similar to the ceramics and glass. However, the wood is placed in 
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each bath for a longer period, six weeks instead of two for the ceramics and glass, to 
ensure complete replacement of the water with acetone. After dehydration, the wood 
artifacts are transferred into a silicone oil polymer in order for the acetone to be replaced 
by the polymer. However, wood cannot be placed in a vacuum to facilitate the 
replacement of acetone with silicone oil because wood has a tendency to change shape 
when placed under a vacuum, due to the collapse of cellular walls (Helen Dewolf 2011, 
pers. comm.). Excess oil is removed with a MTMS before a catalyst is used to crosslink 
the polymer chains. (Smith 2003:23-25). The same percentages of silicone oil and 
MTMS that are used for the ceramics and glass were used to treat the wood artifacts.  
3.6.2 Rubber 
The use of rubber in ship construction began in the 19th century, and the use of 
vulcanized rubber was widespread by the 1860s (Grieve 2009:677). Unprocessed, raw 
rubber is soluble in non-polar solvents and can become soft and sticky when warm. 
Charles Goodyear’s vulcanization process, introduced in the 1830s, involves heating raw 
rubber with elementary sulfur that cross-links the isoprene chains in the rubber to 
provide strength and elasticity in a three dimensional network.  Vulcanization also 
includes additives such as pigments, catalytic agents, reinforcing fillers and protectors, 
such as antioxidants and softeners. Rubber molecules consist solely of carbon and 
hydrogen with an empirical formula of C5H8.  The rubber molecule has one double bond 
to each C5H8 molecule which increases the molecular weight. Rubber in the vulcanized 
state contains a higher proportion of the double bonds and, while stronger, vulcanized 
rubber is more susceptible to oxidation from ozone (O3) in the surrounding air. As the 
polymer chains are broken down and produce lower molecular weight products, the 
rubber becomes hard and brittle. Ozone, formed in the air through electrical charges, can 
start the oxidation process by bonding with the polymer chains. With only one ozone 
molecule per polymer chain, the molecular weight of the chains can be halved. (Pearson 
1987:31; Mills and White 1994:114-115).  Therefore, artifacts made of rubber must be 
kept away from electrical equipment. They need to be stored in a material such as 
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cardboard that is equally susceptible to ozone and therefore can absorb the molecules 
before they reach the rubber (Mills and White 1994:115).  
Rubber artifacts from the USS Monitor, like those from Westfield, did not show 
any penetration of iron and cupreous corrosion products; however, staining was 
frequently encountered. Rubber artifacts found with Monitor included vulcanized rubber 
buttons, rubber gaskets, and vulcanite combs. The combs, issued by the U.S. government 
during the Civil War, were made from vulcanite, a much harder rubber that contains 30-
50% sulfur, versus the less than 30% added to vulcanized rubber. Monitor conservators 
removed any iron concretion remaining on the rubber artifacts mechanically with 
wooden tools and ultrasonic water baths or chemically with 2% phosphoric acid. 
Conservators also found that a 2% solution of dibasic ammonium citrate safely removed 
corrosion products. Staining was removed by placing the artifact in a 5% solution of 
ethylenediaminotetraacetic acid (EDTA) in deionized water for one week. 
Electrophoresis was also attempted on rubber gaskets to remove corrosion from tackier 
rubber surfaces. While the process successfully removed the concretion, electrophoresis 
also resulted in delamination (Grieve 2009:678-679,681-682). 
Rubber gaskets similar to those found on Monitor were found on the site of 
Westfield. The gaskets were found in association with the iron hatches. The salt water 
environment and iron corrosion resulted in damage around the edges; however the 
gaskets were well preserved relative to other Westfield artifacts. The gaskets were 
mechanically cleaned to remove corrosion products and dehydrated before being treated 
in the same way as the ceramics, glass, and wood, using a silicone polymer. Because 
exposure to ultraviolet rays actually helps the polymer catalyze, the silicone can absorb 
the UV that would otherwise harm the rubber underneath (Helen Dewolf 2011, pers. 
comm.).  
3.6.3 Leather 
 Leather conservation is very subjective, based on appearance, flexibility, 
shrinkage, and hygroscopicity, or the leather’s ready ability to absorb water. Like other 
organic artifacts, stained leather must first be cleaned using both chemical and 
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mechanical techniques. In many cases, the leather staining is not treated, as attempting to 
remove the stains is more detrimental to the leather artifact as a whole. However, in 
cases where the stain can be removed, gently running or agitated water can be used to 
clean fragile pieces. Chemicals such as oxalic acid, disodium and tetrasodium EDTA, 
ammonium citrate, citric acid, and potassium permanganate have all been used to clean 
leather, removing various stains and imbedded corrosion products. However, little 
research has been conducted as to what effect these compounds have on the tanning 
agents in leather.  
 Archaeological leather from underwater sites is conserved using bulking agents 
and various methods of drying, and the application of fats, oils, or waxes. Without a 
bulking agent like polyethylene glycol (PEG) or glycerol, the proteins in the leather 
begin pulling themselves together, causing shrinkage and hardening. Treating leather 
with PEG has fallen out of use recently due to hygroscopicity, shrinkage at high 
temperatures, and PEG’s dark and greasy appearance. Glycerol also has similar 
disadvantages. However, these bulking agents in combination with freeze drying provide 
a successful treatment for wet archaeological leathers. Fat, oils, and waxes such as 
Bavon, Guildhall Museum leather dressing, nealsfoot oil, and lanolin can be used to 
soften the dried leather, although none offer completely successful treatments (Pearson 
1987:128-131).  The small leather fragments found with Westfield were treated in 
silicone oil in the manner described for the various artifacts above. They were placed in 
the ten dehydration baths for six weeks each and will be treated with silicone oil and 
MTMS in a vacuum, catalyzed using DBTDA, and cleaned of excess polymer. The 
leather artifacts are still undergoing treatment, however, previous treatments of leather 
with silicone were positive, producing leather that was flexible and near the original 
color. 
3.6.4 Bone 
Bone is both hygroscopic and anisotropic, so all salts must be removed before 
drying to prevent splitting and cracking.  Salts can be easily removed through 
subsequent baths of tap water and deionized water until the salt content is minimal. After 
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the soluble salts are removed, the bone is dehydrated using the aforementioned method 
of ten baths for six weeks each. The removal of insoluble salts is subjective and 
conducted with both mechanical and chemical means. Hydrochloric acid or formic acid 
at 5-10% can be used to remove calcium carbonate deposits. Oxalic acid and ammonium 
citrate at 5% is used to remove iron stains while hydrogen peroxide at 5-10% is used to 
remove sulfide stains. However, the removal of stains should be done judiciously, as 
more damage can be done to the artifact than is warranted.  
Following salt and stain removal, consolidation is necessary. Polyvinyl acetate or 
Paraloid B-72 is typically used for consolidation, similar to ceramics. The artifact can 
either be fully immersed in a 5-10% solution of the consolidant, or the consolidant can 
be applied to the surface using a brush. The bone can be placed in a vacuum to speed up 
the process of absorption. The bone can be removed from the consolidant once air 
bubbles cease rising to the surface of the solution (Hamilton 1996:16-18). 
Bone artifacts from Westfield are similar to other categories of artifacts; small, 
fragmentary, and non-diagnostic. After dehydration, the bones were conserved using 
silicone polymers. While the treatment is not reversible, bone lends itself well to silicone 
oil treatment, as the silicone oil easily replaces traditional consolidants. The bone is 
treated in the same manner as other organic artifacts; transferred from 100% acetone into 
silicone oil and MTMS, placed in a vacuum, and removed from the silicone oil and 
catalyzed with DBTDA. Excess polymerized silicone oil is removed with MTMS (Smith 
2003:112-118).  
3.6.5 Textile 
 Very few fragments of textiles were preserved on Westfield. Iron corrosion 
played a large role in their preservation, either preserving individual fibers or 
impressions of the textile fragments. The standard treatment for conserving textiles 
includes careful cleaning in water or chemical cleaning, while striving to maintain a pH 
between 6.5 and 10, deemed safe for most textiles. Following cleaning, the textile is 
dried through slow exposure to air, through solvents, or freeze drying. If consolidation is 
necessary, glues like polyvinyl acetate, methyl acrylate, or Paraloid B-72 mixed in a 
 80 
 
non-polar solvent is applied locally, as immersion could damage the fibers (Pearson 
1987:141-146).  
 For artifacts like those from Westfield, cleaning and removal of the corrosion 
products would cause the fibers to pull apart and lose their shape. The use of the silicone 
oil treatment allows for the cleaning step to be saved until after the fibers have been 
conserved. The textile is placed directly into the dehydration baths without the removal 
of the concretion that holds the fabric together. After dehydration, the fragment is placed 
in silicone polymer, removed and catalyzed, and cleaned with MTMS. The silicone oil 
will coat the concretion particles, allowing them to be easily cleaned off after the 
treatment. In their conserved state, the textile fibers are strong enough to be thoroughly 
cleaned and preserved (Helen Dewolf 2011, pers. comm.). For artifacts that contain only 
an impression of a textile, casts of the impressions were made to preserve the shape of 
the fibers using RTV adhesive. 
3.7 Conclusion 
 After the conservation process is completed, artifacts are stored at the 
Conservation Research Laboratory until they are shipped to a Naval History and 
Heritage Command storage facility or to various Texas museums for display. 
Conservation is crucial to the artifacts’ future preservation and availability for study. In 
addition, knowledge is gained from the conservation methodologies applied specifically 
to artifacts 19th-century artifacts, through experience and experimentation. 
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4. ARTIFACT CATALOG 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Exploded, salvaged, dredged, and eroded, the artifacts from the site of the sunken 
USS Westfield exhibited a wide range of preservation. Many were mere fragments, while 
occasionally an object was found complete. The small finds tended towards the 
fragmented side, some completely unrecognizable. As mentioned in Section 1, only 
Priority 1 artifacts were conserved, and from this, a total of 79 artifacts were selected for 
this catalog. They were selected based on specific criteria. First, only objects not related 
to ship construction or steam machinery were chosen. This includes ceramics, glass, 
tableware, tools, and clothing related artifacts. Second, small artifacts which were 
possibly diagnostic or a ship-related artifact used regularly by the crew, including 
unidentified objects, bricks, cupboard buttons, chain, sash weights, and sheaves. 
Artifacts relating to ordnance and the Dahlgren cannon will be published in a master’s 
thesis by Andrew Thomson, and objects relating to the boiler, steam machinery, and ship 
construction will be analyzed in a dissertation by Justin Parkoff.  
 This section begins with a short description of the manufacture of each metal 
type found on Westfield; iron, copper, and lead. At the beginning of the sections on 
ceramics, glass, condiment shaker top, brick, plates and buckles, and files is a short 
discussion of each. Following the discussion, individual artifacts are cataloged by classes 
and groups, modeled from Stanley South’s (1977:95-96) classification. A condensed list 
can be found in the Appendix (Table A-7). Each artifact description begins with the 
artifact number, useful measurements, and a short description. For the more diagnostic 
artifacts, this description may include a short synopsis on the manufacture and use of the 
item. The ceramics and bricks include colors from the Geological Society of America’s 
Rock-Color Chart using Munsell color chips (Geological Society of America 1991). This 
is followed by a photograph of the artifact, Figures 4.1-4.19, 4.24-4.39, 4.41-4.78, 4.80-
4.87, taken following conservation by staff at the Conservation Research Laboratory.  
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 The identification of artifacts presented the greatest challenge in this analysis. 
While some are easily recognized, others, in their fragmented condition, simply could 
not be identified and are presented as such. In other cases, extensive visual examination 
of published archaeological finds, illustrated catalogs, and picture catalogs published by 
Civil War relic collectors provided the source for identification.  
4.2 Metals 
 Metal artifacts of iron, copper, and lead comprise the majority of Westfield 
artifacts. This section details the production and economic importance of these metals in 
the 19th century, condensed here and applicable to the metal artifacts throughout Section 
4. 
4.2.1 Iron 
Iron exists within the earth’s crust as an ore, most commonly as hematite. The 
rusty, metallic ore is generally between 40-60% pure iron and is mined from iron beds 
on the surface or from deep veins within the earth. Iron production began with removal 
of the ore from the iron beds. Once removed, the ore was washed, roasted to remove 
sulfur, which weakens the iron, and smelted using a blast furnace, to drive off water and 
oxygen. Blast furnaces were heated using anthracite coal, coke, and charcoal, which 
resulted in the production of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and sulfur run-off, 
harming biological life in the surrounding areas (Freedley 1856:246-249; Gordon 
1906:4). A blast furnace could produce between 120-160 tons of iron per week, on 
average. 
The iron ore was poured into shallow troughs, called pigs. Next, the pig iron was 
melted into cast or wrought iron, depending on a classification and based on a numerical 
grade. Gray pig iron flowed well and contained the most carbon and oxygen, while white 
pig iron was more pure but extremely hard and weak. Pig iron smelted again in blast 
furnaces, formed cast iron (Freedley 1856:249-250,252). Cast iron was then poured into 
intricate molds or items with hollows. Various, complicated recipes were developed to 
control how the iron cooled, as the chemical components of cast iron were not fully 
understood until the end of the 19th century. Deviations from these recipes generally 
 83 
 
caused failures, especially in cannon (Gordon 1906:10-11,14). Wrought iron was 
converted from pig iron in puddling furnaces using charcoal as fuel (Freedley 1856:251). 
Charcoal contains less sulfur, which produces better wrought iron which was used for 
products requiring strong, thin iron, such as steam boilers. Low temperature bloom 
smelting and the skill of the iron worker kept the wrought iron free from weakening 
impurities such as carbon, sulfur, and phosphorous (Gordon 1906:7-8,14).   
The iron industry sat at the forefront of commerce in 19th-century America. The 
abundant iron deposits in the United States were believed to be inexhaustible; iron was 
mined without concern for the number of mines that had been opened or what iron was 
left for future generations (Freedley 1856:245,247-248). During the Civil War, the iron 
industry prospered, producing guns and rifles, railroads, wagon wheels, machines, tools, 
hardware, ironclad ships, and steam engines. In 1864, iron manufacturers produced 
1,135,996 net tons of pig iron, compared to the 731,544 net tons produced in 1861 
(Table 4.1) (Battis 1989:154,172). Iron also remained the cheapest of metals, before the 
mass production of mild steel after 1866 (Freedley 1856:253; Gordon 1906:12). The 
high demand for iron resulted in an increase in imported metal starting in 1861 through 
1872, despite high importation tariffs (Battis 1989:158).  
 
 
Table 4.1. Pig iron production from 1857-1866, in net tons (Battis 1989:172).  
Year Anthracite Iron Bituminous and Coke Iron Total 
1857 390,385 77,451 798,157 
1858 361,430 58,351 705,094 
1859 471,745 84,841 840,627 
1860 519.211 122,228 919,770 
1861 409,229 127,037 731,544 
1862 470,315 130,687 787,622 
1863 577,638 157,961 947,604 
1864 684,018 210,125 1,135,996 
1865 479,558 189,682 931,582 
1866 749,367 268,396 1,350,343 
 
 84 
 
 The demand was so great that anthracite pig iron was increasingly accepted as a 
substitute for charcoal iron. Melted using anthracite coal or coke instead of charcoal for 
heat, anthracite pig iron could not be made as thin or as strong as charcoal iron. This 
shift to anthracite furnaces, characterized by hotter blasts and higher pressures, was the 
largest development in the iron industry during the Civil War. By the 1870s, the majority 
of iron produced came from anthracite furnaces (Battis 1989:163,169; Freedley 
1856:251).  
Despite this change, there was little innovation in the years surrounding the Civil 
War. The 1860s marked the beginning of an understanding of the chemical components 
of iron and the start of a transition period between viewing iron production as an art to 
regarding it as a science (Battis 1989:189,191). Previously, iron manufacturers 
controlled iron quality by controlling the composition, basing their formulas on amounts 
of iron from different sources, with the belief that the qualities of each source varied. 
Manufacturers believed that the difference was mechanical, that in cast iron the atoms 
were arranged homogenously while in wrought, the atoms were stretched into distinct 
fibers held together by a, “cementing principle contained in the cinder of the iron”. 
Despite the trust put into the various sources of iron in the 19th century, there is little 
practical difference between different mining sites, and the differences between cast and 
wrought iron are chemical rather than mechanical, as discussed in Section 3 (Freedley 
1856:250; Gordon 1906:5). 
 Iron artifacts comprise 37% of the total Priority 1 artifacts from the USS 
Westfield collection. The majority of these artifacts are related to ordnance, ship 
construction, and machinery. A lower percentage, about 17%, of the artifacts discussed 
in this thesis, are composed of iron. 
4.2.2 Copper 
 The Industrial Revolution brought changes in the production of copper and 
copper alloys. New inventions in steam machinery and electricity increased demand for 
copper. The demand was met with increased supply through the use of steam-driven 
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technology, including pumps to remove water during mining. Copper and brass are ideal 
for ship building, sheathing, and measuring instruments at sea because they are non-
magnetic and corrosion resistant (Joseph 2001:5-6). The use of steam in water 
transportation greatly increased the use of copper in shipbuilding. Copper was needed 
for stripping, rivets, boiler plate, and steam engines. At the start of the Civil War, the 
copper industry became second in importance only to iron and was supplied primarily by 
copper from the Lake Superior region, transported by water to New England through the 
Great Lakes and the Erie Canal.  
 As the copper industry expanded, war production consumed the newly improved 
copper refineries and rolling mills. The production of copper for ships and locomotives, 
ordnance, and copper ingots reached a peak in the history of nonferrous metals, and 
wartime consumption exceeded any previous demand for copper. However, the Civil 
War was also a transition period for the copper industry. Towards the second half of the 
war, copper became scarcer, and the supply could not meet the continuous high demand. 
At the same time, the competition for government contracts increased, with suppliers 
selling copper at wholesale prices to beat the competition. This practice was quickly 
stopped by a newly created association of American copper merchants and 
manufacturers (Whiteman 1971:119-120,192-193,197,199). 
 These changes were reflected in the prices of copper throughout the war. The 
wholesale price per pound remained steady in the first few years then quickly doubled in 
the second half of the war, as shown in Table 4.2. In the decades that followed, the price 
of copper dropped again, half of the price at the beginning of the 1860s (Weed 
1916:1252). The American Civil War also marks the beginning of significant changes in 
the American copper industry. Between 1861 and 1870, the United States produced less 
than 10% of the world’s supply of copper. In 1869, a copper tariff barrier was introduced 
which allowed the U.S. to meet the world’s demand of copper at minimum cost and 
allowed for almost immediate control of the market. By the end of the 19th century, the 
U.S. produced more than half the world’s supply (The Arizona Copper Tariff 
Commission 1932:88-91).  
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 Cupreous artifacts comprise 29% of the USS Westfield priority 1 artifacts, mostly 
in the form of cupreous fasteners. Cupreous objects represent 27% of the artifacts 
included in this thesis, as personal objects, clothing items, tools, and unidentified 
objects. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Price of copper in the United States, by year (Weed 1916:1252). 
Year Price per pound (Dollars) 
1858 .23 
1859 .22 
1860 .23 
1861 .22 
1862 .22 
1863 .34 
1864 .47 
 
 
4.2.3 Lead 
Third only to iron and copper, lead was widely distributed across the United 
States, due to improvements in transportation and metallurgical practice. There were 
many sources of lead available in New York in the 19th century. The ore was mined and 
extracted in three varieties; galena, or lead sulfide, cerussite, or lead carbonate, and 
anglesite, or lead sulfate. Extracting lead was an art, based on the reduction of lead oxide 
by carbon or carbon monoxide, the reaction between lead sulfide and lead sulfate or 
oxide, and the decomposition of lead sulfide by metallic iron, all of which are 
endothermic reactions. By 1885, lead extraction was transformed from an art to a 
science, in order to maximize the amount of lead and minimize the cost. 
There were three types of lead on the market, and variations on the quality of 
these types were common. The first two, desilverized, or soft lead, and antimonial, or 
hard lead, have little differences. The last type contains a small percentage of copper and 
antimony and is more resistant to acids. The grades of lead also depended on the supply 
and demand in the market, and the quality of lead available at any given time.  
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During the 19th century, the primary use of lead was as a white color additive to 
paint and pigment. Also, sheet lead was used for linings that could withstand acids and 
acid vapors. During Westfield’s construction, lead came primarily from New York, 
Virginia, and Joplin, Missouri. Very little lead was imported before 1883, although the 
price of lead was higher in New York than in London between 1861 and 1870. The chart 
below, Table 4.3, shows the lead production in the United States and cost of lead in New 
York leading up and during the first couple of the Civil War (Ingalls 1908:3,37-38,83-
84,86-87,215,217). 
 Lead objects are a relatively small portion of the priority 1 artifacts, at 6.3%, as 
belt buckles, small lead sheets, and amorphous lead fragments. The brass clad lead core 
buckles are cataloged in this section and represent 10% of the total artifacts cataloged in 
this thesis. The brass clad front surfaces did not survive on all of the buckles.  
 
 
Table 4.3. Production of lead in the United States in tons, 1 ton equivalent to 2,000 lbs., 
and price of pig lead in New York (Ingalls 1908:200, 203). 
Year U.S. Lead Production (tons) Price (cents per pound in New York) 
1858 19,500 5.94 
1859 21,000 5.50 
1860 20,200 5.65 
1861 14,100 5.25 
1862 14,200 6.10 
1863 14,800 6.25 
 
 
4.3 Kitchen Artifact Group 
4.3.1 Ceramics 
 The few surviving ceramic fragments from Westfield were most likely standard 
issue items from the US Navy and imported from Europe. During the 19th century, 
American pottery, which rivaled Europe in texture, durability, hardness, and finish, 
could not compete with the supply of European pottery, despite the vast resources 
available in the US. The clay is mined by workmen, assisted by steam machinery and 
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prepared by moistening, grinding, kneading, and dividing the clay into various size 
lumps required by a particular vessel. The lumps are shaped into vessels on a throwing 
wheel before they are dried and packed into a kiln for baking, causing the clay to 
become hard and tough (Freedley 1856:472-473). 
 Stoneware, one of the most common types of pottery in the 19th century, is fired 
at very high temperatures, vitrifying the clay and making it leak proof. This makes 
stoneware ideal for holding liquids. By this time, most of the flatware was made by 
casting the clay in molds before firing. For decoration, various glazes were used. While 
stoneware made strong, utilitarian vessels, they were not easily transportable and broke 
easily (Crouch 1992:20). The clay used for stoneware vessels was grey or buff-colored 
when fired and turned brown from iron oxide. Salt-glazed stoneware, developed in 
Germany and brought to Britain in the 1670s, was made by throwing salt into the kiln 
during firing. The salt vaporized at the high temperatures and settled on the surface of 
the pots forming a distinctive mottled glaze (Potteries Museum and Art Gallery 1999:8). 
Other common types of ceramics represented on Westfield include porcelain, 
whiteware, and ironstone. Porcelain became more common in the 19th century, produced 
in a thicker variety, and therefore cheaper. Whiteware was also widespread. Fired at a 
low temperature, whiteware suffered from crazing or surface cracks that caused the clay 
to leak. Whiteware developed from pearlware which evolved from the prolific 
creamware of the 18th century. Whiteware, with creamware, pearlware, and stone china, 
dominate 19th-century ceramic assemblages and are frequently confused because the 
differences depend on a subjective observation of how much bluing is in the glaze. 
Ironstone was a very utilitarian and thick ware, more common in the later 19th century, 
from the 1870s to the 1900s. Between the 1850s and 1870s, plain ironstone seemed to 
replace transfer-printed wares and vessels were comparable in form and size. Except for 
porcelain, all fine wares from the 19th century were made in England (Miller 1980:2-4; 
Helen Dewolf 2012, pers. comm.). In this thesis, no attempt was made to place the 
ceramics in established typologies. The ceramic catalog follows this section and 
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subsequent sections will follow this format, with the catalog proceeded by a short 
description, as outlined in the introduction, Section 4.1. 
 
118-017 Porcelain Sherd 
Fig. 4.1. 
L:2.00 in. (5.08 cm), W:1.06 in. (2.70 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
Small porcelain body sherd. No diagnostic features. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Artifact 118-017. 
 
 
134-046 Porcelain Sherd 
Fig. 4.2. 
L:2.25 in. (5.72 cm), W:2.00 in. (5.08 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64cm) 
Small porcelain rim sherd. Small portion of rim preserved. Bend on opposite end where 
the original object may have sloped downwards to create the concave lower portion of a 
plate or bowl.  
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Figure 4.2. Artifact 134-046. 
 
 
120-280 Ironware Sherd 
Fig. 4.3. 
L:5.00 in. (12.70 cm), W:2.50 in. (6.35 cm), Max. th.:0.38 in. (0.95 cm) 
Ironware rim sherd from plate or platter. Original diameter approximately 12.59 in. 
(32.00 cm). Scratches along surface. Side opposite rim bends to slope down into concave 
lower portion of plate.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Artifact 120-280. 
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135-009 Whiteware Sherds 
Fig. 4.4 
(A) L:1.00 in. (2.54 cm), W:0.50 in. (1.27 cm), Th.:0.19 in. (0.48 cm)  
(B) L:1.75 in. (4.44 cm), W:0.75 in. (1.91 cm), Th.:0.13 in. (0.32 cm)  
Small whiteware body sherds. No diagnostic features. Significant crazing.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Artifact 135-009. 
 
 
140-039.1 Whiteware Sherd 
Fig. 4.5. 
L:1.63 in. (4.13 cm), W:1.06 in. (2.70 cm), Th.:0.19 in. (0.48 cm)  
Small whiteware rim sherd. Portion of rim preserved. Significant crazing. 
 
 
A 
B 
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Figure 4.5. Artifact 140-039.1. 
 
 
103-039.1 Whiteware Sherd 
Fig. 4.6. 
L:3.13 in. (7.94 cm), W:1.88 in. (4.76 cm), Th.:0.31 in. (0.79 cm)  
Small whiteware rim sherd. Portion of rim preserved. Opposite of rim, the sherd bends to 
create the concave lower portion of the original plate. Significant crazing observed. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Artifact 103-039.1.  
 
 
 93 
 
132-001.7 Whiteware Sherd 
Fig. 4.7. 
L:2.38 in. (6.03 cm), W:1.13 in. (2.86 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
Small whiteware rim sherd. Portion of rim preserved. Glazing eroded away.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Artifact 132-001.7.  
 
 
139-011 Whiteware Sherd 
Fig. 4.8. 
L:3.63 in. (9.21 cm), W:2.31 in. (5.87 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
Whiteware rim sherd. Original diameter of plate approximately 9.84 in. (25 cm). Three 
blue annular lines; two around the edge, one thick and one thin, and one thin line where 
the sherd bends down into the lower portion of the bowl. Significant crazing observed.  
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Figure 4.8. Artifact 139-011. 
 
 
140-039.2 Stoneware Sherd 
Fig. 4.9. 
L:1.50 in. (3.81 cm), W:0.44 in. (1.11 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
Small stoneware body sherd. Maroon glaze on both sides. No diagnostic features. 
Munsell color grayish brown 5YR 3/2 (Geological Society of America 1991:2). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Artifact 140-039.2. 
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124-033 Stoneware Sherd 
Fig. 4.10. 
L:5.38 in. (13.65 cm), W:4.00 in. (10.16 cm), Th.:0.31 in. (0.79 cm) 
Stoneware body sherd. Maroon (Munsell color very dusky red 10R 2/2) glaze on inner 
side with horizontal striations or grooves, tan (Munsell color grayish orange 10YR 7/4) 
mottled glaze on outer side (Geological Society of America 1991:1-2). No diagnostic 
features preserved.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Artifact 124-033. 
 
 
109-123 Salt-glazed Stoneware Sherd 
Fig. 4.11. 
L:2.87 in. (7.29 cm), W:3.00 in. (7.62 cm), Th.:0.5 in. (1.27 cm) 
Salt-glazed stoneware body and base sherd. Outer surface flecked with orange and dark 
brown. Inner surface has streaks of orange and dark brown. Towards base, streaks 
change from angled to parallel with base. Munsell colors: inside- very dusky red 10R 
2/2, outside- Light olive gray 5Y 5/2 (Geological Society of America 1991:2-3). 
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Figure 4.11. Artifact 109-123.  
 
 
132-001.7 Salt-glazed Stoneware Sherd 
Fig. 4.12. 
L:1.88 in. (4.76 cm), W:2.00 in. (5.08 cm), Th.:0.25-0.50 in. (0.64-1.27 cm) 
Small salt-glazed stoneware rim sherd from lid. Glaze present on lower, inner portion of 
sherd. Rim preserved which would sit on both the outer and inner portion of the pot rim. 
The heavy lid may have possibly belonged to a large crock pot used for vinegar or 
pickling (Helen Dewolf 2012, pers. comm.). Munsell color pale yellowish brown 10YR 
6/2 (Geological Society of America 1991:2). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Artifact 132-001.7. 
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4.3.2 Glass  
From 1833-1903, glass manufacture was one of the largest and most important 
industries in America (McKearin and Wilson 1978:68). During this time, the glass 
industry was highly competitive and highly secretive. Accordingly, records are scarce 
for glass production. The Civil War increased demand for glass products. The war was 
also a transition period in glass manufacture, and there were a variety of techniques 
used, resulting in a variety of qualities. As such, no characteristics exist for recognizing 
Civil War bottles. In addition, most glass does not have any identifying markings, 
including the glass from Westfield (Russell 1988:11,13,15).  
There are two essential ingredients for glass production, silica and alkali, in the 
form of soda, lime, potash, or pearl ash. Ordinary containers were made from green glass 
or bottle glass, referring to the composition, as opposed to the color. This green glass 
was naturally colored from the impurities and chemical nature of the ingredients; 
however, during the 1840s and 1850s, artificial glass colors became common. By the 
1870s this trend had shifted toward more colorless or clear glass containers. A glass 
recipe for lighter green glass from 1867 calls for 12 parts of sand, 5 parts soda, 2 parts 
lime, and 10 parts sandstone. Darker green glass was produced by substituting the ash in 
the sandstone with lime. The dark green glass, exhibited by several examples found on 
Westfield, was tougher and used for alcoholic liquids; wine, port, ales, beers, and cider, 
for example.  
The ingredients for the glass were mixed and vitrified, or melted, when placed in 
a coal burning furnace. An iron tube with a small bore that was wider and thicker 
towards one end, called a blowpipe, gathered up the mixture, or the metal. The metal 
was rolled into a cylindrical shape as it cooled. A bubble was formed by blowing into the 
blowpipe. Any final adjustments in size were added and the neck and base was formed, 
or the glass was placed into a mold of clay, wood, or metal. The bottle was next cracked 
off of the blowpipe and the kick-up was added. Between 1857 and 1867, six patents 
were issued for devices to hold the bottle while it was cracked off the blowpipe. Finally, 
the neck was finished and polished, and a ring was added for the collar (McKearin and 
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Wilson 1978:7-9,12-15). This method left a small pontil scar on the base of the bottle 
where the blowpipe was removed, even when molds were used to form the bottles. 
During the 1850s, there was a shift away from leaving the pontil scar; however, bottles 
from the early period of the Civil War still exhibited this mark (Russell 1988:11,14). 
 
121-025 Bottle Base 
Fig. 4.13. 
L:8.06 in. (20.48 cm), Base diam.:2.81 in. (7.14 cm), Kick-up height:2.19 in. (5.56 cm), 
Th. (at base):0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
Large dark green glass bottle fragment. Glass is thick and heavy. Missing neck, rim, and 
most of body. Significant portion of base and kick-up still intact. Outside surface shows 
horizontal bands or stretch marks that correspond to a smooth, wavy surface on the 
inside. Outer surface around base exhibits numerous scratch marks. Kick-up is 1.25 in. 
(3.18 cm) in diameter and has a smooth, concave surface. Walls of the kick-up are 
almost parallel to bottle walls. Small air bubbles on base, especially on the kick-up.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Artifact 121-025. 
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132-396 Bottle Base 
Fig. 4.14. 
L:3.75 in. (9.53 cm); Base diam.:3.13 in. (7.94 cm), Kick-up height:1.50 in. (3.81 cm), 
Th. (at base):0.31 in. (0.79 cm) 
Very dark green (almost black) bottle base fragment. Glass is thick and heavy. Only 
base, kick-up, and small portion of walls preserved. Surface shows scratch marks. A few 
large air bubbles present, in particular, one along the inside junction between the wall 
and the kick-up. Kick-up has low sloping walls that are almost at 45 degrees from the 
walls of the bottle. A small, shallow pontil scar is on the outside, convex side of the 
kick-up. No mold seams present.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Artifact 132-396. 
 
 
111-066.1 Bottle Base Fragment 
Fig. 4.15. 
L:1.31 in. (3.33 cm), W:0.88 in. (2.22 cm), Th.:0.25 in. (0.64 cm) 
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Dark green bottle base fragment. Identical color and texture to 132-396, possibly from a 
similar bottle. Surface is worn and scratched. Original bottle would have had a similar 
kick-up to 132-396.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Artifact 111-066.1. 
 
 
140-013 Bottle 
Fig. 4.16. 
L:9.13 in. (23.18 cm), Diam.:2.25 in. (5.72 cm), Rim diam.:1.19 in. (3.02 cm), Rim 
th.:0.13 in. (0.32 cm)  
Possibly intrusive. Light bluish-green soda or mineral water bottle. Neck and rim broken 
in multiple places and missing a few fragments, otherwise complete. A seam runs down 
both sides of the bottle, except for the rim, indicating the bottle was made using a two 
piece mold. There are air bubbles throughout the glass, smaller ones concentrating in the 
body and a few larger ones in the base. The base is unique, rounded so that the bottle 
cannot sit upright.  
Soda and mineral water bottles were introduced around 1850. They were made 
heavier and thicker to prevent explosion and breakage, and fitted with wire fasteners 
around a heavily collared mouth, to withstand the pressure of the carbonation. The 
majority of mineral water bottles range from 6-8.5 in. (15.24-21.59 cm) and could hold 
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anywhere from 8-14 oz. (0.24-0.41 L). They were primarily aquamarine, green, or blue. 
However, their most diagnostic feature was the smooth or round base, preventing the 
bottle from being stood upright, an innovation developed in England (Van Rensselaer 
1926:39-40; McKearin and Wilson 1978:238-239). This prevented the cork from drying 
out and shrinking, causing the liquid inside to lose carbonation or evaporate. They were 
usually produced using a two piece mold; the neck, shoulder, body and entire base was 
molded, before the thick collar was added by hand. The majority of these soda, or 
mineral water bottles, were imported from Great Britain, more so than those made in the 
United States or those made overseas for American companies. Sometimes referred to as 
ballast bottles, they are thought to have been imported from England as ballast due to 
their heavy weight. The majority of the round bottom base bottles date from the 1870s to 
the 1910s, indicating that this example recovered from Westfield may be intrusive or 
deposited on the site during the dredging in the early 20th century. The preservation of 
the bottle, the only one which is almost complete, would indicate that this may be the 
case, having been spared from the initial explosion (Lindsey 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.16. 140-013. 
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134-047.1 Bottle Neck Fragment 
Fig. 4.17. 
L:2.00 in. (5.08 cm), W:1.88 in. (4.76 cm), Th.:0.38 in. (0.95 cm) 
Light bluish green bottle neck fragment. Identical color and texture to 140-013, possibly 
from similar bottle with wider base. The angle from the neck to the body is slightly 
wider than 140-013. Small air bubbles present in glass. No seams visible. Wavy bands 
on outside surface of neck not present on 140-013. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Artifact 134-047.1. 
 
 
4.3.3 Tableware 
Only one example of metal tableware, an electroplated silver condiment shaker 
cap, possibly for dispensing salt or pepper, was preserved with USS Westfield. 
Electroplating began in the 1840s and was introduced commercially by the mid-19th 
century. The date of the first electroplating experiment is unknown; however, the 
beginnings of electroplating are associated with the development of electricity in the 
early 19th century (Raub 1993:284-285; Turner 1993:211). The technique first involved 
the silver or gold plating of decorative items or better quality utilitarian objects (Child 
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1993:293). Plating with precious metals, for decorative purposes or fraud, allowed for 
the maximum display value at minimum cost, producing cheaper copies of silver 
originals (La Niece 1993:201). Silver was one of the first metals to be electroplated 
commercially, primarily for tableware. Electroplated silver objects are highly decorative 
and resistant to attack from fruit acids and other foodstuffs (Canning 1960:383).  The 
Elkington cousins monopolized the emerging industry for decades, with patents on silver 
and gold plating with an electric current (Child 1993:293). By the 1860s, electroplating 
with silver was becoming commonplace. 
 The commercial methods of producing plated metal objects have remained 
relatively the same since the initial invention. Metals are plated in two methods. The first 
is very similar to the electrolytic reduction used to conserve the iron and cupreous 
artifacts from Westfield. Metal salts are dissolved into an aqueous solution, which is 
reduced by a current of electricity passed between two electrodes. Here, the cathode is 
negative, attracting the ions which plate the base metal attached to the cathode. The 
anode is positive and dissolves into the electrolyte, producing more metal ions of the 
plating metal.  The weight of the deposited metal is proportional to the electricity passed 
through the solution. This method allowed for control of the thickness of the plated 
surface and the amount of silver used. A typical solution for silver plating would include 
20 grams of silver nitrate, 36 grams of potassium cyanide, and 22 grams of potassium 
carbonate, for every liter of water. When plating pewter, an excess of potassium cyanide 
is used to produce a matte silver finish which is polished to a highly reflective surface. 
The second method relies on a chemical reaction. The plated metal is deposited on the 
base metal from a chemical solution such as copper sulfate (Child 1993:291-
293,295,298-299).  
Few small artifacts belonging to USS Westfield are as diagnostic or important as 
the condiment shaker cap. The discovery of the possible pepper shaker cap was 
momentous. Weeks of x-raying Westfield concretions had yielded little more than a 
series of bolts, bleeds, and boiler bits. A large bolt, which appeared to have a small 
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button towards the end, was visible on the x-ray. Further x-rays revealed the condiment 
shaker cap, which confirmed suspicions that this was something significant.  
  
109-010.1 Condiment Shaker Cap 
Figs. 4.18, 4.19, 4.20. 
Height: 0.92 in. (2.34 cm), Max. diam.: 1.15 in. (2.91 cm), Inner diam.: 0.87 in. (2.21 
cm), Diam. of finial: 0.30 in. (0.76 cm), Th. of side: 0.05 in. (0.13 cm), Diam. of holes: 
0.07 in. (0.19 cm)  
Electroplated silver condiment shaker cap. Small finial at the top surrounded by 14 holes 
to dispense a condiment, most likely either salt or pepper. The top is rounded around the 
edges from which the sides descend almost perpendicularly, with a small band designed 
to fit around the top of the glass bottle below. The inside surfaces are smooth with a 
spiral pattern on the top. Initial testing with the Bruker XRF revealed that the condiment 
shaker cap is made from electroplated silver on pewter. High levels of tin, silver, and 
copper were found, with smaller amounts of antimony and lead. A drawing is shown in 
Figure 4.20. 
 
view, bottom view, and top view.
 
Figure 4.18. Artifact 109-010.1. Possible pepper shaker top in progress photos. Side
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Figure 4.18. Continued
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Figure 4.19. Artifact 109-010.1 X-ray.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20. Drawing of Artifact 109-010.1. By Jessica Stika. 
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 The pepper shaker cap was separated from the bolt, and a significant amount of 
the concretion was removed using a pneumatic chisel. As the surface of the cap was 
revealed, the pneumatic chisel was abandoned for small wooden dowels, so the surface 
would not be scratched (shown in Figure 4.21). After the concretion was completely 
removed, the pepper shaker cap was placed in baths of 2% sodium sesquicarbonate until 
the salt content reached a minimum, about 3.5-7 parts per million. After three baths of 
boiling deionized water, the cap was polished using sodium bicarbonate and a small 
fiberglass brush. Since the cap base was a cupreous metal, the cap was soaked in a 2% 
benzotriazole (BTA) and ethanol solution before being coated with Krylon clear finish 
with 2% BTA added.  Following the final coating, the cap was wrapped in a lint free 
paper towel that had been soaked in 2% BTA and then was sealed in a plastic bag. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21. Cleaning the condiment shaker cap.  
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 The pepper shaker cap, Artifact 109-010.1, was found in grid square 109, as 
indicated by the artifact number. Other Priority 1 small artifacts in square 109 include a 
salt-glazed stoneware fragment, 109-123, and a US cartridge box plate, 109-089. The 
relative locations of the other small Priority 1 artifacts are shown in Figure 4.22. Due to 
the nature of the salvage excavation, provenience information for Westfield concretions 
is somewhat general. The clamshell grabs were aimed at each of the 15 by 15 ft. (4.6 by 
4.6 m) squares; however, in many instances the grabs overlapped adjacent grid squares.  
A map of the Westfield site is shown below in Figure 4.22, overlaid with the 15 
ft. (4.6 m) grid squares in red. An outline of a sketch of USS Clifton, sister ship of 
Westfield and very similar in design, is superimposed above the grid squares. The outline 
has been greatly simplified, stretched, and shifted to fit the length, shape, and possible 
original position of Westfield. Outlined in yellow are the officer’s cabins, located on the 
port side of the ship, directly over square 109. If the room designations of Clifton are 
identical to Westfield, Westfield sank approximately where the outline is placed over the 
grid, and erosion and dredging of the site did not move the condiment shaker cap after 
the sinking, then there is a possibility that this cap came from the officer’s table. 
However, the pepper shaker cap was found concreted to a bolt, which might not be near 
the cap’s original location. 
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Figure 4.22. Site map of USS Westfield. Imposed over the map are a numbered grid and 
an outline of a sketch of USS Clifton. Labels from sketch indicate that row of cabins 
along the port side, highlighted in yellow, are the officer’s rooms and water closet After 
Borgens et al. (2010:128,D-6). 
 
 
Documentary research may shed more light on the origins of the pepper shaker 
cap.  In Donald Fennimore’s American Silver and Pewter (2000:68), the author lists a 
Victorian electroplated cruet made in 1861 by the Meriden Britannia Company from 
Meriden, Connecticut. The example shown in Figure 4.23 has three free-swinging 
baskets which rotate a center axel, allowing the items in each basket to be easily reached. 
While the set from which the Westfield pepper shaker cap may not have been as fanciful 
as this, the cap does match this set almost identically. The cap most likely came from a 
glass bottle similar to those shown on the bottom left of Figure 4.23; however, 
designating the cap as belonging to a pepper shaker is an educated guess. The silver-
plated cap could have easily belonged to a salt shaker or another condiment.  
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Figure 4.23. Victorian electroplated cruet (Fennimore 2000:68). 
 
 
4.4 Small Ship Construction Elements 
4.4.1 Brick 
Brick from USS Westfield is fragmented and highly eroded. Bricks were used to 
line and insulate the boiler, so there were no standard brick allotments for navy ships as 
the amount necessary varied according to each boiler (United States Navy Department 
1865:24). Bricks are made from clay, composed of crystalline particles or minerals, of 
which the most common are kaolinte, montorillonite, illite, and chlorite (McKee 
1973:41; Gurcke 1987:3-6). Other minerals in the clay can produce different colors. For 
example, ferric oxide produces shades from pink to reddish black while ferrous oxide 
can produce colors from green to black. The presence of lime turns the bricks to yellow 
or greenish-yellow. Magnesia and alumina results in buff colored bricks and manganese 
produces brown.  
The first step in the manufacture of brick is obtaining the clay from which to 
make them, called mining, or “winning”. The clay is then prepared for molding. 
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Additives can be mixed into the clay to produce a better brick. For example, between 30-
70% sand can be added to reduce warping and cracking (McKee 1983:41-42). Rocks are 
removed from the clay during the process of tempering and drying to produce 
consistency. Various clays can also be blended for the same result (Gurcke 1987:6-13). 
 Molding, or “forming”, is the process where the clay is shaped into bricks. The 
three methods, soft-mud, stiff-mud, and dry-pressed, are based on the percentage of 
water in the clay. Soft-mud bricks are either made by hand or machine and formed by 
pushing the clay into a mold. Stiff-mud bricks are made by a machine that extrudes then 
cuts the clay to form the brick shape. This is the most common brick manufacture 
techniques used in the present day. Dry-pressed clay can contain up to 10% water and 
are formed like soft-mud bricks, except a machine compresses the dry clay into a steel 
mold, exerting enough pressure to form the brick. The 19th century was a transitional 
period between molding by hand and the introduction of brick making machines (Gurcke 
1987:13-23). The first steam molding machines were introduced to New York in 1849. 
With a few improvements, these machines soon completely replaced the hand molding 
method (Tomkins 1888:282). 
 Following molding, the bricks are left to dry, or they will break apart in the kiln. 
Handmade bricks could take up to two to three weeks of drying time. Firing, or 
“burning”, followed in three stages. The bricks were placed into the kiln and raised to 
between 250° and 350°F. This first stage, called “water-smoking”, caused white steam to 
evaporate from the bricks. Raising the temperature to between 1,400° and 1,800°F, 
called dehydration, drives off the remaining water. During vitrification, the temperature 
of the kiln is raised to 1,600° and 2,200°F, the clay softens, and the harder particles melt 
and adhere to each other. The entire process can take up to a week in a primitive kiln, 
but can be as short as 40 hours in a modern kiln (Gurcke 1987:28-34). 
 Mortar is soft and pliable, made to fill the cracks between bricks for strength and 
durability. Obtained from limestone and marble, lime-sand mortar was used until about 
1880. This was considered a soft mortar, in comparison to the concrete mortar used after 
1880, and was flexible enough to be used in a ship. However, more waterproof mortar, 
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in the form of hydraulic cement, waterproof cement, and water-lime mortar, was 
available in the United States before 1870. New York was the largest producer of natural 
cement during this time. The waterproof or cement mortar was used where strength and 
resistance to moisture was necessary (McKee 1973:61-62,68). Mortar remnants can still 
be seen on some of the brick fragments, indicating that they had been used (Lenik 
1966:11). 
   
122-003 Brick 
Fig. 4.24. 
L:3.20 in. (8.12 cm), W:4.30 in. (10.92 cm), Th:2.03 in. (5.15 cm) 
Large brick fragment. Large grained with large inclusions. No mortar, but impressed 
lettering on obverse side. Letters read “OLE”, followed by what could have been an “N” 
or “H”. These letters measure 0.75 in. (1.91 cm) tall. Underneath this, the letters are 
“LON” and measure 0.56 in. (1.43 cm) tall, possibly indicated the word, “LONDON”. 
Bricks made in London commonly had chalk added to the clay before firing. This chalk 
prevented shrinkage and cracking and often turned the brick a more yellowish color 
(Gurcke 1987:12-13). Dark, maroon staining on top of brick. Munsell color pale 
yellowish orange 10YR 8/6 (Geological Society of America 1991:2). 
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Figure 4.24. Artifact 122-003. 
 
 
135-011 Brick 
Fig. 4.25. 
L:3.00 in. (7.63 cm), W:1.25 in. (3.18 cm), Th:0.93 in. (2.37 cm) 
Small brick fragment. Possible original surface near small bit of mortar, 0.15 in. (0.38 
cm thick). Fine grained with small sand grit; small air bubbles that have been 
compressed in some areas. Munsell colors: brick is moderate red 5R 5/4, mortar is pale 
yellowish brown 10R 6/2 (Geological Society of America 1991:1). 
 
 
 114 
 
 
Figure 4.25. Artifact 135-011. 
  
 
136-004 Brick 
Fig. 4.26. 
L:4.29 in. (10.90 cm), W:2.44 in. (6.19 cm), Th:1.65 in. (4.20 cm) 
Almost complete brick in 2 pieces, fine grained with very small grit. No mortar 
preserved. Small air bubbles on inside of brick. Parallel indentions on one edge of the 
brick. Munsell color light brown 5YR 6/4 (Geological Society of America 1991:2). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26. Artifact 136-004.  
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152-003 Brick 
Fig. 4.27. 
L:1.32 in. (3.36 cm), W:1.14 in. (2.90 cm), Th:1.13 in. (2.86 cm) 
Fine grained small brick fragment with medium sized inclusions. The fragment has two 
colors, split halfway down the middle, perhaps due to burial environment. Small air 
pockets. Munsell colors pale reddish brown 10R 5/4 and moderate reddish orange 10R 
6/6 (Geological Society of America 1991:1). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.27. Artifact 152-003. 
 
 
130-033 Brick and Mortar 
Fig. 4.28. 
L:2.26 in. (5.75 cm), W:1.94 in. (4.93 cm) 
Small mortar fragment with the surfaces of three bricks present. The bricks were fine-
grained with large inclusions. The mortar is fine-grained with few inclusions. The mortar 
was between two bricks and two layers of bricks. The thickness of the mortar between 
layers is 0.65 in. (1.64 cm) and between the bricks is 0.31 in. (0.8 cm). The brick is 
Munsell colors moderate reddish orange 10R 6/6 and the mortar is pale yellowish brown 
10YR 6/2 (Geological Society of America 1991:1-2). 
 
 116 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28. Artifact 130-033.  
 
 
4.4.2 Sash Weights 
 The sash weights may remain a mystery. Indicating the presence of large 
windows which would have been expected on a New York ferryboat, the sash weights 
seem unnecessary when viewing the small portholes present on the Memphis drawing of 
Westfield as a navy gunboat, shown in the Appendix (Figure A-1). Current theories 
support that these may have been cut from their windows during Westfield’s conversion 
from ferryboat to gunboat. However, no evidence of portholes has been found among the 
Westfield artifacts. Similar sash weights are commonly used by fisherman as buoy 
weights. Thus, they may be modern. The variety of sash weights found on Westfield may 
support the conclusion that these are intrusive artifacts. 
 
119-171 Sash Weight 
Fig. 4.29. 
L:7.17 in. (18.20 cm), Diam.:1.83 in. (4.66 cm) 
Lower portion of sash weight. Cylindrical in shape and starts to narrow 2.99 in. (7.60 
cm) from the end. Made from a two-piece mold. Two ridges run along the sides opposite 
of each other, indicating that the mold pieces were not correctly attached when the sash 
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weight was made. No weight markings were found, as that portion of the weight was not 
preserved. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.29. Artifact 119-171. 
 
 
120-074 Sash Weight 
Fig. 4.30 
L:8.82 in. (22.40 cm), Diam.:1.49 in. (3.79 cm), Hole diam.:0.50 in. (1.28 cm), Weight 
number indention H./W.:1.61/0.95 in. (4.09/2.42 cm), Weight number H./W.:1.10/0.85 
in. (2.79/2.15 cm) 
Upper portion of sash weight with hole or opening to allow a rope to be tied around the 
top. A number “8” is molded into the side, indicating the weight. This sash weight was 
made from a two-piece mold and shows a small portion of a ridge along one side, 
indicating the two mold halves were slightly out of alignment. 
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Figure 4.30. Artifact 120-074.  
 
 
118-177 Sash Weight 
Fig. 4.31 
L:10.63 in. (27.00 cm); Diam.:1.75 (4.44 cm), Hole diam.:0.74 in. (1.89 cm), Weight 
number indention H./W.:1.71/0.96 in. (4.34/2.45 cm) 
Upper portion of sash weight with hole or opening to allow a rope to be tied around the 
top. A number “10” is molded into the side, indicating the weight; however the “1” has 
eroded away. This sash weight was made from a two-piece mold and shows a ridge 
along one side. Poorly preserved with many pockets in the cast iron. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.31. Artifact 118-177. 
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122-004 Sash Weight 
Fig. 4.32. 
L:7.68 in. (19.50 cm), Diam.:1.73 in. (4.39 cm), Weight number indention 
H./W.:1.52/0.84 in. (3.87/2.13 cm), Weight number H./W.:1.06/0.80 in. (2.68/2.04 cm) 
Upper portion of sash weight with hole or opening to allow a rope to be tied around the 
top. A number “10” is molded into the side, indicating the weight. This sash weight was 
made from a two-piece mold and shows a small portion of a ridge along one side, 
indicating the two mold halves were slightly off. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32. Artifact 122-004. 
 
 
4.4.3 Sheaves 
120-308 Sheave 
Fig. 4.33. 
Iron sheave: Outer diam.:5.43 in. (13.78 cm), Inner diam.:1.73 in. (4.41 cm), Th.:1.56 in. 
(3.95 cm) 
Inner cupreous ring: Outer diam.:1.65 in. (4.19 cm), Inner diam.:0.95 in. (2.43 cm) 
Cupreous bearings: H.:1.38 in. (3.50 cm), Diam.:0.59 in. (1.50 cm) 
Cast iron (epoxy) shaft: L.:3.74 in. (9.49 cm), Diam.:0.57 in. (1.45 cm) 
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Cast iron sheave with cupreous bearings. Six spokes connect the inner circle to the outer 
circle. The inner circle shows ridges on the top and bottom to encase the cupreous 
bearings. The outer surface of the outer circle has a wide indention to hold the rope or 
chain. Poor cast iron preservation obscures any sign of wear.  Six small cupreous 
bearings are sandwiched between two circular plates. The plates are held together by two 
cupreous rectangular rods. The cylinders rotate around small circular protrusions on the 
two plates. The bearings rotated around a cast iron shaft. The shaft, cast in epoxy, is 
poorly preserved and signs of wear are not visible.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.33. Artifact 120-308. 
 
 
128-016 Sheave 
Fig. 4.34. 
Iron sheave: Outer diam.:5.49 in. (13.94 cm), Inner diam.:1.79 in. (4.54 cm), Th.:1.54 in. 
(3.91 cm) 
Inner cupreous ring: Outer diam.:1.66 in. (4.21 cm), Inner diam.:0.90 in. (2.29 cm) 
Cupreous bearings: H.:1.21 in. (3.07 cm), Diam.:0.61 in. (1.56 cm) 
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Cast iron (epoxy) shaft: L.:2.74 in. (6.97 cm), Diam.:0.71 in. (1.79 cm) 
See description for 120-208. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34. Artifact 128-016. 
 
 
4.4.4 Chain 
102-009 Chain (large) 
Fig. 4.35. 
L.:2.44 in. (6.19 cm), W.:1.52 in. (3.85 cm), Diam.:0.57 in. (1.45 cm) 
Nine complete wrought iron chain links and one half link. Poorly preserved. 
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Figure 4.35. Artifact 102-009. 
 
 
103-067 Chain (large) 
Fig. 4.36. 
Chain link: L.:2.60 in. (6.60 cm), W.:1.71 in. (4.34 cm), Diam.:0.53 in. (1.35 cm) 
Eight complete wrought iron chain links. Poorly preserved. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.36. Artifact 103-067. 
 
 
114-004 Chain (medium) 
Fig. 4.37. 
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Chain link: L.:2.28 in. (5.80 cm), W.:1.25 in. (3.17 cm), Diam.:0.37 in. (0.95 cm) 
Poorly preserved iron chain (cast epoxy). One link and four partial chain links preserved.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.37. Artifact 114-004. 
 
 
134-086 Chain (medium) 
Fig. 4.38. 
Chain link: Diam.:0.40 in. (1.02 cm) 
Two partial iron (cast epoxy) chain links. Poorly preserved.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.38. Artifact 134-086. 
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110-056 Chain (small) 
Fig. 4.39. 
Small chain links: L.:0.65 in. (1.65 cm), W.:0.52 in. (1.32 cm), Th.:0.11 in. (0.28 cm) 
Possible small/medium chain link: L.:1.09 in. (2.77 cm), W.:0.72 in. (1.83 cm), 
Diam.:0.10 in. (0.25 cm) 
Medium chain link: L.:1.76 in. (4.47 cm), W.:1.30 in. (3.30 cm), Diam.:0.21 in. (0.54 
cm) 
Teardrop chain link: L.:2.11 in. (5.37 cm), W.:1.34 in. (3.40 cm), Diam.:0.084 in. (0.21 
cm) 
Small complete iron chain links attached to a possible small/medium and medium chain 
link. This is attached to another link shaped like a teardrop. All measurements are taken 
from the x-radiograph. The chain links are yet to be conserved.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.39. Artifact 110-056 X-ray. 
 
 
4.4.5 Cupboard Button Latches 
 The cupboard button latches may have remained a mystery if not for a couple of 
hardware catalogs from 1865 and 1870. They were a very logical choice for keeping 
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cabinet doors closed on a ship using a cheap and efficient method. The button was 
attached to a small plate split between the cupboard door and the frame and rotated to 
open or lock the cupboard door shut. The first catalog example, from Lynn 
Blumenstein’s Wishbook 1865 (1968), listed two types of cupboard buttons. The first 
looked identical to Artifact 120-284, but was iron and japanned, or coated in black 
lacquer, while the Westfield artifact is cupreous. The Wishbook also listed an example in 
cast brass which appears more like Artifact 132-128, but was advertised in dimensions at 
least 1 in. (2.54 cm) smaller than the Westfield example (Blumenstein 1968). The second 
catalog James L. Haven & Co.’s Illustrated Catalogue and Price List of Hardware and 
Implements (1870:21) showed similar examples and included an image of the entire 
latch, shown in Figure 4.40 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.40. Cupboard buttons from James L. Haven’s Illustrated Catalog (Haven 
1870:21).  
 
 
120-284 Cupboard button latch 
Fig. 4.41. 
L:1.76 in. (4.46 cm), W:0.49 in. (1.24 cm), Inner diam.:0.24 in. (0.61 cm) 
Cupreous cupboard button. Rotated on cupreous plate to hold a cupboard door shut. Two 
small wings on either side aided in grasping and turning the button. Each end slightly 
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concave to fit on top of the plate. The length is an estimate, perhaps slightly less than the 
diameter of the plate.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.41. Artifact 120-284.  
 
 
132-128 Cupboard button latch 
Fig. 4.42. 
L:2.94 in. (7.48 cm), W:0.72 in. (1.83 cm), Center hole diameter:0.27 in. (0.68 cm.) 
Cupreous cupboard button. Larger than 120-284, this button would have been for a more 
substantial cabinet latch. The two wings aided in grasping and turning the button on the 
plate below. The opposite side shows elliptical shallow recess, 1.44 in. (3.66 cm) in 
length. 
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Figure 4.42. Artifact 132-128.  
 
 
121-078.1 Cupboard button latch with screw 
Fig. 4.43. 
L:2.82 in. (7.16 cm), W:0.67 in. (1.70 cm), Th.:0.37 in. (0.93 cm) 
Screw: L:0.67 in. (1.69 cm), Shaft diam.:0.26 (0.66 cm), Head diam.:0.32 in. (0.81 cm), 
Head th.:0.05 in. (0.13 cm) 
The two wings aided in grasping and turning the button on the plate below. The original 
screw that the plate rotated on was preserved. The opposite side shows elliptical shallow 
recess. Flat head screw through central hole in cupboard button. Not yet conserved at the 
time of this submission. 
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Figure 4.43. Artifact 121-078.1. 
 
 
 
4.4.6 Rope 
128-043 Rope 
Fig. 4.44. 
(1) L:2.76 in. (7.00 cm), W: 0.78 in. (2.00 cm) 
(2) L:2.52 in. (6.40 cm), W: 0.75 in. (1.90 cm) 
(3) L:1.73 in. (4.40 cm), W: 0.55 in. (1.40 cm) 
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Remnants of rope preserved in concretions. Did not survive conservation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.44. Artifact 128-043. 
 
 
4.5 Clothing 
4.5.1 Plates 
 The Civil War was a transition period away from decorative to more functional 
uniforms for soldiers. This is typified by a decrease in the use of belt and cartridge box 
plates. Plates encompass both belt buckles and decorative plates used for uniforms, and 
the term is generally used in place of the name “buckle”. They were made by stamping 
the design into a copper plate to create a shell, attaching the hooks or loops onto the 
back, and then filling the shell with lead. At the beginning of the war, the Union issued 
plates with a vast array of decorations. Individual states created their own plates but 
most were unable to resupply their soldiers with replacements. In addition, the federal 
government issued the common plate, with the large letters “US” stamped into the front, 
identical to the ones found on Westfield. For the waist belt plates, a leather belt from 
which equipment, such as a bayonet scabbard, was attached. These had three hooks on 
the back of each plate, two on one side to attach the plate to the leather belt and one 
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larger hook to secure the belt once placed around the waist. Cartridge box belt plates 
were placed on the shoulder strap holding the cartridge box, and cartridge box plates 
were on the box, both as a decoration and as a weight to hold the covering flap shut. 
These plates had two small loops on the back, one on either side, to attach them to the 
cartridge box. Other types of plates include sword belt plates and shoulder and cross 
strap plates, used for carrying a sword, bayonet, or powder flasks.  
The Confederacy could not provide soldiers with this variety and in some cases 
any type of plate at all. Confederate soldiers often used U.S. plates worn upside down as 
a substitute. The British blockade runners also supplied the Confederate troops with 
snake or “S” shaped buckles, which were attached to two oval links on either side of the 
“S”. One such example was found on the Westfield site and may have been taken off a 
British blockade runner, as the Union personnel were not above using British plates also. 
As the Civil War progressed, both sides were unable to furnish troops with the necessary 
plates, and there was a decrease in their use. In addition, with the introduction of rifled 
guns, accuracy was greatly increased, and the plates functioned less as a decorative item 
and more as a shiny moving target (Kerksis 1974:3-5,441). 
The plates listed below include pieces from a possible British snake belt plate 
and a frame of what may have once been a belt plate. The list also includes the examples 
of “US” marked belt and cartridge box plates, differentiated by the different types of 
clasps either on the back or sides of the plate. Those marked with the “U.S.” symbol 
appear to be lead but once had a shell of copper alloy overlaid above the lead. Traces of 
this cupreous material can still be seen on closer examination.  
 
135-003 Snake belt plate loop 
Fig. 4.45. 
L:2.31 in. (5.87 cm), W:0.74 in. (1.89 cm), Th:0.12 in. (0.31 cm) 
Cupreous snake belt buckle loop. Associated with snake belt plate (111-064). The 
midpoint of one long side shows a weld point, and the metal is thicker at that point. In 
addition, a break point is seen next to the weld point. This is most likely the original 
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attachment to a small circular loop where the snake buckle would have attached. 
Another identical loop on the other side of the snake belt plate would have completed the 
attachment to the belt. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.45. Artifact 135-003. 
 
 
111-064 Snake Belt Plate 
Fig. 4.46. 
L:1.56 in. (3.97 cm), W:0.65 in. (1.64 cm), Th.:0.22 in. (0.55 cm) 
Cupreous snake belt plate. Associated with snake belt plate loop, 135-003. Most likely 
originally decorated to look like a snake. The head shape is clearly seen in the 
photograph. A small circular loop would have been linked to both ends and attached to 
an elliptical loop. The loop would be attached to the belt.  
 
 
 132 
 
 
Figure 4.46. Artifact 111-064. 
 
 
108-103 Belt Plate 
Fig. 4.47. 
L:3.20 in. (8.13 cm); W:2.07 in. (5.27 cm); Th. (center):0.28 in. (0.70 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.11 in. (0.27 cm), Letter height:1.21 in. (3.08 cm) 
Lead belt plate. Stamped “US” on the front, cupreous mount on reverse, a few tiny spots 
where stamped brass plate remains. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.47. Artifact 108-103. 
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106-032 Belt Plate 
Fig. 4.48. 
L:2.97 in. (7.54 cm); W:1.97 in. (5.00 cm); Th. (center):0.19 in. (0.48 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.11 in. (0.29 cm); Letter height:1.17 in. (2.97 cm)  
Lead belt plate. Stamped “US” on the front, cupreous mount on reverse. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.48. Artifact 106-032. 
 
 
123-042 Belt Plates (A&B) 
Fig. 4.49. 
(A) L:2.85 in. (7.23 cm); W:2.00 in. (5.09 cm); Th. (center):0.19 in. (0.49 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.08 in. (0.20 cm); Letter height 1.20 in. (3.04 cm) 
(B) L:2.88 in. (7.32 cm); W:2.04 in. (5.18 cm); Th. (center):0.22 in. (0.57 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.10 in. (0.25 cm); Letter height:1.57 in. (3.98 cm)  
2 Lead belt plates. Stamped “US” on the front, cupreous mount on reverse. 
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Figure 4.49. Artifact 123-042. 
 
 
124-041 Belt Plate  
Fig. 4.50. 
L:3.27 in. (8.31 cm), W:2.07 in. (5.25 cm), Th. (center):0.19 in. (0.49 cm), Th. 
(edge):0.10 in. (0.27 cm), Letter height:1.18 in. (3.00 cm) 
Lead cartridge box plate. Stamped “US” on the front. 
 
 
A 
B 
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Figure 4.50. Artifact 124-041. 
 
 
107-024 Cartridge Box Plate 
Fig. 4.51. 
L:3.27 in. (8.30 cm); W:2.08 in. (5.29 cm); Th. (center):0.18 in. (0.46 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.11 in. (0.28 cm); Letter height:1.18 in. (2.99 cm)  
Lead cartridge box plate. Stamped “US” on the front. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.51. Artifact 107-024. 
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121-142 Cartridge Box Plate 
Fig. 4.52. 
L:3.25 in. (8.26 cm); W:2.08 in. (5.29 cm); Th. (center):0.23 in. (0.59 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.11 in. (0.27 cm); Letter height:1.20 in. (3.05 cm)  
Lead cartridge box plate. Stamped “US” on the front, a bit of the stamped brass plate 
remains. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.52. Artifact 121-142. 
 
 
122-061  Cartridge Box Plates (A & B) 
Fig. 4.53.  
(A) L:3.31 in. (8.40 cm); W:2.07 in. (5.27 cm); Th. (center):0.21 in. (0.53 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.08 in. (0.21 cm); Letter height:1.20 in. (3.04 cm) 
(B) L:3.23 in. (8.21 cm); W:2.00 in. (5.08 cm); Th. (center):0.18 in. (0.45 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.10 in. (0.26 cm); Letter height:1.18 in. (3.01 cm)  
Lead cartridge box plate. Stamped “US” on the front, a little bit of the stamped brass 
plate remains (mostly on 122-061A). 
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Figure 4.53. Artifact 122-061. 
 
 
109-089 Cartridge Box Plate 
Fig. 4.54. 
L:3.29 in. (8.35 cm); W:2.05 in. (5.21 cm); Th. (center):0.19 in. (0.49 cm); Th. 
(edge):0.09 in. (0.22 cm); Letter height:1.21 in. (3.07 cm) 
Lead cartridge box plate. Stamped “US” on the front. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.54. Artifact 109-089. 
 
 
 
A B 
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123-041 Belt Plate 
Fig. 4.55. 
L:3.48 in. (8.83 cm), W:3.03 in. (7.70 cm), Th.: 0.10 in. (0.24 cm) 
Cupreous belt plate. Most likely originally had decorative insert belt plate. Small tabs 
still preserved along edges to hold decoration. Bent and poorly preserved. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.55. Artifact 123-041. 
 
 
4.5.2 Textiles 
133-181 Fabric impression shown on amorphous cupreous fragment 
Fig. 4.56. 
Measurements unavailable. See photo. 
Fabric impression preserved in corrosion products on surface of amorphous cupreous 
object. 
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Figure 4.56. Artifact 133-181. 
 
 
133-123 Fabric impression 
Fig. 4.57. 
Th. of fiber:0.076 in. (0.19 cm) 
Fabric impression preserved in concretion. The fibers appear to be the same size or 
larger than 133-181. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.57. Artifact 133-123. 
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103-039 Fabric impression 
Fig. 4.58. 
Th. of fiber:0.021 in. (0.55 cm) 
Fabric impression preserved in concretion. Smallest fiber of the three examples selected. 
Impression indicates that original fabric pieces folded over, possibly wrapped around the 
ceramic piece that is associated with this artifact. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.58. Artifact 103-039. 
 
 
4.5.3 Other Clothing Related Items 
133-111 Clasp 
Fig. 4.59. 
L:1.29 in. (3.28 cm), W:1.25 in. (3.17 cm), Cylinder inner diam:0.15 in. (0.38 cm), outer 
diameter:0.35 in. (0.89 cm) 
Cupreous clasp. Wear marks on inside of clasp. The marks are regular, straight, and 
parallel with the cylinder. Irregular scratch makes on both sides. Two small holes on 
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either side of clasp filled with cupreous material. The cylinder is hollow with wear 
marks on outside at either end. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.59. Artifact 133-111. 
 
 
120-296 Pack hook 
Fig. 4.60. 
L:1.30 in. (3.31 cm), W:1.25 in. (3.17 cm), Th:0.19 in. (0.48 cm) 
Cupreous pack hook. 
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Figure 4.60. Artifact 120-296. 
 
 
111-065 Leather pack button 
Fig. 4.61. 
L:0.90 in. (2.29 cm), Diameter of base:0.64 in. (1.63 cm), Th. of base:0.06 in. (0.15 cm), 
Shaft diam.:0.16 in. (0.40 cm); Top sphere L:0.43 in. (1.09 cm), W:0.39 in. (0.98 cm) 
Cupreous stud or button for leather pack. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.61. Artifact 111-065. 
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131-096 Leather pack button 
Fig. 4.62. 
L:0.86 in. (2.19 cm), Diameter of base:0.47 in. (1.20 cm), Th. of base:0.06 in. (0.14 cm), 
Shaft diam.:0.15 in. (0.37 cm); Top sphere L:0.41 in. (1.04 cm), W:0.38 in. (0.97 cm) 
Cupreous stud or button for leather pack. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.62. Artifact 131-096. 
 
 
110-122 Strap Clasp 
Fig. 4.63. 
L:1.77 in. (4.49 cm), W.:1.06 in. (2.70 cm), Th.:0.14 in. (3.51 cm), Inner diam. of 
eye:0.44 in. (1.13 cm) 
Cupreous strap clasp. Rectangular opening for strap opposite an eye. A small hook 
would have been inserted through the eye to connect the strap to another item. Highly 
eroded.  
 
 
 144 
 
 
Figure 4.63. Artifact 110-122. 
 
 
4.6 Personal Items 
120-295 Key 
Fig. 4.64. 
L:3.08 in. (7.83 cm), Max. shaft W:0.35 in. (0.88cm)  
Cupreous key. Missing portion of ring. Three bands around the shaft, 0.10 in. (0.26 cm) 
hole at handle towards bottom of shaft.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.64. Artifact 120-295 
108-067 Bayonet scabbard hook 
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Fig. 4.65. 
Plate: L.:2.35 in. (5.96 cm), W.:1.64 in. (4.17 cm), Th.:0.02 in. (0.06 cm) 
Clip: L.:1.25 in. (3.19 cm), W.:0.49 in. (0.05 cm), Th.:0.30 in. (0.77 cm) 
Cupreous bayonet scabbard hook used to clip the bayonet scabbard to the frog that 
suspended the scabbard from the belt. Attached to cupreous plate which wrapped around 
the top of the leather bayonet scabbard. Two holes in plate for fasteners. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.65. Artifact 108-067. 
 
 
110-054.1 Oil Lamp Piece 
Fig. 4.66. 
Max. diam. (top):1.71 in. (4.35 cm), max. diam. (bottom):1.04 in. (2.63 cm), 
thickness:0.87 in. (2.22 cm) 
Cupreous oil lamp piece. Circles unevenly spaced around circumference, 0.02-0.13 in. 
(0.05-0.33 cm) apart holes are uniform in size, 0.12 in. (0.30 cm) in diameter. These are 
most likely made from a punch by hand. The lip around the top circumference would 
have held the glass in place. The lower portion is formed to fit onto the base of the lamp. 
The oil lamp piece shows damage and wear on both the top and bottom. 
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Figure 4.66. Artifact 110-54.1 
 
 
4.7 Activities Group 
4.7.1 Tools 
 Tools provided for the vessels of the U.S. Navy varied by the size and type of 
ship, according to the Navy Department’s specific allotment. When compared to the 
large varieties and quantities allotted, the tools recovered from Westfield represent a very 
small and poorly preserved portion of what was originally available.  
 
132-385 Hammer Head 
Fig. 4.67. 
L:5.05 in. (12.83 cm), Max. W:1.38 in. (3.50 cm), Diam. of round end:2.33 in. (5.93 
cm), Elliptical handle hole L:1.04 in. (2.64 cm), W:0.75 in. (1.90 cm) 
Iron hammer head. Square in section with round, flat hammer end. Elliptical handle hole 
in center with original wood fragments recovered. Original surface poorly preserved. 
The U.S. Navy issued a variety of hammers issued to navy ships, including chipping 
hammers, hand hammers, riveting hammers, and assorted copper hammers (United 
 147 
 
States Navy Department 1865:26). The type of this particular example is difficult to 
identify due to the hammer’s poor preservation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.67. Artifact 132-385. 
 
 
132-385A Wood Handle fragments from hammer 
Fig. 4.68. 
Left fragment: L:1.51 in. (3.83 cm), W:0.85 in. (2.17 cm), Th.:0.20 in. (0.51 cm) 
Right fragment: L:1.53 in. (3.89 cm), W:0.83 in. (2.11 cm), Th.:0.31 in. (0.79 cm) 
Two wood fragments from hammer head. Fragmented on inside, side towards the middle 
of the original handle, and smooth on the outside, where the wood sat against the iron.  
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Figure 4.68. Artifact 132-385A.  
 
 
139-005 and 119-021 Bullet Mold 
Fig. 4.69. 
L: 7.87 in. (20 cm) 
Cupreous bullet mold with complete handle on one half of mold (139-005) that splays 
outward and downward from the mold at a length of 6.19 in. (15.73 cm). The handle is 
missing for the other half (119-021). The two halves join together just behind the mold 
where the handle is much wider. The piece with a missing handle (119-021) may have 
sat on top of 139-005. 119-021 has a circle hole with a diameter of 0.33 inches (.84 cm) 
at the attachment point. The other half, 139-005, may have been placed under the first 
piece and has a square attachment hole with a length of 0.28 in. (0.70 cm). The mold 
cavity matches up well on both sides with a maximum length of 1.22 in. and a maximum 
width of 0.61 in. (3.1 cm and 1.54 cm, respectively). There is a small spout where the 
metal was originally poured. At the top of the spout, the diameter is 0.47 in. (1.2 cm) 
which narrows to 0.30 in. (0.77 cm). A small hole, diameter 0.24 in. (0.61 cm), on the 
upper portion of the mold on the complete handled half (139-005) either marks a fill line 
for the mold or indicates another piece was attached, at 1.00 in. (2.54 cm) from bottom 
of the mold. Another hole is below the spout and in front of the “U” shaped mold cavity. 
Another piece would have likely gone here, so that both halves could lock together on 
the other side of the mold. The lower half (139-005) shows evidence of a washer with a 
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diameter of 0.65 in. (1.66 cm) fitted to the bottom face at the attachment between the 
two halves, while the other half (119-021) shows evidence for a similar washer with a 
diameter of 0.57 in. (1.46 cm) on the top of the attachment point. Due to their similar 
size, the two mold halves likely belonged to the same bullet mold or to an identical 
mold.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.69. Artifacts 139-005 and 119-021. 
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118-023 Unidentified Tool 
Fig. 4.70. 
L:3.23 in. (8.20 cm), Max. W.:0.90 in. (2.28 cm) 
Cupreous unidentified cross-shaped tool. Base has extension to fit into a handle, possibly 
of wood. Opposite this, a 0.03 in. (0.06 cm) slit originally held another thin object. The 
object would have been held in place by a small screw at the top of this unidentified tool 
and supported by the two arms or extensions. The slit extends 0.89 in. (2.25 cm) from 
the top of the tool. The two arms or extensions are hollowed out in the shape of a 
cylinder with a diameter of 0.21 in. (0.53 cm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.70. Artifact 118-023.  
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133-130 Unidentified object or tool 
Fig. 4.71. 
L:3.78 in. (9.60 cm), Shaft diam.: 0.66 in. (1.68 cm), Head width:0.74 in. (1.88 cm), 
Head length:0.60 in. (1.53 cm) 
Unidentified cupreous object or tool. Square head with cylindrical shaft. Small 
indentations visible on bottom, possibly from use or from erosion. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.71. Artifact 133-130. 
 
 
4.7.1.1 Files 
Files are made in a wide variety of sizes, shapes, and weights for multiple or 
specific tasks, and they are of great importance to all workers of metal.  Files have to be 
strong and durable, and harder than the metal they are filing. Prior to the late 19th century 
when files were made with special alloy steel, files were made using carburized wrought 
iron, blister steel, shear steel, and cast steel. A special class of blacksmiths, called 
filesmiths, made files by hand. By the 19th century, there were further specializations in 
filesmithing, such as forgers, grinders, cutters, and hardeners. File blanks were forged 
and ground to the appropriate shape and smoothness. Teeth were individually cut in 
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rapid succession, using a chisel and hammer by a skilled workman relying only on sight 
and feeling. Easily replaced handles, primarily wooden, were optional, depending on the 
file’s use and user. Files were then tested, cleaned, oiled, and shipped out (Freedley 
1856:349; Ross and Light 2000:20-22). By the late 19th century, time and labor saving 
machines were introduced which eliminated the need for the old, highly skilled methods 
of file making. Production of files in the United States was relatively new in the 1860s, 
having just started in the previous decade. Prior to the 1850s, they were imported from 
Sheffield, England, the center of the file industry in England. The first American file 
company was established in Pittsburgh in the 1820s. Not until 1845 were files first 
manufactured in New York, by John Rothery (Arbor 1994:36).  
The U.S. Navy Department issued files under three categories. For the engineer’s 
department, between 18 and 36 files and 12 to 18 file handles may have been issued to 
Westfield for a two year period. For the carpenter, between 3 and 6 cross cut saw files, 
fine saw files, and 2-3 rat tail saw files, in addition to 6 to 15 handsaw files were issued. 
In a separate section, the carpentry department was issued between 4 and 10 flat bastard 
files, flat, fine files, half-round files, and half-round bastard files. Between two and four 
rat-tail, three-sided, and four-sided files were also issued (United States Navy 
Department 1865:25,78,87). Determining which department these files, 119-151 and 
119-054, were allocated to, is impossible. However, this information clearly 
demonstrates that the files recovered from Westfield are only a small portion of the many 
files issued to a naval ship. Both files listed above came from the same grid square on 
the site, 119. This grid square is located almost in the center of the wreck site and may 
indicate a central location for tool storage on the ship. However, due to the wrecking 
event, assumptions of this nature remain questionable.  
 
119-151 Flat File 
Figs. 4.72, 4.73. 
L:4.80 in. (12.20 cm), W:1.28 in. (3.25 cm), Th.:0.33 in. (0.84 cm) 
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 Figure 4.73. Surface detail of Artifact 119-151. 
 
Fragment of iron single-pointed flat file. Point opposite the tang or spike preserved. 
Teeth 0.04 in. (0.10 cm) apart on faces and edges. Angled, double-cut teeth across both 
faces. On the original cast, the double-cut teeth are preserved. These are shown in 
photographs of the cast below (Figure 4.73). These are not as evident on the painted 
epoxy cast (Figure 4.72). Teeth along the edges and point are perpendicular to the 
surface. Poorly preserved. Original iron not preserved, only the epoxy cast of the 
concretion mold.  
  
 
Figure 4.72. Artifact 119-151. 
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Figure 4.73. Continued. 
 
 
119-054 Half-Round File 
Fig. 4.74. 
L:12.20 in. (31.00 cm), W:1.20 in. (3.04 cm), Th.:0.44 in. (1.12 cm) 
Almost complete half-round file. Preserved from point to the upper portion of tang or 
spike. Missing the majority of the handle. Teeth 0.05 in. (0.13 cm) apart on faces and 
edges. Angled, double-cut teeth across flat face and angled, single-cut teeth on rounded 
face. These are shown in photographs of the original artifact below (Figure 4.72). 
Original iron artifact did not survive conservation, this is the epoxy cast.  
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Figure 4.74. Artifact 119-054. 
 
 
4.7.2 Other 
108-093 Latch 
Fig. 4.75. 
L:2.18 in. (5.55 cm), W:0.95 in. (2.41 cm), Th.:0.26 in. (0.66 cm) 
Cupreous latch. Eye opposite of hook not preserved. One large band around the shaft. 
Ring end missing. 
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Figure 4.75. Artifact 108-093. 
 
 
128-063 Latch 
Fig. 4.76. 
L:1.39 in. (3.53 cm), Th:0.04 in. (0.09 cm), Eye outer diam.:0.30 in. (0.77 cm) 
Cupreous hook or latch. Surface flat on one side and concave on the opposite side. Edges 
not well preserved around the eye. Ring end is badly eroded.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.76. Artifact 128-063. 
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121-137  Unidentified threaded loop 
Fig. 4.77. 
L:1.04 in. (2.63 cm), Loop inner diam:0.37 in. (0.94 cm), outer diam:0.72 in. (1.83 cm), 
lower base cylinder inner diam:0.33 in. (0.83 cm), outer diam:0.54 in. (1.38 cm) 
Cupreous loop. Threaded, hollow cylinder with loop attached to top. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.77. Artifact 121-137. 
 
 
121-084 Counterpoise Weight 
Fig. 4.78, 4.79. 
L:2.36 in. (6.00 cm), Min. diam.:1.61 (4.1 cm), Max. diam.:1.92 in. (4.9 cm), Upper 
circle:0.79 in. (2.0 cm), Lower circle:0.47 in. (1.2 cm), Weight:11.23 oz. (318.45 g) 
Cylindrical counterpoise weight. Cast iron with lead adjustment in central shaft 
originating from bottom central depression. Small circle on the top which allowed the 
weight to be hung. A ring would have been attached to the top for hanging. Bottom has 
another indented circle which allows the lead inside to be seen. The weight would have 
hung from a scale, counterbalancing the object was placed on the scale to be weighed. A 
cross-sectional drawing is shown in Figure 4.79. 
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Figure 4.78. Artifact 121-084. Top view, bottom view, and side view 
 
 
 
Figure 4.79. Cross-section drawing of counterpoise weight. The two drawings show two 
possible theories on the extent of the lead core inside the weight. The lead is shown in 
gray surrounded by a dashed line. The ring, shown by the dashed circle at the top of the 
weight, is a possible reconstruction for how the weight may have hung from the scale.  
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134-035 Hasp 
Fig. 4.80. 
L:5.31 in. (13.49 cm), Max W:1.81 in. (4.60 cm), Max Th.:0.22 in. (0.55 cm), Inner 
diameter of loops at end:0.29 in. (0.73 cm), Outer diam.:0.72 in. (1.82 cm), Long ellipse 
L:1.79 in. (4.56 cm), W:0.42 in. (1.09 cm) 
Cupreous hasp for padlock clasp. Two holes on one end. One of these holes is filled with 
copper, suggesting that the other portion of the hasp was also made of copper. The other 
end has decorative beveling, flat on one side and concave on the other, and a long ellipse 
opening to allow for loop to enter and a lock to be attached. 
 
 
  
Figure 4.80. Artifact 134-035. 
 
 
125-037 Plate with rope decoration 
Fig. 4.81. 
L:8.31 in. (21.10 cm), Max. W.:0.57 in. (1.44 cm), Max. Th.:0.22 in. (0.58 cm), Center 
hole diam.:0.32 in. (0.82 cm) 
Cupreous plate with rope decoration. Possibly a handle or decorative plate for a handle. 
“S” shape rope design on outer face. Both ends show break. Small circular hole with 
oval border in center for handle.  Twisted and bent. 
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Figure 4.81. Artifact 125-037. 
 
 
4.8 Unidentified  
132-001.02 Unidentified Finial 
Fig. 4.82. 
L:0.89 in. (2.25 cm), Max W.:0.91 in. (2.31 cm) 
Cupreous finial. Composed of two pieces. Lower portion appears to be cylindrical with a 
circular base, 0.91 in. (2.31 cm) in diameter. Inside of lower portion is hollow, with a 
diameter of 0.32 in. (0.80 cm). The outer diameter of the cylinder, barely visible below 
the upper portion, is 0.46 in. (1.18 cm). The upper portion fits over the lower portion and 
has a maximum diameter at its base of 0.58 in. (1.46 cm). This diameter slowly 
decreases as the upper portion extends until it forms a convex cross-section with a 
diameter of 0.37 in. (0.95 cm). The diameter increases to form the top button, diameter 
0.56 in. (1.42 cm), which marks the top of the finial. Small, poorly preserved grooves or 
teeth are evident around the top circumference of the button.  
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Figure 4.82. Artifact 132-001.02. 
 
 
125-062 Unidentified 
Fig. 4.83. 
L:3.08 in. (7.82 cm), W:0.40 in. (1.02 cm) 
Unidentified cupreous object.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.83. Artifact 125-062. 
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120-271 Unidentified 
Fig. 4.84. 
L:1.20 in. (3.04 cm), W:0.44 in. (1.11 cm) 
Unidentified cupreous object. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.84. 120-271. 
 
 
128-064 Unidentified 
Fig. 4.85. 
L: 0.68 in. (1.73 cm), W: 0.15 in. (0.37 cm), Th.: 0.11 in. (0.28 cm) 
Unidentified cupreous object. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.85. Artifact 128-064. 
 
 163 
 
131-078 Unidentified strap 
Fig. 4.86. 
L:3.69 in. (9.38 cm), L of fork ends:1.51 in. (3.83 cm), Max W:1.03 in. (2.62 cm), Max 
Th. of strap before fork:0.23 in. (0.59 cm) 
Cupreous unidentified forked strap. One hole at the end of the strap. Originally, the two 
sides would have formed a “U” shape. Small copper shaft through opposite end. Fork 
sides separated 0.37 in. (0.93 cm), holes at end of forked ends diameter of 0.39 in. (1.0 
cm). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.86. Artifact 131-078. 
 
 
40   Unidentified Object 
Fig. 4.87. 
L:5.75 in. (14.6 cm), Max. W.:1.61 in. (4.1 cm), Th.:0.59 in. (1.49 cm) 
Unidentified cast iron object. Concave and half-circle in shape with a small, possibly 
purposeful notch on the top left.  
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Figure 4.87. Artifact 40. 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 This catalog provides descriptions of the Priority 1 small artifacts related to the 
crew and the daily running of the ship for comparison to other archaeological 
collections, possible future identification for objects not yet identified, and as a record of 
artifacts found on the site of USS Westfield. The artifacts listed in the catalog were 
chosen based on their diagnostic properties and importance in representing the artifacts 
from the Westfield site. In some cases, like the belt and cartridge box plates, the entire 
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collection was cataloged above, while in others like the brick, glass, and ceramics, only 
the most important are cataloged. In a large part, the choice to include an artifact was 
purely subjective, based on how the item fit within the larger group.  
Artifact identification and measurements consumed the most time and effort for 
the creation of this catalog. Due to this and the fragmentary nature of the artifacts, 
research of individual artifacts was neglected in favor of general research on the 
materials and types of objects. This research, included throughout this section, reflects 
the transitional period of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, when iron and 
copper dominated the metal industry and new technologies expanded the supply and use 
of these materials. The manufacturing methods for the items listed in the section 
changed also, taking advantage of new technologies.   
 Iron and copper artifacts comprise the majority of finds from USS Westfield. Iron 
artifacts include most of the Westfield collection and were in the form of boiler and 
machinery parts, while cupreous artifacts dominate the small finds of the collection 
because they survive better than small iron objects. Noticeably absent from the catalog 
are iron and copper fasteners, which comprise the majority of the small finds. These 
artifacts were not included because they are categorized as part of the hull construction, 
and the large quantity and types of fasteners would have overshadowed the unique 
artifacts in the catalog.   
Few diagnostic, organic artifacts survived on the wreck site and those few were 
left out of the catalog. The wood fragments found on the Westfield site were not included 
because most of the small pieces were intrusive and the larger fragments were most 
likely part of the hull. Only a few glass and ceramic remains from the site were included 
because they were very fragmentary, and no writing or maker’s marks were found on the 
small pieces. Anthracite coal pieces found on Westfield, distributed across the site, were 
also not discussed in the catalog because the sizes and shapes of the individual pieces 
have little archaeological value.  
 The Westfield artifacts show very poor preservation in general due to the initial 
explosion during the Battle of Galveston, dredging activity in the early 20th century, and 
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the harsh conditions of the wreck location. Due to this, the small finds are more than 
likely not in or near their original location when Westfield sank, eliminating any reliable 
provenience information. To increase the difficulty of determining provenience, the 
rescue archaeology conducted at the site only provides a general location of artifacts, 
within a 15 ft. (4.57 m) square (Borgens et al. 2010:D-6).  
As such, much of the information learned from the small finds comes from studying the 
artifact groups, in combination with historical records, and not their relation to one 
another or the site. This is detailed further in Section 5. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 After nearly 150 years on the sandy bottom of Galveston Bay, USS Westfield 
now exists as an artifact collection of twisted metal and small fragments available for 
study by archaeologists and for public education. This thesis examines the small artifacts 
found with Westfield, including a discussion of their conservation and a catalog for 
future reference. This concluding section briefly summarizes the previous four sections. 
In addition, this section uses historical documents, in combination with archaeology, to 
connect the material culture to the people who built, equipped, and worked on USS 
Westfield.   
5.2 Excavation and Prioritization 
 USS Westfield was excavated by PBS&J (now Atkins Global) in late 2009, and 
the artifacts were cataloged in early 2010, as part of the Texas City Channel 
Improvement Project in Galveston, Texas. The site was divided into 15 x 15 ft. (4.57 x 
4.57 m) grid squares distributed virtually over the wreck site. A large electromagnet and 
a clamshell dredge were used to bring up most of the remains, as the swift moving water 
and harsh conditions of the channel made regular diving on the site impossible. After the 
artifacts were excavated, they were sent to Freeport, Texas where they were cataloged, 
recorded, and photographed (Borgens and Gearhart 2010:4-5). 
 In the spring of 2010, the artifacts were brought to the Conservation Research 
Laboratory at Texas A&M University’s Riverside campus for prioritization and 
conservation. The Westfield artifacts were prioritized into five categories. Priority 1 
artifacts were kept for conservation, for their display and informational value. Priority 2 
and 3 artifacts were deaccessioned and moved into permanent wet storage, or reburial. 
Some Priority 2 artifacts were relabeled Priority CRL and kept for training purposes. 
Priority 4 and 5 artifacts were made up of concretion bleeds or fragments of non-
diagnostic artifacts, and were discarded. Prioritization required extensive knowledge of 
the collection by conservators. To aid in this process, a database was created to organize 
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the information about the artifact number, location, material type, description, and 
priority of each of the over 8,000 artifacts. In addition, x-radiographs were taken to 
identify the small iron artifacts preserved under layers of iron corrosion or concretion. 
 While prioritization and x-rays were necessary for determining whether or not an 
artifact was kept for conservation, the process was extremely time-consuming. After the 
artifacts were prioritized, the priorities had to be approved by all interested parties, 
including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Naval History and Heritage Command, 
the Texas Historical Commission, and the Conservation Research Laboratory. Finalizing 
the database was a tedious, but important process. Once the priorities were approved, 
artifacts stored in an array of vats were re-sorted by priority which took a span of three 
months, delaying conservation further. However, these steps were necessary to complete 
the deaccession process ethically.  
5.3 Historical Background 
The Westfield was built by Jeremiah Simonson of Brooklyn, New York and 
commissioned for the Staten Island Ferry Service by Cornelius Vanderbilt in the spring 
of 1861. The ferryboat had a length of 214 ft. (65.2 m), a breadth of 34 ft. (10.4 m), and 
a depth of 12 ft. 11 in. (3.9 m), and its hull registered at slightly less than 900 tons. The 
ship’s vertical walking beam engine was built by Morgan Iron Works of New York 
(Heyl 1965:335). Westfield served as a ferryboat for five months before the ship was 
purchased by the U.S. Navy, which lacked the ships needed to conduct the blockade of 
Southern ports. USS Westfield was commissioned on 13 February 1862, with Lieutenant 
Commander William B. Renshaw as captain (New York Times 1862a, 1862d).  
Westfield was employed with the West Gulf Blockading Squadron and sent to the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi River for an attack on New Orleans. Prior to the 
battle, the ferry gunboat served to pull heavy mortar schooners over the bar at the 
entrance to the Mississippi and to observe the Confederate forts (Cotham 
2006:43,45,47). During the battle, in late April 1862, Westfield assisted in pummeling 
Confederate Forts Jackson and St. Philip and extinguishing or deflecting fire rafts, sent 
down the river by the Confederate Navy (Mahan 1885:62-63,65; Dufour 1960:231).  
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Between May and October 1862, Westfield completed many different tasks in the 
Gulf of Mexico, participating in an attack on Mobile, Alabama, patroling Lake 
Ponchartrain and surrounding waters, and fighting in the Battle of Vicksburg (Cotham 
2006:37-74). In October, Westfield, Harriet Lane, Owasco, and Clifton were sent to 
capture Galveston, Corpus Christi, Sabine Pass, and Port Lavaca, Texas (Cotham 
1998:57-59). Galveston was captured in early October and occupied by Union ships until 
January of 1863. During this time, Westfield and Clifton made their way to Matagorda 
Bay to demand the surrender of Port Lavaca and Indianola. The Confederates fought 
back, resulting in the capture and looting of Indianola and the bombardment of Port 
Lavaca by Westfield’s guns (Malsch 1988:137-138,162,167; Cotham 2006:110-
111,114,115).  
Westfield and Clifton returned to Galveston Bay in November of 1862. Rumors 
of Confederate ships in the bay kept the sailors and marines on alert (Cotham 2006:116-
119). In the early hours of New Year’s Day, 1863, four Confederate ships attacked from 
the north of Galveston Bay, while General Magruder and his troops crossed the bridge 
onto Galveston Island and attacked the Union troops stationed on Kuhn’s Wharf (Davis 
1863:458; Palmer et al. 1863:447-448; Cotham 1998:113-114). Westfield spotted the 
Confederate ships at 4:00 A.M. and immediately weighed anchor, sailed forward, and 
grounded in the sand on the northeast side of Pelican Spit (Burt 1863:455; Jones 
1961:323; Tucker 2006:325,354). As the Battle of Galveston progressed, Harriet Lane 
was captured by the Confederate cottonclads, the troops on shore were taken prisoner, 
and Westfield remained stuck in the sand. Acknowledging the need for a retreat, 
Renshaw decided to scuttle the gunboat instead of leaving the ship for the Confederates. 
The ship exploded prematurely, killing Captain Renshaw, the officers, and a few crew 
members (Burt 1863:456; Palmer et al. 1863:449). 
The Battle of Galveston was a significant defeat for the Union Navy during the 
Civil War. Galveston thereafter remained under Confederate control until the end of the 
war. The loss of Westfield was labeled as unjustified by David Farragut, and Captain 
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Renshaw was blamed for the loss of the gunboat, the abandonment of Harriet Lane, and 
defeat by the Confederates (Farragut 1863c:447).  
5.4 Conservation 
 Iron artifacts comprise the majority of objects found on the site of USS Westfield. 
Their conservation is detailed in Section 3. The preservation of the iron from this site is 
challenging for conservation, ranging between the stage of a completely whole iron 
artifacts, a partially preserved iron core and a mushy graphite surface, and an empty 
concretion cavity. The largest challenge to conservation came from the cast iron objects, 
which in some cases were entirely graphitized. This graphite layer consistently flaked or 
spalled off the surface of the artifacts.  
An experiment was conducted to solve this problem and determine better 
conservation methods for Westfield artifacts. The results supported the hypothesis that 
damage to the graphite layer of the cast iron artifacts was caused in a relatively brief 
period that artifacts were allowed to air dry, shorter than what would have been 
expected. In addition, electrolysis with artifacts drilled to directly attach the electrical 
current to the iron core was found to be the best treatment for Westfield cast iron. These 
findings have a significant implication for the successful treatment of any similar 
collection and are considered to be a major contribution of this thesis. These results, as 
well as developing techniques for casting the degraded iron artifacts were critical to the 
success of the Westfield conservation effort. 
 Copper artifacts were also commonly found with Westfield and were conserved 
using electrolytic reduction, similar to the iron objects. Lead objects were cleaned 
mechanically and chemically with hydrochloric acid before being rinsed and sealed in 
microcrystalline wax. Ceramics and glass were treated with catalyzed silicone oil 
polymer. While this method is sufficient to treat these artifacts, for general conservation, 
this process is expensive and unnecessary for glass and ceramics. On the other hand, the 
treatment is very beneficial to the organic artifacts, especially wood, leather, and rubber.  
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5.5 Artifact Catalog 
 The artifact catalog documents the small, unique Priority 1 artifacts related to the 
crew or the daily running of the ship found on the site of USS Westfield. The catalog 
also serves as a comparative collection for those studying American Civil War sites. The 
list includes basic measurements, a description, and photographs. In order to connect the 
material culture, or the artifacts, back to the people who made the objects, research was 
conducted on the manufacturing processes and industries producing the various material 
types, including iron, copper, and lead, as well as individual artifacts such as the belt 
plates, a soda bottle with a rounded bottom, and the condiment shaker cap. This research 
highlighted the transitional period during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, 
showing changes in the development of technology and an increased demand for 
supplies during the Civil War.  
 The provenience for the Priority 1 artifacts chosen for this thesis is very general. 
The salvage excavation, conducted with a clamshell dredge and an electromagnet due to 
the harsh environment of the site, only allowed the location of artifacts to be recorded 
within a 15 ft. (4.57 m) square. However, because of the explosion during the Second 
Battle of Galveston and 20th-century dredging operations, most small finds were most 
likely not in their original position. Despite this, a site map was created below (Figure 
5.1) showing the relative locations of Priority 1 artifacts listed in Section 4. This map 
shows that the artifacts were spread across the entire site and not found in one specific 
area. This is expected; in addition to the explosion resulting in the spread of objects, the 
artifacts chosen in Section 4 had a variety functions, material type, and preservation. 
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Figure 5.1. Site map of USS Westfield showing locations of small Priority 1 artifacts. 
After Borgens et al. (2010:D-6). 
 
 
5.6 U.S. Navy Regulations and Allotment of Equipment 
 The changes and transitions represented in the study of the Westfield artifact 
collection and characteristic of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century were also 
experienced by the U.S. Navy, as the allotment of equipment became more regulated. By 
studying these regulations, in comparison to objects found on the site during the 
Confederate salvaging and the later excavation, this is made apparent. The Regulations 
for the Government of the United States Navy, 1865 (1865b:1-2), lists the types of U.S. 
Navy ships by rate (shown below in Table 5.1). According to this chart, Westfield would 
have been considered a Fourth Rate ship, as a purchased paddle-wheel steamer of just 
less than 900 tons. A second document, Allotment Established for Vessels of the United 
States, 1864 (1865a:33-34), lists regulations for the sizes of anchors and kedges required 
by ships of a specific rate. The bower anchor weight is determined by multiplying the 
square of the extreme breadth of the ship by a multiplier based on the rate of the ship, 
listed in the document and shown below in Table 5.2. Westfield, with a breadth of 34 ft. 
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(10.36 m) and a fourth rate ship, may have been issued a 2,500 ton bower anchor, if 
these regulations were followed.  
 
 
Table 5.1. Navy regulations for third and fourth rate ships (United States Navy 1865b:1-
2). 
Third Rate Fourth Rate 
Sailing ships from 700 to 1,300 tons Sailing ships under 700 tons 
Screw steamers from 600 to 1,200 tons Screw steamers under 600 tons 
Paddle-wheel steamers from 700 to 
1,000 tons 
Paddle-wheel steamers under 800 tons 
Iron-clad steamers from 1,200 to 2,000 
tons 
Iron-clad steamers under 1,200 tons 
Purchased screw steamers from 700 to 
1,400 tons 
Purchased screw steamers under 700 tons 
Purchased paddle-wheel steamers from 
900 to 1,500 tons 
Purchased paddle-wheel steamers under 900 
tons 
Receiving ships Store and supply vessels 
 
 
Table 5.2. Allotment of anchors and kedges for paddle-wheel steamers in the U.S. Navy, 
based on rate (United States Navy 1865a:34). 
Rate Type Multiplier Bower  Sheet Stream Kedge 
1st If rigged as ship or bark 3.0 2 2 1 4 
2nd If rigged as ship or bark 3.0 2 2 1 3 
3rd If rigged in a lighter way 2.2 2 1 1 3 
4th If between 700 and 500 tons 2.0 2 1 1 2 
4th If between 500 and 300 tons 2.0 2 0 1 2 
4th If between 350 and 200 tons 2.0 2 0 1 2 
4th If less than 200 tons 2.0 2 0 1 1 
 
 
 Based on Table 5.2, and Westfield’s 891 tons, Westfield may have had two bower 
anchors, one sheet, one stream, and two kedge anchors. This document also lists 
regulations for the size of the stream and kedge anchors, and their associated chain size, 
calculated based on the rules and listed in Table 5.3 below. The stream anchors were 
regulated to be one-fourth the size of the bower and sheet anchors, and the kedge 
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anchors, in the case of the ship having two, were at one-sixth and one-tenth of the bower 
anchor weight. Charts in the document dictate what size chain, both diameter and length, 
for each size anchor (United States Navy 1865a:33-39). 
 
 
Table 5.3. Possible allotment of anchors, kedges, and anchor chain for USS Westfield 
(United States Navy 1865a:33-39). 
Anchor Quantity Size 
(tons) 
Chain 
diameter 
(in./cm) 
Chain 
length 
(fathoms) 
Chain 
length 
(ft./m) 
Chain weight 
(tons) 
Bower 2 2,500 1.25/3.18 135 810/247 6.35 
Sheet 1 2,500 1.25/3.18 120 720/219 5.64 
Stream 1 625 0.63/1.60 60 360/110 0.72 
Kedge #1 1 416  0.50/1.27 n/a n/a n/a 
Kedge #2 1 250  0.44/1.11 n/a n/a n/a 
 
 
 This information is useful as an estimate of the anchors and chain that were 
aboard USS Westfield and can be calculated for any U.S. Navy ships from the Civil War, 
as long as the breadth and rate of the ship are known. However, this estimate may not 
reflect reality and is contradicted by two sources. According to the Confederate Prize 
Commission Records (see Section 2.6.5, Table 2.6), a four inch diameter hawser was 
recovered from the ship. In Allotment Established for Vessels of the United States, 1864 
(1865a:38), a four inch diameter hawser, or a circumference of 12.5 inches, would be 
associated with a bower anchor weight of between 3,000 and 3,500 tons, larger than 
Westfield would have needed based on the U.S. Navy regulations. The chain preserved 
on Westfield, cataloged in Section 4.4.4, presents another issue. The task of identifying 
where this chain came from on the ship is impossible; however, there is a possibility that 
the chain may have come from the kedge or stream anchors. The chain is poorly 
preserved, so any diameter measurements taken from the chain links is a minimum. The 
diameters from the largest size of chain are 0.57 in. (1.45 cm) and 0.54 in. (1.35 cm), 
which is too large for either estimated chain size for the two kedges. Most likely, the 
original diameters would have been larger, due to the poor preservation of the iron; 
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however, these diameters may still have been too large for the regulation size stream 
anchor chain as well. 
 While the evidence from the chain diameters is only approximate at best, the 
large hawser recovered from the ship could indicate that Westfield may have had larger 
anchors than what would have been necessary for a ship of that size. Many factors could 
have contributed to this. Primarily, at the time of Westfield’s purchase, the U.S. Navy 
was not equipped to provide standardized equipment as outlined in the 1865 regulations, 
as discussed in Section 2.2 (New York Times 1862a; Roberts 2002:9-10), exemplified by 
the Navy’s purchase of a ferryboat. Westfield may have been converted and equipped 
using whatever supplies were available locally and inexpensively. On the other hand, 
Westfield’s equipment may come from more extensive forethought. Larger, heavier 
anchors could have assisted the ship when anchoring close to land, such as in rivers or 
just outside of harbors, in the heavy storms of the Gulf of Mexico or the East Coast, or in 
towing heavy mortar schooners (Kevin Crisman 2013, pers. comm.).  
 In either case, there seems to be a change towards the end of the war from a “use 
what we got” mentality to more standardization and regulation in equipping Navy ships, 
whether or not those rules were followed. The experience gained by the Navy during the 
years between Westfield’s commissioning and the publication of the Allotment 
Established for Vessels of the United States, and a steadier supply of ships and 
equipment, allowed for this transition to take place. Further, these changes parallel the 
changes that were occurring in the manufacturing processes of supplies, shown in 
Section 4.  
5.7 Conclusion 
In 2009 and 2010, USS Westfield was excavated from Galveston Bay almost 150 
years after the converted ferryboat sank during the Battle of Galveston on 1 January 
1863. In the spring of 2010, the collection of artifacts was brought to the Conservation 
Research Laboratory at Texas A&M University’s Riverside Campus where they were 
prepared for conservation. Standard laboratory procedures for conservation were 
conducted on the majority of the Priority 1 artifacts, or those conserved for display and 
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informational value, and included variations on electrolytic reduction and silicone 
polymer treatment. Historical research of USS Westfield highlighted the vessel’s use as a 
New York ferryboat, its conversion to a gunboat, and its use in the West Gulf 
Blockading squadron in 1862. Details of the Second Battle of Galveston and Westfield’s 
sinking included in that section recognized the importance of the loss for the Union in 
the Gulf of Mexico. A timeline in the Appendix (Table A-1) was created as a condensed 
version of the historical background for easy reference. Unique Priority 1 artifacts, 
related to the crew or the daily running of the ship, were chosen for a catalog in Section 
4. This catalog was intended to be a reference for others studying Civil War collections, 
as well as a way to further research Westfield. While the artifacts themselves are not 
extremely diagnostic, research into their manufacture emphasized the transitions and 
changes that were experience in the 19th century.  
The result of this thesis is a better understanding of Westfield’s history and role 
in the American Civil War, a working knowledge of how to manage, prioritize, and 
conserve an extensive artifact collection, and a reference catalog of the unique small 
artifacts from the site. The conservation techniques, cataloging process, and analysis can 
be successfully applied to any future Civil War conservation project and will alleviate 
any of the problems encountered and eventually solved during the Westfield project. In 
addition, this thesis was completed in honor and in memory of those who perished 
during the Second Battle of Galveston on New Year’s Day 1863, whose memory is 
preserved by the seemingly small bits and pieces of Westfield that are discussed in the 
preceding sections. 
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Table A-1. Historical Timeline for USS Westfield. 
DATE EVENT 
1 June 1860 Cornelius Vanderbilt begins construction on Westfield at the 
Simonson shipyard (Stiles 2009;337). 
9 July 1861 
 
A small sailboat containing three soldiers from Governor’s 
Island capsizes off of Quarantine in New York. Two of them 
are saved by Captain Braisted of the Staten Island ferry boat 
Westfield (New York Times 1861). 
22 November 1861 U.S. Navy purchases Westfield (Silverstone 1989;102). 
31 January 1862 Westfield arrives in New York to be armed and put into 
commission (New York Times 1862b). 
10 February 1862 Westfield receives armament of four 32-pounders, broadside, 
and two pivot guns, one fore and one aft (New York Times 
1862c). 
13 February 1862 USS Westfield commissioned (New York Times 1862d). 
22 February 1862 Westfield leaves Staten Island and heads south (Cotham 
2006:40). 
25 February 1862 Westfield sails with USS John P. Jackson, Clifton, and Forbes 
to join Captain David D. Porter’s mortar fleet (New York 
Times 1862e). 
26 February 1862 Off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, Westfield encounters a 
large gale where the force of the waves removed a few 
planks. Pumps were used to remove the incoming water until 
the ship reached the harbor in Port Royal, South Carolina 
(Cotham 2006:43). 
28 February 1862 Westfield arrives in Port Royal, South Carolina for repairs 
from a heavy storm. Her forward guard was bent inward (New 
York Times 1862f). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
DATE  EVENT 
8-10 March 1862 Westfield reunites with Clifton in Key West, Florida. A few 
days later, Westfield leaves for Passe a l’Outre in the 
Mississippi River and spends two weeks towing vessels over 
the bar and rescuing larger ships that run aground (Cotham 
2006:43,45). 
18 March-13 April 
1862 
 
Westfield tows and assists USS Mississippi and USS 
Pensacola over the bar at Southwest Pass, south of New 
Orleans in the Mississippi River (Renshaw 1862a). The time 
is also spent disguising the fleets’ outer hulls with Mississippi 
mud and attaching tree limbs to the tops of the masts of the 
mortar schooners (Cotham 2006:47). 
31 March 1862 New York Times (1862i) Key West correspondent reports that 
Westfield has departed from Key West, Florida. Westfield 
arrives in Pilot Town, LA to rendezvous with the fleets to be 
used in the capture of New Orleans. There are 47 vessels total 
with 440 large caliber guns (Cotham 2006:46-47). 
13 April 1862 
 
Westfield is part of a coastal survey party along with USS 
Harriet Lane. Two rebel gunboats approach Westfield and the 
crew fires upon the rebels with rifle shot. The two Union 
ships are quickly joined by six to eight more, before the 
Confederate boats escape to safety under Fort Jackson. The 
crew of Westfield fires the 100 pounder rifle, breaking the 
shaft of the gunboat CSS Defiance, damaging the rebel ship 
sufficiently to warrant the crew to scuttle the ship (Renshaw 
1862a). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
 
DATE EVENT 
17 April 1862 
 
Westfield assists in extinguishing the flames of two 
Confederate fire rafts (Renshaw 1862a). 
18 April 1862 
 
Westfield tows mortar schooners and drives off a rebel 
steamer which retreats to Fort St. Philip. The crew fires ten 
shots with the rifle, while receiving similar rifle shot from the 
steamers and 10 inch shot and shell from the fort (Renshaw 
1862a). 
18-24 April 1862 
 
Battle of New Orleans. Westfield assists in supplying 
ammunition for mortar schooners as the bombardment of the 
forts at New Orleans continues day and night (Renshaw 
1862a; Cotham 2006:49). 
21 April 1862 Westfield extinguishes another Confederate fire raft (Renshaw 
1862a). 
24 April 1862 
 
3:45 am. Westfield, with the rest of the mortar flotilla 
steamers led by USS Harriet Lane, attacks Fort Jackson and 
Fort St. Philip. Westfield’s crew concentrates fire on Fort 
Jackson from a distance of 600 yards (549 m). Renshaw later 
informs David Porter that with their conservative use of 
ammunition, for the entire operations since March, Westfield 
has only used 35 rifle shot and shell, 11 9-inch shells, and 17 
8-inch shells (Renshaw 1862a). Henry O. Gusley states that 
event was a, “terrific battle of nearly an hour” after fleets 
reached a position both above and below the forts (Cotham 
2006:49). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
 
 
 
DATE EVENT 
27-28 April 1862 General Benjamin Butler lands a large force behind Fort St. 
Philip, effectively cutting off the forts on three sides and 
concluding the Battle of New Orleans. Both Forts Jackson 
and St. Philip surrender to Commodore Porter on the 28th of 
April and marines from Westfield are ordered to take 
possession of Fort Jackson (Cotham 2006:51). 
29 April-5 May 
1862 
Westfield returns to Pilot Town just below Southwest Pass at 
the mouth of the Mississippi River to aid ships into the river. 
Henry O. Gusley complains of mosquitoes (Cotham 2006:38-
39). 
8 May 1862 Master’s Mate William L. Babcock promoted to Acting 
Master. Westfield, along with Harriet Lane, Clifton, John P. 
Jackson, and Miami, are anchored four miles from Fort 
Morgan, near Fort Gaines, for reconnaissance in preparation 
for an attack on Mobile (New York Times 1862k). 
10 May 1862 Westfield arrives back at Ship Island after a not entirely 
successful blockade on Mobile. Clifton ran aground within 
range of the Forts Morgan and Gaines but succeeded in 
extricating herself before any damage was done. Westfield 
participated in a friendly race back to Ship Island in which the 
crew was able to prove Westfield was the faster of Clifton and 
John P. Jackson (Cotham 2006:56,58). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
 
 
DATE EVENT 
14 May-1 June 
1862 
Westfield explores Lake Ponchartrain, Pearl River and the 
Rigolettes in search of rebel steamers. On the night of 15 
May, Westfield’s armorer Jacob Snukel threw himself 
overboard, without an apparent cause, and drowned. Westfield 
returns to Ship Island on 16 May and travels to Pensacola, 
Florida on the 31st of May to find that the town of 
Warrington, Florida, and the correspondingly naval yard, to 
have been burned (Cotham 2006:58-67). 
4-19 June 1862 Westfield travels between Pilot Town, New Orleans, and 
Rodney, Mississippi before meeting with Commodore 
Farragut’s fleet in Vicksburg, Mississippi in preparation for 
an attack there (Cotham 2006:68-77). 
26 June-15 July 
1862 
The battle that ensued at Vicksburg was much slower and 
ineffective compared to the quick results at New Orleans. 
CSS Arkansas caused damage to her connecting rod with a 
rifle shot. The shell passed through her wheel house, cutting 
an arm of the wheel, and then was picked up on deck. The 
WGBS sets out to destroy Arkansas. Renshaw reports on the 
scuttling of Sidney C. Jones (Renshaw 1862b; New York 
Times 1862m). The siege of Vicksburg continues until the 
15th of July when the Union commences a two hour attack by 
night that silences the Confederate batteries and results in the 
firing of the town (Cotham 2006:81-84). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
 
 
DATE EVENT 
23 July 1862 Westfield is back in New Orleans. (Renshaw 1862b). 
7 August 1862 Westfield travels to Baton Rouge, LA as reinforcements for 
Commander Farragut. Confederate forces numbering to 6,000 
had attacked the Union’s 2,500 on 5 August. CSS Arkansas 
was engaged with two Union gunboats, resulting in the 
destruction of Arkansas by the crew to avoid capture by the 
Union (Cotham 2006:87-89). 
8 August-20 
September 1862 
Westfield ordered to leave her current location in Baton 
Rouge and head to New Orleans, Louisiana to prepare to 
leave the Mississippi River (Farragut 1862a).  By 8 August, 
she is anchored once again at Pensacola, FL where she 
remains until 19 September before returning to Ship Island 
(Cotham 2006:90-98). 
25 September-2 
October 1862 
Westfield is between Ship Island and Pilot Town preparing for 
an attack on Galveston, Texas. The ship arrives at Sabine Pass 
on 2 October (Cotham 2006:99-104). 
4-6 October 1862 Galveston is captured by Captain Renshaw and Westfield, 
with the aid of Harriet Lane, Owasco, Clifton, and Henry 
Janes (Renshaw 1862d). Renshaw requests the surrender of 
Galveston, which was denied. Union forces exchange fire 
with the rebels and soon discover that the large guns at 
Galveston are actually Quaker guns. Galveston soon 
surrenders (Cotham 2006:104,106). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
 
 
 
 
DATE EVENT 
12-21 October 1862 Marines aboard Westfield are stationed on Pelican Island and 
used to disperse any rebel forces and defend the island 
(Cotham 2006:107-109). 
23 October 1862 Westfield is joined by the Clifton in their journey to 
Matagorda Bay. Both vessels run aground in the entrance into 
the bay. Westfield captures Lecompte, a blockade runner 
(Cotham 2006:110-113). 
26 October 1862 Indianola surrenders to Westfield (Cotham 2006:113-114). 
31 October-2 
November 1862 
Attack on Lavaca and the bursting of Westfield’s 100 pounder 
Parrot rifle. The bombardment lasted two days. Westfield ran 
low on ammunition, so the battle subsided and the gunboats 
set sail for Galveston (Cotham 2006:115-116). 
5-14 November 
1862 
Westfield remains at Galveston, hearing rumors of rebel 
steamers in the bay. HBM Greyhound arrives in Galveston 
and Westfield acts as transport for Greyhound’s captain. A 
boat crew from Owasco goes ashore and is fired upon in an 
ambush. Almost all of the crew is wounded (Cotham 
2006:116-120). 
20-29 November 
1862 
Westfield captures another blockade runner, runs aground off 
Pelican Spit, and, on the 29th, spies a rebel ram coming down 
the bay and Westfield gives chase (Cotham 2006:120-122). 
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Table A-1. Continued.  
DATE EVENT 
1-21 December 
1862 
Westfield continues monitoring rebel activity at Galveston. 
She receives a nine-inch Dahlgren cannon from Clifton 
(Cotham 2006:123-126). 
24 December 1862 The 42nd Massachusetts Regiment of 400 soldiers arrives 
aboard USS Saxon (Cotham 2006:120-127). 
1 January 1863 
 
 
Battle of Galveston: Union naval forces are attacked by two 
cottonclads and two other vessels. Westfield is scuttled to 
prevent capture and Harriet Lane is captured. What remains 
of the Union vessels and sailors, 70 from Westfield, head back 
to New Orleans (Farragut 1863a). 
4 January 1863 The marines and sailors from Westfield arrive in New Orleans 
aboard Clifton (Cotham 2006:130). 
19 March 1863 The guns from Westfield and Harriet Lane are used to create 
rebel battery at Galveston (New York Times 1863b). 
4 May 1863 Rebel steamers are used in an attempt to raise a part of 
Westfield (New York Times 1863c). 
1 June 1863 Houston Telegraph reports that a total of five guns, including 
an eight-inch Columbiad and a nine-inch Dahlgren have been 
salvaged from the wreck of Westfield. The Telegraph predicts 
that there will be more found (Houston Telegraph 1863c). 
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Table A-2. Chloride Readings from Cast Iron Experiment. Vat ∆ indicates the electrolyte was changed. UR indicates the 
reading was unreadable. 
 
  
Vat #22- 
Control 
Vat #27- 60 
minutes Vat #23- 6 hours 
Vat #28- 24 
hours 
  
Amp/V Sol./Cl. Amp/V Sol./Cl. Amp/V Sol./Cl. Amp/V Sol./Cl. 
1 10/16/2012  2/3 UR 2/2 UR 2/2 UR 2/3 UR 
2 10/23/2012  2/3 UR 2/2 UR 2/2 UR 2/3 UR 
3 10/30/2012  2/3 UR 2/2 UR 2/2 UR 2/3 UR 
4 11/6/2012 Vat ∆ UR Vat ∆ UR Vat ∆ UR Vat ∆ UR 
5 11/13/2012  2/3 85 3/2 10.6 2/2 57 2/3 70 
6 11/20/2012  2/3 18 3/3 21 2/2 18 2/3 28 
7 11/27/2012  2/3 10.6 2/3 28 2/2 25 2/3 43 
8 12/7/2012 Vat ∆ n/a 2/3 39 2/2 46 2/3 46 
9 12/11/2012  1/2 14 2/3 32 1/2 25 2/3 57 
10 12/18/2012  1/2 18 2/3 25 1/2 32 2/3 50 
11 1/2/2013  1/2 10.6 2/3 28 1/2 32 2/3 39 
12 1/7/2013  1/2 14 2/3 32 1/2 35 2/3 46 
13 1/14/2013  1/2 85 2/3 35 1/2 39 2/3 57 
14 1/22/2013  1/2 21 2/3 27 1/2 32 2/3 46 
15 1/29/2013  1/3 10.6 2/3 21 2/3 18 1/3 50 
16 2/5/2013  1/3 25 1/3 32 1/3 35 1/3 53 
17 2/12/2013  1/3 21 1/3 43 Vat ∆ 50 Vat ∆ n/a 
18 2/19/2013  1/3 21 Vat ∆ 53 2/2 UR 1/3 10.6 
19 2/26/2013  1/3 14 1/3 14 2/2 7 2/3 10.6 
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Table A-3. Graph of chloride readings versus the square root of time for Vat #22 
Control. The red line indicates best fit line for most points and the green line indicates 
straight line connecting dots, from which the diffusion coefficient, or slope, was 
calculated. The black line indicates a general trend line. 
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Table A-4. Graph of chloride readings versus the square root of time for Vat #27 60 
minutes. The red line indicates best fit line for most points and the green line indicates 
straight line connecting dots, from which the diffusion coefficient, or slope, was 
calculated. The black line indicates a general trend line. 
 
 
 
  
 204 
 
Table A-5. Graph of chloride readings versus the square root of time for Vat #23 6 
hours. The red line indicates best fit line for most points and the green line indicates 
straight line connecting dots, from which the diffusion coefficient, or slope, was 
calculated. The black line indicates a general trend line. 
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Table A-6. Graph of chloride readings versus the square root of time for Vat #28 24 
hours. The red line indicates best fit line for most points and the green line indicates 
straight line connecting dots, from which the diffusion coefficient, or slope, was 
calculated. The black line indicates a general trend line. 
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Table A-7. List of Artifacts Cataloged in Section 4. 
 
Artifact Group (by 
section number) 
Artifact (Short description and 
number) 
Material 
Type 
Page 
4.3 Kitchen artifact 
group 
   
4.3.1 4.3.1 Ceramics    
 Porcelain body sherd (118-017) C 89 
 Porcelain rim sherd (134-046) C 89 
 Ironware rim sherd (120-280) C 90 
 Whiteware body sherds (135-009) C 91 
 Whiteware rim sherd (140-039.1) C 91 
 Whiteware rim sherd (103-039.1) C 92 
 Whiteware rim sherd (132-001.7) C 93 
 Whiteware rim sherd with blue annular 
lines (139-011) 
C 93 
 Small stoneware body sherd (140-039.2) C 94 
 Stoneware body sherd (124-033) C 95 
 Salt-glazed stoneware body and base 
sherd (109-123) 
C 95 
 Small salt-glazed stoneware rim sherd 
from lid (132-001.7) 
C 96 
4.3.2 4.3.2 Glass    
 Dark green glass bottle fragment (121-
025) 
G 98 
 Very dark green bottle base fragment 
(132-396) 
G 99 
 Dark green bottle base fragment (111-
066.1) 
G 99 
 Bluish green soda or mineral water 
bottle (140-013) 
G 100 
 Bluish green bottle neck fragment (134-
047.1) 
G 102 
4.3.3 4.3.3 Tableware    
 Condiment shaker top (109-010.1) Ag 104 
4.4 Architecture 
(Small ship 
construction) group 
   
4.4.1 4.4.1 Brick     
 Large yellow brick fragment (122-003) A 112 
 Small brick fragment (135-011) A 113 
 Fine grained light color brick (136-004) A 114 
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Table A-7. Continued.  
 
Artifact Group (by 
section number) 
Artifact (Short description and 
number) 
Material 
Type 
Page 
 Fine grained small brick fragment (152-
003) 
A 115 
 Small mortar fragment (130-003) A 115 
    
4.4.2 4.4.2 Sash weights     
 Lower portion of sash weight (119-171) Fe 116 
 Number “8” sash weight (120-074) Fe 117 
 Number “10” sash weight (118-177) Fe 118 
 Number “10” sash weight (122-004) Fe 119 
5 4.4.3 Sheaves    
 Sheave (120-308) Cu/Fe 119 
 Sheave (128-016) Cu/Fe 120 
6 4.4.4 Chain    
 9 large complete chain links (102-009) Fe 121 
 8 large complete chain links (103-067) Fe 122 
 Medium chain links (114-004) Fe 122 
 Medium chain links (134-086) Fe 123 
 Small chain links (110-056) Fe 124 
7 4.4.5 Cupboard 
buttons  
   
 Small cupboard button (120-284) Cu 125 
 Large cupboard button (132-128) Cu 126 
 Cupboard button with screw (121-
078.1) 
Cu 127 
8 4.4.6 Rope     
 Rope fragment (128-043) O 129 
4.5 Clothing group    
9 4.5.1 Buckles    
 Snake belt buckle loop (135-003) Cu 130 
 Snake belt buckle (111-064) Cu 131 
 “US” stamped belt plate (108-103) Pb 132 
 “US” stamped belt plate (106-032) Pb 133 
 “US” stamped belt plate (123-042) Pb 133 
 “US” stamped belt plate (124-041) Pb 134 
 “US” stamped cartridge box plate (107-
024) 
Pb 135 
 “US” stamped cartridge box plate (121-
142) 
Pb 136 
 208 
 
Table A-7. Continued.  
Artifact Group (by 
section number) 
Artifact (Short description and 
number) 
Material 
Type 
Page 
 “US” stamped cartridge box plates (122-
061) 
Pb 136 
 “US” stamped cartridge box plate (109-
089) 
Pb 137 
 Cupreous belt plate frame (123-041) Cu 138 
10 4.5.2 Textile    
 Fabric impression on cupreous 
amorphous fragment (133-181) 
O 138 
 Fabric impression in concretion (133-
123) 
O 139 
 Small fabric impression in concretion 
(103-039) 
O 140 
11 4.5.3 Other Clothing 
Related Items 
   
 Clasp (133-111) Cu 140 
 Pack hook (120-296) Cu 141 
 Leather pack button (111-065) Cu 142 
 Leather pack button (131-096) Cu 143 
 Strap clasp (110-122) Cu 143 
4.6 Personal items 
group 
   
 Key (120-295) Cu 144 
 Bayonet scabbard clip (108-067) Cu 145 
 Oil lamp piece (110-054.1) Cu 145 
4.7 Activities group    
12 4.7.1 Tools    
 Iron hammer head (132-385) Fe 146 
 Wood fragments from hammer handle 
(132-385A) 
O 147 
 Bullet mold (139-005; 119-221) Cu 148 
 Tool or handle-cross shaped (118-023) Cu 150 
 Unidentified tool (133-130) Cu 152 
4.7.1.1 Files    
 Flat file (119-151) Fe 152 
 Half-round file (119-054) Fe 154 
13 4.7.2 Other    
 Cupreous latch (108-093) Cu 155 
 Cupreous latch (128-063) Cu 156 
 Unidentified threaded loop (121-137) Cu 157 
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Table A-7. Continued.  
Artifact Group (by 
section number) 
Artifact (Short description and 
number) 
Material 
Type 
Page 
14  Counterpoise weight (121-084) Fe/Pb 157 
 Hasp (134-035) Cu 159 
 Decorative rope handle plate (125-037) Cu 159 
4.8 Unidentified 
group 
   
 Unidentified finial (132-001.02) Cu 160 
 Unidentified cupreous object (125-062; 
120-271; 128-064) 
Cu 161 
 Unidentified strap (131-078) Cu 163 
 Unidentified cast iron object (40) Fe 163 
 
Key: 
A: Architectural 
Ag: Silver 
C: Ceramic 
Cu: Cupreous 
Fe : Iron 
G: Glass 
O: Organic 
Pb: Lead 
 
